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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the so called post-Washington consensus (PWC) and the role of the 
World Bank in its promotion and implementation. It argues that the PWC represents the 
promotion of a new form of neoliberalism – socio-institutional neoliberalism (SIN) – 
which stems from the conflict and contradiction associated with the Washington 
consensus based around earlier neoliberal prescriptions such as fiscal discipline, trade 
liberalisation and privatisation. While seeking the continued extension of liberal 
markets attempted by proponents of the Washington consensus, SIN rigorously 
specifies the institutional elements that neoliberals now see markets requiring. It 
stipulates a particular state form and even allocates roles to specific social institutions. 
Vitally, SIN is not just about policy content. Indeed, it is an attempt to shape the very 
environment through which policy can be contested. To this end, SIN includes 
important delivery devices and political technologies to aid with embedding reform, in 
an attempt to resolve one of the major problems for the Washington consensus: 
insufficient progress in reform implementation. 
  SIN is highly political in terms of its ideological commitments, the policy 
matrices that these commitments generate and the processes by which the 
implementation of reform is attempted. As a political programme, SIN seeks nothing 
less than the embedding of a form of governance that attempts to contain the inevitable 
clashes associated with the extension of market relations. While this attempt at 
extending market relations inextricably links the Washington consensus with the PWC, 
it is the substantive efforts and new methods associated with the latter to deliver and 
deeply embed policy which make it distinct. 
 Yet SIN continues to face differing degrees of acceptance and resistance in the 
underdeveloped world. Here it is essential to consider internal Bank dynamics, relations 
between the Bank and member countries, and the various alliances and conflicts within 
these countries and their involvement in either promoting or resisting SIN reform. A 
feature of this thesis is the analytical framework that allows systematic consideration of 
these diverse political dynamics. Crucially, the reality of such political dynamics means 
that there is often a significant gap between what the World Bank promotes and what 
occurs on the ground. 
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Introduction 
On January the 3
rd, 2005, the World Bank’s ninth president, James Wolfensohn, notified 
the organisation’s Board of Executive Directors that he would not be seeking to renew 
his incumbency for a third term.
1 Wolfensohn’s ten years as president of the world’s 
most significant development organisation had centred around creating a different 
Bank; one where poverty reduction was at the centre of a new agenda that was to be 
more comprehensive, country driven and where participation, partnership, ownership 
and knowledge were to be allocated substantive roles. It also saw an increased interest 
by the Bank in the role of civil society and the state in development. This marked a shift 
towards an approach to development that exhibited a very strong focus upon the 
importance of institutions and their relationship to market establishment and operation. 
The new direction also entailed the Bank’s own decentralisation, with a stronger focus 
upon the role of the organisation’s country offices. 
Importantly, significant conflict – both internal and external to the organisation 
– accompanied the Bank’s new approach to the promotion of market-led development. 
Conflict also preceded Wolfensohn’s tenure. Indeed, the approach he championed 
emerged in response to conflicts associated with the previously dominant form of 
orthodox market-led development, most famously described by John Williamson as the 
‘Washington consensus’.
2 When Wolfensohn took over the Bank’s reins in 1995, 
problems with the early interventions of neoliberalism in Africa, the former Soviet 
Union, Latin America and elsewhere were exacting a toll on the legitimacy of both 
neoliberalism and the Bank, as one of its leading proponents. In a book edited for the 
Bank on the Wolfensohn era, Ruth Kagia notes that: 
  
In 1995 the World Bank was an institution under siege. NGOs criticized its 
environmental and structural adjustment policies, clients expressed 
dissatisfaction with its business approach, and the major shareholders showed 
frustration at its perceived inefficiency. Its 50-year celebrations in 1994 
                                                 
1 World Bank, ‘James Wolfensohn’s Presidency’, available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTOFFICEPR
ESIDENT/EXTPASTPRESIDENTS/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20309401~menuPK:2
32053~pagePK:139877~piPK:199692~theSitePK:227585,00.html , accessed January 21, 2005. 
2 John Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’ in John Williamson (ed.), Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much has Happened?, (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1990). INTRODUCTION 
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galvanized protest marches, crystallizing in the “50 years is enough” 
movement.
3 
 
While the Bank and the neoliberal tenets to which it is wed weathered the storm, neither 
have escaped unchanged. Market-led development is an evolving project. It has had to 
adapt to problems in practice – a significant issue for neoliberals being that of reform 
implementation. It also had to deal with what to its critics were massive contradictions 
and theoretical lacunae. Here, problems of governance, issues of reform sequencing and 
the influence of coalitions of rent seekers became common defences of neoliberal 
proponents in explaining policy failure. New thinking in liberal economic theory, 
especially that associated with new institutional economics (NIE), increasingly exerted 
an influence. It especially proved useful in multilateral development circles, 
underpinning what has now become a complex but rather cohesive campaign to shore 
up the legitimacy of market-led development.  
Crucially, conflict centred around ideological battles and problems in practice 
associated with the Washington consensus has produced a new and dominant form of 
neoliberalism – what is referred to in this thesis as ‘socio-institutional neoliberalism’ 
(SIN). The promotion of SIN as an approach to poverty reduction and development is 
predominantly associated with the World Bank. In essence, the idea of SIN is to further 
the project of market-extension into social life. This has potentially massive political 
ramifications for the state and constituencies within underdeveloped countries where 
SIN’s proponents seek pervasive influence. If market-led development is an evolving 
political project, SIN underlines that the politics of that project has entered a 
qualitatively new phase. This critical point is undervalued in contemporary analyses 
centred around ‘the post-Washington consensus’. Importantly in this regard, critical 
assessments give insufficient attention to the fact that what is often described vaguely as 
the post-Washington consensus is essentially a new form of market-led development 
that involves new political strategies to deliver both new and old neoliberal content. In 
short, the purpose of SIN is to extend the discipline of the market and build the 
institutions the market is now seen as requiring, and this agenda is assisted by new 
delivery devices and forms of political technology. Such delivery devices can include 
                                                 
3 Ruth Kagia, ‘Overview’, in Ruth Kagia (ed), Balancing the Development Agenda. The Transformation 
of the World Bank Under James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005 (Washington, The World Bank: 2005), 2. 
See also Ben Fine, ‘Neither the Washington Consensus or the post-Washington consensus’, in Ben 
Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus (eds) Development Policy in the Twenty-first Century – 
Beyond the post-Washington Consensus (London and New York, Routledge: 2003), 1-2. INTRODUCTION 
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projects and programs. The political technologies involved with these delivery devices 
often relate to consultation processes, and other methods associated with ‘partnership’ 
and ‘participation’. Therefore, SIN is political not just by virtue of its policy content but 
also the mechanisms and methods by which its policies are delivered. These devices 
and technologies form an important part of what is nothing less than a reframed form of 
conditionality.  
Consequently, this thesis asks which structures and ideologies are promoted 
through SIN and by what means do its proponents attempt to promote them? However, 
a no less important question the thesis asks is what political dynamics SIN generates 
and encounters? Here, one of the thesis’ key tasks is to identify and analyse both the 
forms of support and opposition that are associated with SIN (as it is promoted by the 
Bank) and explain their impact and roles within the project. Socio-institutional 
neoliberals seek nothing less than to shape a new institutional framework through which 
market reform policies are implemented and justified. Yet, importantly, these 
frameworks themselves are the subject of political contestation and the thesis seeks to 
gain an understanding of which groups support and resist such a project and why.  
The thesis makes clear that SIN is an ideologically consistent array of policies 
that has its basis within the methodological individualism of classical economics, where 
a central emphasis is placed upon the choices of individuals. This influence is coupled 
with a fairly recent extension to the tenets of classical economics – the insights of NIE. 
NIE’s influence is reflected in SIN’s concentration on social and political institutions 
(especially those of the state) and their relationship to market efficiency. Indeed, NIE 
has led to various new areas of analysis for market-led development. Most notable in 
this regard, is the attention now given to social and human capital, and the importance 
more generally of ‘good governance’ – that is, the existence of a particular market-
compatible institutional framework.  
Crucially, these ideas have generated new projects, programs and approaches for 
market-led development organisations like the Bank. For example, drawing upon the 
influence of NIE – where transaction costs and the imperfect allocation of information 
generate impediments to market activity – projects and programs now attempt to ‘build’ 
and ‘reshape’ institutions to reduce the cost for market actors. This is in addition to, and 
seen as complimentary with, the orthodox macroeconomic fundamentals and 
development infrastructure focus of organisations like the Bank. Indeed, increasingly INTRODUCTION 
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these can actually be fused, as the case study in chapter eight on the Kecamatan 
Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia demonstrates. 
However, critically evaluating SIN is not just about identifying its theoretical 
underpinnings and the obvious elements through which NIE finds expression. A 
concern with implementation of programs through novel and innovative delivery 
devices and political technologies, which often have links to NIE, forms the essential 
political core of SIN. In this thesis, the term ‘delivery devices’ refers to mechanisms 
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are intended to carve out 
a particular policy terrain, or the Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), which are also 
means by which to shape the policy environment, as well as individual projects. 
‘Political technologies' are those methods used by the Bank to attempt to assist with the 
further extension of the liberal market and its attendant values into social life. Such 
technologies are particularly evident in the form of consultation processes and other 
activities related to ‘partnership’ and ‘participation’ around the Bank’s reform agenda, 
which attempt to harness support for the project and provide a veneer of inclusiveness. 
These are designed to harness those coalitions of interests amenable to the project – 
which perhaps could be understood in SIN parlance as a form of social capital. 
Interestingly, the very design of these technologies circumscribes the input of those 
inimical to SIN. Where the Bank pushes such processes it doesn’t have to physically 
exclude opposition from participating in consultation processes and the like. Indeed, 
opposition groups often choose to exclude themselves for a myriad of concerns (a point 
discussed in chapter seven) – many of which speak volumes about the political design 
of the Bank’s methods. Vitally, SIN’s delivery devices and political technologies work 
together, with PRSPs and CASs now often including consultation processes and other 
activities associated with partnership and participation.  
What is essential here is that terms like participation and partnership are more 
than just spurious lingo or clever spin. They are attached to concrete processes that seek 
the very inclusion of certain elements germane to the extension of the broader political 
project, while presenting necessary (from the perspective of facilitating the dominance 
of the paradigm) impediments that curtail the representation of particular interests. They 
also exhibit the added bonus of presenting an image of legitimate concern for the 
opinions of interest groups. Again, these political technologies attempt to shape the very 
terrain around which policy debates occur and reform programs are promoted and 
contested. In essence, they serve a highly political function, entailing both an agenda INTRODUCTION 
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(and norm) setting role, and promoting processes which provide a veneer of legitimacy 
for market extension projects.  
The prominence of delivery devices and political technologies in SIN are 
important aspects of its depoliticising character. Many of the programs and policies of 
SIN are couched in technical terms that obfuscate class relations and conflict. This 
remains very much a political strategy of depoliticisation because many of the programs 
and policies that are part and parcel of SIN appeal or threaten different interests, with 
social class being a significant factor in contrasting responses to SIN. This is 
particularly evident in the assistance and resistance that is channelled towards SIN 
reforms and policy discussions. 
For example, in chapter six a detailed analysis of the World Bank’s role in the 
privatisation of Manila’s water services illustrates the contentious nature of the 
reinvention of privatisation (in this case a part-privatisation with a NIE focus upon 
institutional regulation) and its use within the commodification of the water sector. Here 
SIN has been pivotal to the constitution of a market in water services and delivery. But 
the constitution of this market, far from being apolitical, reflects an underlying set of 
class interests that seek to benefit from these programs. In the push to privatise Manila’s 
water services, international and domestic capital variously worked in conflict and 
combination, battling it out in an attempt to secure profit making opportunities. These 
interests were supported by the Philippine government’s free market predisposition, the 
World Bank’s advice and investment and the Western governments where many of the 
international bidders for the privatisation came from. But as the analysis of the chapter 
makes clear, such interests are often in opposition to that of the general public in the 
underdeveloped world – who in the majority are poor. Furthermore, the Manila case 
demonstrates the difficulties (after implementing SIN reform) associated with 
regulating powerful interests who can eschew their obligations and, in the case of the 
Philippines, demand concessions outside those allowed by contracts. This leaves the 
state with the prospect of picking up the bundle and bailing out commercial entities.  
Such developments expose the shortcomings of the apolitical assumptions of 
NIE that underpin SIN. Questions about the nature of transaction costs and their 
implications for market operation give way to questions about efficiency of what and 
for whom – in essence, questions about politics and especially socio-economic politics. 
In this way, politics matters both for the Bank’s approach to implementation and its INTRODUCTION 
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outcomes for the Filipino public whose access to fundamental public services is now 
constrained by the unequal outcomes of the commodification of a public utility: water.  
The questions of efficiency of what and for whom are pertinent also to the 
political use of particular technologies to assist with the implementation of SIN. For 
example, participation and partnership (the thematic bases for chapter seven and an 
analysis of the Philippines Country Assistance Strategy) are, of course, now ubiquitous 
words in World Bank material – not to mention agencies that take much of their agenda 
from the organisation. In traditional parlance, both words at least imply the 
representation of interests and the inevitability of mutual compromise – perhaps for one 
particular party more than another. But participation as used by the World Bank tends to 
entail a circumscription of representation, presenting no evidence of compromise on the 
part of the organisation over the content of what is to be participated in or partnered. 
Vitally, participation and partnership suggest a political strategy of depoliticisation that 
attempts to marginalise representative politics.  
In this respect, participation and partnership processes are important elements in 
an array of methods and devices which contribute to the approach being essentially anti-
pluralist. These processes are a fundamental part of an attempt to harness the support of 
those congenial with SIN objectives, presenting its proponents with an opportunity both 
to assess implementing conditions for its policy content and, simultaneously, to set a 
highly defined agenda. The rigidity of both the processes and the agenda associated 
with SIN, oriented as they are to the task of implementation, can actually alienate and 
dissuade the participation of those who are critical of it. This raises serious questions 
about the Bank’s agenda, its implementation and the importance of the participatory 
involvement of people broadly affected by poverty and the Bank’s work (given its 
institutional mandate in relation to poverty reduction). 
Similar issues of depoliticisation are raised when we examine the more 
innovative and even radical (by neoliberal standards) delivery programs for poverty 
reduction that have appeared within the SIN framework. One such case, the Kecamatan 
Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia, forms the basis for the case study in chapter 
eight. While the KDP has been a successful program in terms of implementation of 
reforms and the construction of infrastructure it remains a concern that such debt-based 
schemes, which attempt to facilitate liberal market-led development in desperate 
economies, have not necessarily proven themselves as ‘silver bullets’ for poverty. 
Indeed, given the lack of emphasis in reversing larger structural impediments to INTRODUCTION 
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development, such programs may just be another element, to quote Paul Cammack, in 
promoting ‘the proletarianisation of the world’s poor’.
4 In this way, the KDP is an 
example of how SIN targets problems at certain levels (for instance local governance) 
and attempts to extend market discipline (along with transparency and accountability) 
while depoliticising what could be seen as the more central issues associated with class 
and the contradictions of global capitalism more generally.    
The thesis presents an analytical framework that allows us to both explain and 
critically evaluate SIN as well as to determine who supports it, who resists it and why. 
Far from being apolitical, SIN is an intensely political project. Crucially, the thesis 
extends beyond contemporary analyses of the PWC to emphasise a new form of 
neoliberalism that includes its own delivery devices and political technology. These are 
intended to curtail political impediments to reform, harness supporting coalitions and 
carve out a particular political space to aid with delivery of a particular institutional 
framework. Seen from this perspective the PWC is not just a new set of polices to be 
advocated (as it is conceived by former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz) 
nor ‘old wine in new bottles’ (a phrase which sums up many of the critical takes on the 
PWC). The framework outlined in the thesis analyses SIN as a set of prescriptions, 
delivery devices and political technologies that are meant to extend market discipline 
further upon the underdeveloped world. What is important here is that SIN’s political 
technologies are meant to depoliticise issues of class and inequality precisely to further 
policies that have real impacts upon class relations and material distribution. 
 
Methodology 
 
The investigation of SIN presented in this thesis employs a qualitative methodology 
which draws upon both primary and secondary research materials.
5 The primary 
research material was derived from interviews conducted in Indonesia, the Philippines 
and, to a lesser extent, Thailand, during two separate field trips to each of the countries, 
over approximately nine weeks in 2005. Interviews in each of the three countries were 
conducted with strategically selected World Bank staff, past and present government 
personnel (national and local), consultants, people from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), political parties, trade unions, academia and villagers. The 
                                                 
4 Paul Cammack, ‘What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduction, and Why it Matters’, New 
Political Economy, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 2004), 190. 
5 The secondary research material was largely drawn from a wide array of academic, organisational and 
media sources. INTRODUCTION 
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fieldwork undertaken was strategically focused largely within the capitals of each 
country. This said, visits to several villages in West Java (Indonesia), a province north 
of Bangkok (Thailand) and to Cebu (in the Philippines) were also undertaken to source 
information relevant to the individual programs and projects analysed in each particular 
setting.  
The case study chapters (chapters six, seven and eight) are thematically based, 
with each one drawing upon a particular theme (or themes) within SIN. Certain 
projects, programs and operations were chosen for these chapters for their potential to 
highlight each theme ‘in action’. The process of selecting particular activities of the 
Bank to study was by no means an easy one. Indeed, given the time-based nature of 
projects, the departure of staff and the limits of coordinating such factors within a 
manageable research project, decisions had to be made fairly early on about which 
elements within the Bank’s work would serve to be points of analysis in the three final 
case study chapters. In total, the three core case studies within the thesis intentionally 
focus upon seemingly different examples of the Bank’s work: a water privatisation 
project, a CAS and a social development project.
6 Here, the point of selecting a diverse 
range of elements to focus upon was to demonstrate the utility of a framework, based 
around SIN, capable of identifying and explaining points of intersection and divergence 
in both the institutional features of SIN reforms and the varying approaches to delivery 
associated with them.  
Subsequently, the privatisation of Manila’s water supply was chosen as a case 
study (chapter six) because it presented an example of ‘knowledge dissemination’ – that 
is a new approach to delivering fairly old reform content (privatisation). However, the 
reform content itself is also relevant to an examination of SIN, demonstrating some of 
the shifts that have occurred within the Bank’s work, especially the strong emphasis 
upon public-private partnerships and the NIE-underpinned concerns associated with 
institutional regulation. Likewise, in chapter seven, the 2006-08 CAS for the Philippines 
was selected to be the basis for an analysis of the Bank’s use and integration of 
participation and partnership in its country programs. Indeed, the CAS presents an 
excellent opportunity to look at participation and partnership in two distinct, yet related, 
ways. Firstly, given that consultation processes were used by the Bank in developing 
                                                 
6 Other projects, such as the Country Development Partnerships (CDPs) in Thailand, feed into the 
analysis in a more minor way. The significant inclusion of the CDPs as a case study in the thesis was 
not implemented due to the decision to make each of the thematic-based studies focused on one 
individual project or program. This said, the material from Thailand compliments the overall argument 
of the thesis well and will hopefully appear in a published version of the manuscript. INTRODUCTION 
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the CAS, it is possible to look at the relationship between participation and the 
development of a blueprint for a Bank country program. Secondly, looking at the 
resulting program itself, we can see the manner in which participation and partnership 
actually are allocated critical roles in implementing the CAS. Finally, the basis of the 
case study for the last chapter (the KDP) was chosen because it presented an example of 
SIN’s empowerment and institutional foci en masse, that had received considerable 
attention as a positive and different approach to development for the Bank. Importantly, 
taken together, the three ostensibly divergent elements within the Bank’s work present 
excellent cases in which to understand SIN’s form as it exists on the ground, allowing a 
demonstration of the utility of the framework developed in the thesis.  
Interviewing a range of people within the Bank’s country offices was obviously 
crucial for the case studies, especially in chapters seven and eight, where primary 
source material was critical to their respective analyses.
7 Subsequently, Bank staff 
closely aligned with particular projects and programs were particularly important 
interviewees. The information sought in interviews with Bank staff related to 
understanding the motivations behind different projects and programs, in addition to the 
politics, both within and external to the Bank, associated with their implementation and 
maintenance. Here, questions about the relationships between sectors within the Bank 
and between the Bank and government or relevant groups and sections within society 
were of particular interest.  
Many prospective interviewees were identified and contacted (both inside and 
outside of the Bank) leading up to and throughout the course of the fieldwork.
8 Outside 
of the Bank interviews were focused predominantly upon people form NGOs, 
journalists, unions, members of academia and others that were interested (for one reason 
or another) or involved in the Bank’s work. Speaking to people outside (albeit, to 
greatly varying degrees) of the Bank was seen as critical to the various case studies for 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, interviewing people within such organisations is often not the norm for those who write 
about them in academia. Several Bank staff reiterated their considerable concern that while they were 
sympathetic with criticism leveled at the Bank from academia they felt that many academics had no 
idea (or at least displayed little evidence) of a developed understanding for the conditions that Bank 
staffers faced, within the organisation and outside of it.  
8 This said, some of the people met with were recommended by interviewees and others along the way.  
Throughout my two field trips I spoke to many people as part of my research, although only a 
relatively small amount of these conversations are directly referenced in the final text (predominantly 
in chapters seven and eight). To place a numerical figure on the numbers of people interviewed and met 
with that were relevant to the study is difficult. However, reflecting upon my notes I would estimate 
that a core of just over thirty interviews and meetings (not including meetings with villagers, where 
larger amounts of people were met with in one setting) stand out as important in one way or another to 
the fieldwork-centred case studies of chapters seven and eight and the thesis overall.   
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different reasons. For example, the analysis in chapter seven required gaining an 
understanding (from both Bank and non-Bank elements) of the nature of participation 
and partnership involved in the Bank’s work. Here, I was particularly interested in 
understanding why some groups chose to work with the Bank while others saw it as 
highly problematic. Furthermore, where groups did work or interact with the Bank, I 
was interested in understanding the degree of participation and partnership that was 
involved in the relationship, in addition to the nature of the relationship more generally. 
Similarly, in chapter eight, the perspectives of many of the aforementioned people were 
critical given the role that they have played in relation to implementing KDP. Outside 
voices that were not directly involved with implementing the project, but in some 
instances were affected by it, also yielded important information, both on the project 
and on the Bank’s work more generally.  
Overall, the interviews were specifically aimed at unpacking the historical and 
political dimensions of specific Bank operations on the ground and shedding light upon 
the political alliances and conflicts integral to SIN reform and its prospects. Central to 
this was attaining an understanding of the actual processes associated with the different 
elements of the Bank’s work, from the design stage right through to implementation, 
that could explain its seemingly multifaceted complexion and, in turn, extend our 
understanding of what the PWC actually is. Further to this, the interviews were intended 
to yield important insights from people outside the Bank, who were either involved in 
the implementation of or resistance to SIN (or who were potentially impacted by it 
positively or negatively), to better illustrate the precise political nature of the Bank’s 
work.  
  
 
 
Chapter 1 
Contending Understandings of the New Development Agenda 
 
In January 1998, Joseph Stiglitz (then Chief Economist of the World Bank) presented a 
picture at the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) Annual 
Lecture, of what, in his words, ‘…is sometimes called the post-Washington 
consensus.’
9 Entitled ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-
Washington Consensus’, much of the content promoted in the lecture was to be 
associated with a now-dominant project that would draw Stiglitz, in particular, plenty of 
criticism – especially from the more orthodox proponents of neoliberalism. For Stiglitz, 
the post-Washington consensus was a new collection of ideas derived from a set of 
assumptions associated with new institutional economics (NIE) – one branch of which 
he had played an important role in developing. In March of 1998, at the Tenth 
Anniversary of the MITI Research Institute in Tokyo, he presented a paper: ‘Redefining 
the State – What should it do? How should it do it? And how should these decisions be 
made?’
10 Later the same year, he followed up with another lecture – the prestigious 
Prebisch Lecture in Geneva – entitled ‘Towards a New Paradigm for Development: 
Strategies, Policies and Processes’.
11 Both of these continued and expanded upon the 
themes articulated in his WIDER lecture. 
With these seminal contributions, Stiglitz in effect embarked on a concerted 
campaign to add impetus to the emerging push to substantively reshape the market-led 
development agenda.
12 This was seemingly juxtaposed by Stiglitz against the preference 
                                                 
9 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington 
Consensus’, the 1998 World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki (January 1998), 
in Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank: The Rebel Within, (London: Anthem, 
2001), 17-56.  
10 Emphasis in the original. Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Redefining the State – What Should it Do? How should it do 
it? And how should these decisions be made?’, paper presented at the Tenth Anniversary of MITI 
Research Institute, Tokyo (March 1998), in Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank: 
The Rebel Within, (London: Anthem, 2001), 94-126. 
11 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and Processes’, the 
1998 Prebisch Lecture at United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva (October 
1998) in Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank: The Rebel Within (London: 
Anthem, 2001), 57-93. 
12 Ha-Joon Chang calls Stiglitz’s WIDER lecture an ‘opening salvo in his campaign against the 
Washington Consensus’. ‘Ha-Joon Chang, ‘Commentary’, in Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Joseph Stiglitz and 
the World Bank: The Rebel Within (London: Anthem, 2001), 5. See also Ben Fine, ‘Neither the 
Washington Consensus nor the post-Washington Consensus’, in Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and 
Jonathan Pincus (eds), Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century – Beyond the post-Washington 
Consensus (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 2. CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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for policies such as privatisation, liberalised trade, a competitive exchange rate and 
fiscal discipline of the so-called Washington consensus – a term coined by the 
economist John Williamson to describe a discernible consensus emanating from 
Washington around a particular policy set advocated for Latin America in the 1980s.
13  
Although Stiglitz was still heavily-wedded to neoliberalism, there were, 
however, important differences between the agenda that he was promoting and the 
Washington consensus. Furthermore, a distinction needs to be made between what he 
was advocating and what has panned out. In part this is because political reality has 
meant that the realisation of his agenda has not been as true to his vision as he might 
have hoped, not to mention the fact (as we will see) that many of the important elements 
associated with the actual-existing post-Washington consensus (PWC) were actually 
pushed from within the World Bank prior to his arrival at the organisation. 
Nevertheless, he is inextricably associated with the development and consolidation of 
the new development agenda. His vociferousness while Chief Economist at the Bank, 
his criticism of the Bank’s sister organisation – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
– and  his now infamous departure from the Bank, garnered him substantive attention. 
Undoubtedly, orthodox neoliberals like former World Bank Chief Economist and US 
Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, were less enamoured with some of Stiglitz’s 
proposals and ideas and saw him as a major thorn in the side.
14 Likewise, unorthodox 
critics of the PWC honed in on Stiglitz as the most important figure associated with 
reshaping the development agenda. Their arguments were commonly technocratic-left 
appraisals of Stiglitz’s ideas and the prescriptions these entailed, often asserting that he 
was doing little more than reselling and/or adding on to the Washington consensus – 
from which he seemed to be at pains to distance himself. Meanwhile, the perception of 
Stiglitz as some sort of radical led to him gaining some interesting support from 
neoliberal critics who saw him as someone attacking neoliberalism from the inside, 
especially after the Asian crisis.
15  
However, in many ways, Stiglitz’s proximity to the new development agenda 
(understood here as synonymous with the PWC) has complicated analyses of it – 
                                                 
13 John Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in John Williamson (ed.) Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1990), 7. The Washington consensus is explained in much greater detail in chapter two.  
14 This is detailed in the following chapter.  
15 Ha-Joon Chang’s title for his collection of some of Stiglitz’s important speeches Joseph Stiglitz and the 
World Bank: the Rebel Within (cited above), is one obvious example of Stiglitz being portrayed as a 
radical inside the halls of orthodoxy.  CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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especially critical ones.
16 Indeed, much of the critical and non-critical coverage 
accorded to the PWC often suggests that it is little more than Stiglitz and his ideas. 
Focusing upon Stiglitz and conflating his ideas with the PWC has been to the detriment 
of analyses of the actually-existing PWC, or more specifically, the PWC in practice. 
Importantly, the PWC in practice stems from a variety of theoretical and politico-
historical lineages (which includes, but is not limited to, the work and influence of 
Stiglitz). Notably, many of the new development agenda’s key elements, such as 
emphases upon partnership, participation and a stronger role for the state, predate 
Stiglitz’s influence at the Bank significantly (as the next chapter makes clear). 
Crucially, however, the conception of the PWC which Stiglitz has promoted is a 
broad blueprint to be promoted rather than an analytical conceptualisation or framework 
that can assist us in understanding the new development agenda as it actually exists. 
This may seem an obvious point. However, looking at much of the critical literature, the 
two are often confused. Indeed, it seems as though it is often assumed by supporters and 
critics alike that the PWC is little more than Stiglitz’s ideas put into action (plus the 
efforts of Wolfensohn and others), and or little more than ‘old wine in new bottles’ – 
that is old content (from the Washington consensus), presented in a different way.  
The key point of this chapter, which sets up the rationale for the thesis, is that 
none of the current analyses of what is referred to as the PWC do justice to an 
understanding of the new development agenda actually in practice and the politics that 
are associated with this project. The inadequacy of contemporary analyses of the PWC 
generates a demand for a qualitatively different framework, which details a precise 
appreciation of exactly what processes are associated with attempting to translate the 
new development agenda’s prescriptions into reality. This entails moving beyond 
engaging with prescriptive content and looking at the politics of implementation – a 
vitally important element of the actually-existing PWC. 
Accordingly, this chapter first reviews the existing literature relating to the PWC 
to demonstrate the need for a new framework. The alternative framework presented in 
the thesis is premised upon seeing neoliberalism as a political process, and 
understanding the PWC in practice as neoliberalism in its latest and most sophisticated 
– that is complex – form. In particular, it is argued that the concept of socio-institutional 
neoliberalism (SIN), which refers to the form of neoliberalism associated with the 
                                                 
16 This thesis uses the term ‘new development agenda’ and the ‘post-Washington consensus 
interchangeably. However, the thesis sets its conception of the PWC against both present orthodox and 
critical definitions of it.  CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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PWC, is essential to such a framework. Crucially, SIN is not simply seen as the product 
of particular individuals (such as Stiglitz). Indeed, it SIN is seen as the result of conflict 
and contradiction associated with earlier forms of neoliberalism.  
Furthermore, the framework based around SIN allows us to comprehend the 
influence of NIE within the PWC’s prescriptive content and the utility of particular 
delivery devices and political technologies to assist with the embedding of 
neoliberalism. Yet, more than this, the framework also reveals that SIN is a political 
project that attempts to organise sources of support, and which encounters and 
engenders both conflict and resistance. The subsequent chapters of the thesis, and in 
particular the case studies, further demonstrate the utility of such an approach over 
existing analyses. 
 
The ‘Stiglitzian Post-Washington consensus’ and its limited analytical utility 
 
One of the core reasons for requiring a new framework through which to analyse the 
new development agenda is that within the critical literature there is a propensity to look 
at easily identifiable material such as that associated with Stiglitz and Wolfensohn, or 
the Bank’s annual World Development Report, as demonstrative of it. While much of 
this work is of significant utility and engages with substantive policy issues as well as 
specific prescriptive content associated with the PWC, what is missing is a 
comprehensive analytical framework through which the diverse elements of the new 
development agenda, in practice, can be knitted together and understood as a set of 
processes and mechanisms to embed liberal markets. 
In developing such an analytical framework, it is essential to bear in mind that 
the pronouncements of Stiglitz, and even the Bank through particular reports or on its 
website, don’t tell us a great deal about what occurs in practice and the politics of 
implementing the PWC at the country and local level. While excellent case studies on 
elements within the PWC have been done, these too need to be situated in an overall 
framework to illustrate the broader political project that they are part of and the politics 
that this project both generates and encounters.
17 A framework of analysis that makes 
up for these inadequacies can reveal much about the way in which power, at different 
levels, influences the ideas and prescriptions associated with a political project like the 
PWC. It can also reveal much about the actual impact that such ideas and projects end 
up having and why. Indeed, such a framework presents us with a better understanding 
                                                 
17 See, for example, the section below on critical analyses of the PWC and elements of it. CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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of the new development agenda and the manner in which neoliberalism has evolved 
beyond the simple prescriptions that it is most commonly associated with, both in the 
minds of its supporters and critics, to concentrate heavily upon policy implementation. 
In order to underline the analytical foundations of this framework, this section 
looks at the conceptualisation of the PWC by Stiglitz (who can be credited with the 
strongest advocacy of a particular conception of it and who, subsequently, has been 
most strongly focused upon by PWC critics). It argues that it is inadequate to equate 
‘Stiglitz’s PWC’ with the new development agenda in practice and leads critics to 
engage with the ideas and prescriptions promoted by him rather than present an analysis 
of the PWC in action. This is not to say Stiglitz hasn’t been influential upon the 
formation of the new paradigm in development practice – he has been extremely 
influential. However, what he has promoted – what he has called the ‘new development 
strategy’ and ‘new paradigm for development’
18 – has at times been confused, at least 
implicitly, with the PWC as an actually-attempted project. This diverts analyses from 
understanding the very processes and mechanisms by which the PWC actually 
manifests itself and, subsequently, prohibits an understanding of why this occurs. 
  
We should also remember, however, that while Stiglitz has been held up as a 
high-profile critic of the IMF and orthodox neoliberal economics (what he has called 
‘market fundamentalism’),
19 his academic work and indeed the ideas and prescriptions 
to which he is associated are still very much elements within neoliberalism. However, 
rather than problematically equating him with the PWC or seeing him as a radical 
outside of neoliberalism (which he is not), it is essential to see exactly which of his 
ideas have been taken up and how these relate to the form of neoliberalism described 
here as SIN. Interestingly, as we will see later, it is those elements of his work, or 
modifications thereof, that are most easily reconciled with the more orthodox 
proponents of neoliberalism that have been influential beyond his tenure at the Bank. 
  Despite Stiglitz engaging with the Washington consensus, the title of his 
WIDER lecture (‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-
Washington Consensus’), and the lecture itself signal that his conception of the PWC 
remains firmly neoliberal: focused on making ‘markets work well’. Here, Stiglitz 
emphasised the importance of elements such as regulation, competition and 
                                                 
18 Stiglitz, ‘Towards a New Paradigm  for Development’, 58. It is perhaps important that I am clear here 
that I am in no way suggesting that people are saying that Stiglitz came up with the PWC, rather, that 
what he has promoted is often confused with it. 
19 See for example, Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Victoria: Penguin , 2002), 58. CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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transparency as important areas neglected by the Washington consensus.
20  Stiglitz 
contends here and elsewhere that some of the policies of the Washington consensus 
were misguided,
21 which is no doubt part of what has led some to conclude that his 
contributions are more radical than they actually are. Yet, a careful reading of the 
lecture demonstrates a thematic affinity with the Washington consensus, especially in 
regard to its emphasis upon general market extension. Indeed, the key difference 
between ‘Stiglitz’s PWC’ and the Washington consensus is the way in which the market 
is extended (institutionally) – not market extension per se.  
Actually, for Stiglitz, many of the fundamental liberal assumptions about the 
benefit of markets are not problematic. Rather, his conception of the PWC is about how 
best to embed (extend) liberal markets and achieve liberal market efficiency.
22 Here, the 
basic prescriptive emphasis is on the regulatory requirements of capitalism and the ‘role 
of the state’. A great deal of concern is also given to ‘the process of financial reform’. 
Stiglitz’s primary push is not for deregulation and liberalisation (as per the Washington 
consensus). Rather, it relates to the building of a regulatory framework to ‘ensure an 
effective financial system’, which he sees as being critical for macroeconomic stability 
and long-term development, and fostering competition.
23 Here, government policy that 
fosters competition in certain sectors is seen by Stiglitz as critical.
24 Furthermore, this 
‘Washington consensus plus-government’ theme is evident within Stiglitz’s attention to 
privatisation, where he is concerned with the capacity to regulate private interest and 
issues relating to the ‘sequencing and the scope of privatization’ – something that has 
become a staple concern within the new development agenda (see chapter six).
25 
Finally, in Stiglitz’s PWC, the state is also is projected as a basic ‘guarantor state’ – in 
that it is expected to make up for where markets fail or under-provide.
26  
                                                 
20 Stiglitz, ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals’, 17. 
21 In this regard, Stiglitz has criticised the Washington consensus focus upon controlling inflation, and the 
preference for trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation while it ‘ignored other important 
ingredients’. He also offers that the ‘correct’ budget and current deficit size is context sensitive in 
contrast to the macroeconomic policies of the Washington consensus which were focused upon 
reducing government, the budget and the size of the current account deficit.  Stiglitz, ‘More 
Instruments and Broader Goals’, in particular, 20-23, 26. However, even here, after distancing his 
position from orthodoxy, Stiglitz comes back to closely aligning himself with orthodox neoliberals: ‘In 
my view the conclusion to be drawn from this research is that controlling high and medium-rate 
inflation should be a fundamental policy priority but that pushing low inflation even lower is not likely 
to significantly improve the functioning of markets.’ Emphasis added. Ibid, 24. 
22 Stiglitz, ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals’, 23. 
23 Ibid, 31-34. 
24 Ibid, 33-34. 
25 Ibid.  
26 For example, Stiglitz gives some attention to human capital (dealt with in chapter four of this thesis) 
and the importance of government ensuring an adequate provision of it, through education funding, CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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Crucially, for our discussion here, though, is the way in which Stiglitz’s work 
focuses not just upon the particular reforms that entail the transformation of societies 
but the manner in which transformation must take place. In his Prebisch lecture, Stiglitz 
presents a neat articulation of ‘the two critical roles of the new development strategy, 
catalysing change and transforming whole societies.’
27 This systemic theme within his 
PWC advocacy is also reiterated in his critique of previous approaches to development 
that ‘did not reach deep down into society, nor did they believe such a participatory 
approach was necessary.’
28 Vitally, this two-pronged design (entailing particular policy 
content and a concern for delivering particular reforms) is, as this thesis makes clear, a 
key feature of SIN. Importantly, it implies that society can be changed via a concerted 
process of institutional engineering, largely without political conflict. In this regard, 
Stiglitz’s PWC and the new development paradigm are very closely related indeed, 
although a very important qualification should be made. Both participation and 
ownership in Stiglitz’s PWC, play an important part in engendering society-wide 
transformation, as they do in the existing new development agenda.
29 However, 
Stiglitz’s notion of participation in relation to development differs in some important 
ways with the notion incorporated into both Bank documents and the organisation’s 
participatory processes that operate on the ground (as is made evident chapter seven). 
An example of this difference is evident in Stiglitz’s emphasis upon democracy. This 
said, even in his hands participation and ownership still serve a highly functional role: 
that is, to guarantee ‘successful transformation’ in a neoliberal sense.
 30 
There are several important points to distil with respect to Stiglitz’s conception 
of the new development agenda or the PWC. The first is that Stiglitz’s PWC is a new 
approach to market extension rather than a departure from it. While there is a tempered 
recognition within Stiglitz’s speeches of problems that liberal markets can’t easily 
rectify, this is in no way a variant of social democracy, seeking as it does to further the 
extension of the market into social life. In essence, it continues the project of 
neoliberalism and largely ignores issues of power relationships in the market. It exhibits 
a functional concern for embedding neoliberal policies more than anything else. It also 
                                                                                                                                               
given the market’s tendency to under provide it. Ibid, 42. See also, for example, Stiglitz, ‘Towards a 
New Paradigm for Development’, 70. 
27 Emphasis in the original. Stiglitz, ‘Towards a New Paradigm  for Development’, 59. 
28 Ibid, 61. 
29 Ibid, 73. 
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clearly embodies a technocratic-managerial approach to politics that has the effect of 
depoliticising the conflicts and struggles over development.  
Further to this, the inclusion of notions of participation, democracy and 
egalitarianism are contradictory elements as they exist within Stiglitz’s framework (as 
we will see in the later case study chapters), sitting uneasily alongside the anti-pluralist 
institutional straightjacket that is actually implied by his emphasis upon the ‘role of the 
state’ and its relationship to the market.
31 Indeed, as this thesis will make clear, the fact 
that several of these facets are either dropped or highly circumscribed confirms that the 
proponents of the PWC in practice are more than conscious of the need to rein in some 
of the more potentially democratic elements associated with Stiglitz’s PWC. An 
important point should be made that whatever the merits of Stiglitz’s PWC, both before 
and after him, the World Bank’s predominant concern has been the ongoing attempt to 
embed the neoliberal project. To achieve this end, it has used and modified a variety of 
elements in a highly instrumental manner. Stiglitz and his ideas are just one element, 
albeit an important and thematic one, in the new development agenda and it is 
analytically insufficient to equate him with the real-existing PWC. What we still need, 
however, is a more sophisticated framework for understanding the politics of the real-
existing PWC. 
 
Critical understandings of the new development agenda and the World Bank 
 
While the new development agenda is undoubtedly part of a much larger project, this 
thesis is specifically seen as a contribution to the growing literature on the politics of 
the PWC.
32 Current critical analyses of both the PWC and the Bank have been largely 
based around appraisals of the PWC’s identified prescriptions (often related to the 
                                                 
31 I would like to acknowledge a conversation that I had a number of years ago with an acquaintance, 
Andrew Bastow, which played a role in prompting me to consider further the contradictions within and 
between Stiglitz’s political and theoretical positions. 
By anti-pluralist, I am referring to an approach where there is systemic intolerance for 
incorporating competing alternative perspectives from political groups, especially in relation to their 
capacity to shape state institutional form.  
32 Indeed, the new development agenda, as will be elaborated in the following section, can be understood 
as an essential element in a broader project which has been described by Gill as ‘new 
constitutionalism’, what Jayasuriya has described as ‘economic constitutionalism’, what Soederberg 
has analysed in the form of the New International Financial Architecture (NIFA) and what Cammack 
has cited as the ‘completion of the world market’. See for example, Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, 
Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism, Millennium Journal of International Studies, vol. 
24, no. 3 (winter 1995). Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Economic Constitutionalism, Liberalism and the New 
Welfare Governance’, Asia Research Centre Working Paper no. 121 (June 2005), available online: 
http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp121.pdf , accessed February 9, 2007. Susanne Soederberg, The 
Politics of the New Financial Architecture (London and New York: Zed Books, 2004), and Paul 
Cammack, ‘The Governance of Global Capitalism’, Historical Materialism, vol. 11, no. 2 (2003), 39. CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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Stiglitzian conception described above), proposals for new prescriptions for the Bank, 
and the theoretical underpinnings of such prescriptive content. These tasks are very 
useful for those interested in changing ideas on development. However, what is 
essential is to present a framework that assists us in understanding what the PWC is in 
practice, what structures the Bank (as its leading proponent) seeks to promote on the 
ground and, vitally, the politics associated with this. This framework is distinctly 
lacking in the existing literature. 
  Two early, yet important edited volumes have analysed the new development 
agenda and the Bank: Reinventing the World Bank (edited by Jonathan Pincus and 
Jeffrey Winters) and Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century, Beyond the post-
Washington Consensus (edited by Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus).
33 
In the case of the Winters and Pincus volume, a critique of the current Bank (especially 
the prescriptive elements associated with it) and proposals for its reinvention are a key 
focus. While acknowledging the importance of politics, the editors are clearly interested 
in the creation of a development bank in a more ‘traditional’ light: 
 
Finally we put forward a fourth option, which has not received much attention 
in the literature – the World Bank as a development bank. This proposal runs 
directly counter to the conventional wisdom, which holds that development 
banking is passé in an era of vibrant international capital markets. We argue 
that the conventional wisdom is wrong and that the World Bank should build 
on its comparative advantage in development banking and surrender unrelated 
tasks to existing or newly created institutions better suited to carrying out these 
functions.
34 
 
The principal task of the volume is to provide a critique of the current Bank, review the 
competing pushes for change on the organisation and to put forth a proposal for its 
reinvention. In pursuing their task, they and the various contributors to the volume, 
usefully identify what they see as the key facets of the new development agenda driven 
by the Bank. However, if there is one basic criticism of the volume it is that the 
introductory chapter fails to analyse the political project that the Bank is part of and 
                                                 
33 Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds), Reinventing the World Bank, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002); Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus (eds), Development Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century – Beyond the post-Washington Consensus (London and New York: Routledge, 
2003). 
34Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters, ‘Reinventing the World Bank’, in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey 
Winters (eds), Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 9-10. CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
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focuses instead upon pressure for change of the organisation. Many of the new 
development agenda’s prescriptive elements are highlighted in the introductory chapter 
and in the subsequent chapters of contributors – especially Fine’s chapter on social 
capital, Khan’s chapter on corruption and governance and Pincus’ chapter on institution 
building.
35 However, the book’s modus operandi which is set up in the introductory 
chapter (focusing on the Bank’s reinvention and approaches to it) diverts from a more 
systematic framework that could assist us to understand what the Bank is and does in 
practice. In short, the volume fails to comprehend the politics of the new development 
agenda and, rather, sets about proposing a new agenda for the Bank. What this actually 
reveals is that the authors seem trapped within the very same technocratic-analytical 
constraints that they criticise. Indeed, a more politically centred analysis would shift 
from what ‘might be good’ (a reformed Bank) to what exists and the political reasons 
for this. This would reveal a great deal more about the current development agenda that 
the Bank is associated with (which several of the book’s sole-authored chapters actually 
lend themselves towards). 
In the preface of the book, elements of the new development agenda are linked 
to an effort on the part of the Bank, upon Wolfensohn coming to the Bank’s Presidency, 
to deal with questions hanging over the organisation’s legitimacy and sources of 
support.
36 Certain initiatives are seen as important illustrations of a response on the part 
of the organisation to some of these questions: the Strategic Compact (1996), the 
Partnership Initiative (1997), the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and 
the introduction of the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).
37  
Pincus and Winters see the change in the Bank’s work as broadening ‘the 
Bank’s role from lender and economic adviser to include aid coordinator, political 
organizer, social reformer, law enforcer, and even the voice of the world’s poor.’
38 They 
do, however, harbor grave reservations about the Bank’s ability to undertake such tasks, 
asking whether it has the operational capacity in this regard. Importantly, in their 
                                                 
35 See Ben Fine, ‘The World Bank’s Speculation on Social Capital’, in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey 
Winters (eds), Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 203-221; Mushtaq 
Khan, ‘Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World Bank Strategies and their Limitations’, 
in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds), Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 164-184; Jonathan Pincus, ‘State Simplification and Institution Building in a World 
Bank-financed Development Project’, in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds), Reinventing the 
World Bank (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 76-100. 
36 Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters, ‘Preface’, in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds), 
Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), vii.  
37 Pincus and Winters, ‘Preface’, vii-viii. These are all essential elements in understanding the PWC and 
are covered in detail in various chapters within the thesis. 
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critical-technocratic mission, they are also concerned as to whether the Bank is the right 
‘vehicle’ to take on world poverty and ask whether it has the right ‘conceptual 
framework for the analysis of poverty and broader development issues.’
39 For Pincus 
and Winters the Bank’s diversification, or ‘mission creep’, into issues such as 
participation, governance and post-conflict reconstruction is partly attributable to the 
Bank’s ‘bureaucratic inertia’ and the result of accommodating increasing demands from 
member countries.
40 In particular, the editors identify two political challenges to this 
incrementalism – evident in the 2000 ‘Meltzer Report’ (undertaken by the International 
Financial Institution Advisory Commission, which was highly critical of the Bank) and, 
conversely, ‘populist campaigners’ demanding ‘democratic accountability’ of the IMF 
and the Bank.
41 The call for ‘greater focus and accountability’, according to Pincus and 
Winters, has led to ‘piecemeal reforms’ such as the Strategic Compact, the CDF and the 
Bank as a ‘Knowledge Bank’, which they assert are merely the ‘latest series of 
internally managed efforts to redefine the Bank’s mission and restructure its 
relationships with creditor and debtor countries.’
42 From here, the editors advocate 
organisational change for the Bank denoting ‘…a thoroughgoing and externally 
controlled process of transformation’.
43 Interestingly, in this regard, they are acutely 
aware of the Bank’s connection to US power (and in particular the US Treasury) and 
the impact upon the Bank of the end of the Cold War, which they argue  – along with an 
increase in capital flows to the developing world (narrow as they are) – has created 
strong pressures for change at the Bank.
44 
Pincus and Winters identify these pressures for change as being related to ‘the 
emergence of several competing visions of a newly reinvented Bank’ – and with it, 
implicitly, some of the components of the new development agenda.
45 Four competing 
visions for the Bank are highlighted. The first, is the ‘Knowledge Bank’, which they 
strongly associate with Stiglitz. The second vision  of the Bank is the organisation as a 
‘niche’ Bank (advocated by proponents of the right to focus, selectively, upon the 
poorest countries). The third is a ‘left-populist’ view that argues that the Bank cannot be 
reformed and should be shut down. Finally, they put forward their own view – the 
                                                 
39 Pincus and Winters, ‘Preface’, ix. 
40 Pincus and Winters, ‘Reinventing the World Bank’, 1. 
41 Pincus and Winters, ‘Reinventing the World Bank’, 2. The report is dealt with in more detail in the next 
chapter.  
42 Ibid, 3. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 5. 6. 
45 Ibid. CONTENDING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
 
 
  22 
World Bank as a ‘development bank’. Such an organisation, the authors argue, would 
be focused upon its comparative advantage and would farm out those tasks to which it 
is less suited.
46 In this regard, the authors see the Bank’s comparative advantage as 
relating to the promotion of public sector capital flows, rather than the emphasis on ‘the 
institution’s pedagogical, non-financial role.’
47  
For our purposes here, the first vision of the Bank that Pincus and Winters 
outline is perhaps the most relevant to focus upon. However, the framework proposed in 
this thesis strongly argues against an analytical approach that focuses upon ‘visions’ for 
the Bank. This is a version of the Bank that relates neatly to the Stiglitzian PWC 
covered previously. Like Stiglitz’s PWC, it does contain elements that are identifiable, 
though not exclusively, with the new development agenda and is what Pincus and 
Winters, writing in 2002, saw as ‘the vision of the Bank that current management 
strongly endorses’.
48 Furthermore, they perceive this ‘vision’ as ‘a serious dilemma for 
the reinvention project’ that they advocate – something that is actually applicable to the 
real-existing PWC. In their Knowledge Bank ‘vision’, the ideas of Stiglitz and 
Wolfensohn are seen as critical.
49 From this perspective, the failure of conditionality – 
both in terms of its capacity to change borrower country policies and improve 
macroeconomic performance – gave Stiglitz the opening to undertake his agenda setting 
program; that is, the promotion of his version of the PWC.
50 Pincus and Winters state of 
Stiglitz and ‘his’ PWC that:  
 
The post-Washington consensus aggressively widens the scope for the policy 
intervention from economic issues to the political, social and cultural spheres 
while at the same time narrowing the range of acceptable leverage points 
needed for effective intervention. In terms of the three dimensions of 
reinvention, Stiglitz has provided a new conceptual framework, but has failed 
to link it up with a viable operational strategy.
51 
 
The two authors feel that ‘[t]his is a strategy for a kindler, gentler Bank, but one that 
entails sizeable risks for an institution that is already under fire for failing to live up to 
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49 Ibid, 11, 13. 
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its own internal performance standards.’
52 They also have their doubts about the 
potential for the Bank to build new institutions, improve governance and foster 
participation (critical elements within the Stiglitzian PWC) without redistribution of 
economic and political power.
53 In this final respect, their concerns are acutely 
applicable also for the PWC in practice. However, this consideration of the PWC as a 
strategy for a ‘kinder, gentler Bank’ is an exaggeration if we consider the way in which 
change at the Bank has actually unfolded. Rather than a two-man project to create a 
‘kinder, gentler Bank’, the PWC is better understood, as a strategy for a Bank that has 
had more than its fair share of implementation failures and other problems. Overall, in 
response to such realities, Bank staff have developed an approach, within the 
ideological and political confines of many of its senior staff, to rectify these failures and 
problems within the context of a project fixated upon liberal market-extension. 
Therefore, much of the PWC is related in one way or another to embedding and 
maintaining markets. In short, what is evident in the Pincus and Winters volume is a 
failure to conceptualise the PWC as an attempt, driven by a coterie of ideological and 
political interests, to institutionally embed neoliberalism.  
  Similar weaknesses are also evident in Fine et al’s Development Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century: Beyond the post-Washington Consensus. While the subject 
matter is similar to that of the Pincus and Winters volume, the intent of the authors is 
quite different. It specifically engages with the ‘emerging’ PWC, presenting a practical, 
yet limited, way of conceptualising it. Of the PWC they state: 
 
…market failure and institutions played no significant role in the Washington 
consensus. The emergent post-Washington consensus inevitably based itself on 
them. The new consensus, if such it can be called, is still an inchoate current of 
thought, possessing none of the prescriptive – and profoundly misleading – 
sharpness of the Washington consensus.
54  
 
They continue: 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
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54 Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus, ‘Preface’, in Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and 
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The difference from the previous consensus lies perhaps in the following two 
elements. The first is the advocacy of a ‘milder’ opening of the economy to the 
dictates of the market, drawing upon the analysis of market failure. Room is left for 
interventionist policy by the state, in so far as such policies deal with market 
imperfections, thus improving the performance of the market system as a whole. … 
The demarcation lines among acceptable and non-acceptable activities of the 
institutions [of the state], which are presumably necessary for development success, 
are far from clear. Inevitably, the policy prescriptions of the new consensus are 
more vague and less explicit than those of the old. … 
    The second element is an emphasis on the non-economic ‘glue’ that holds society 
together. The concept of social capital is of critical importance in this connection.
55 
… It is apparent that, in this connection too, there are no clear policy prescriptions, 
other than very long term ones.
56 
 
This is a view of the PWC that is also heavily based on focusing upon a Stiglitzian, 
policy-based conception of it.
57 The problem with this analysis of the PWC is that it 
neglects the PWC in practice, largely engaging with it in a technical sense, interrogating 
the prescriptions put forward by Stiglitz. As such, this analysis sees change as relating 
to an array of ‘vague’ policy prescriptions and an ‘inchoate current of thought’.
58 
Actually, in isolating the evolving new development agenda as it exists we can be very 
precise with regard to what prescriptions are implemented on the ground. More than 
this, we can be clear about the politics associated with these prescriptions. While some 
of this can be excused as the result of timing (Stiglitz’s impact upon the Bank was still 
sinking in when the book was first published in 2001), it is clear that many elements of 
the new development agenda that we have today were being implemented long before 
Stiglitz took to the pulpit. This is but another result of largely equating Stiglitz with the 
                                                 
55 Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus, ‘Preface’, xvii. 
56 Ibid. 
57 In particular, the chapters by Kate Bayliss and Christopher Cramer (on privatisation and the PWC) and 
the chapter by Sonali Deraniyagala (on industrial policy), as well as Fine’s introductory chapter  are 
particularly notable in this regard. See Ben Fine, ‘Neither the Washington Consensus nor the post-
Washington Consensus’, 1-27; Kate Bayliss and Christopher Cramer, ‘Privatisation and the post-
Washington Consensus: Between the Lab and the Real World’, in Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and 
Jonathan Pincus (eds), Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century – Beyond the post-Washington 
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PWC, rather than analysing the evolving nature of neoliberalism and the unfolding 
PWC as one stage in this evolution. 
In the preface, the authors make clear that ‘The nine chapters of the book tackle 
various aspects of the emerging post-Washington consensus and reflect the concern to 
build and criticise theory on the basis of strong empirical foundations.’
59 The problem 
here is that the analysis they present of the PWC looks vague, bound as it is to a 
conceptualisation that centres around prescriptions and their theoretical underpinnings 
(especially those presented by Stiglitz). In short, the authors fail to contextualise the 
Stiglitz agenda as an important element of what this thesis calls SIN. What is essential 
is that we see the manner in which particular programs and projects (as delivery 
devices) and processes of participation and partnership (as political technologies) are 
used to embed SIN policies – in short, to extend the market. Such delivery devices, that 
attempt to deliver a certain prescriptive set, and political technologies, which attempt to 
build consensus and marginalise opposition, are actually illustrative of a project to 
embed very specific prescriptions relating to market extension. Here, Stiglitz’s work 
about transforming whole societies resonates strongly. However, the actual existing 
PWC needs to be explained beyond the influence of Stiglitz. Indeed, it is this sort of 
analysis that is required to sufficiently answer a question posed and answered by Fine in 
the leading chapter of the book, which would tell us a great deal more about the new 
development agenda rather than an abstract conception of the PWC:  
 
However, it does raise the more general issue of what impact the post-Washington 
consensus, and the Washington consensus previously, has on practice. Is it merely 
rhetorical gloss on unchanging or otherwise determined policies, or does it heavily 
influence outcomes? The truth is mixed and somewhere in between these two 
stylised extremes.
60  
 
Indeed, the history of the Bank and its work throughout the eighties, nineties and more 
recently is critical, revealing the different tensions and influences (intellectual, political 
and ideological) that have been important in the existing PWC’s development.
61 Like 
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the Pincus and Winters volume discussed earlier, important evidence for continuity in 
the PWC-era is present in the case studies within the volume by Fine et al. However, the 
overall analytical conceptualisation of the PWC is deficient, contained as it largely is to 
a technocratic assessment of a set of prescriptions.  
Moving away from these critiques, the new materialist work on the Bank and the 
‘governance of global capitalism’, associated with Paul Cammack, is another important 
element in an analysis of the Bank and the PWC. And it is vastly less ambiguous about 
what the Bank (and ergo the PWC) is attempting to do. Cammack’s work develops an 
‘approach to world politics derived from Marx’s critical political economy’,
62 and it 
heavily influences this thesis. The notion that the Bank is part of a ‘project…aimed at 
the “completion of the world market”’ and that its efforts in this regard are actually 
towards promoting the proletarianisation of the world’s poor is not contested by this 
thesis – indeed it is countenanced by it.
63 However, his explanation of a ‘Wolfensohn-
Stiglitz project’ and a systematic analysis of World Development Reports, to describe 
what the Bank is and does,  perhaps doesn’t quite do his theoretically sophisticated 
approach justice because of a, thus far, lack of detailed evidence from the field.
64 
However, Cammack’s framework does allow for the future specification of such detail 
to compliment its theoretical insights and he does acknowledge the complexity of 
interests at play in the global system. To understand his framework it is worth quoting 
the following excerpt at length: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
the PWC, when really a linear analysis is more relevant. This is most definitely a legacy of an analysis 
that focuses upon Stiglitz. This influence is also present in Fine’s following remark about the PWC: ‘In 
short, even before the old consensus has been decently assessed and buried, the pretender to its throne 
is already grabbing at the crown in a palace revolution.’ Ben Fine, ‘Neither the Washington Consensus 
nor the post-Washington Consensus’, in Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus (eds), 
Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century – Beyond the post-Washington Consensus (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003), 3-4. Such an analysis is interesting given Fine’s remarks relating to 
the PWC’s intellectual underpinnings: ‘the break with mainstream neo-classical economics can only be 
exaggerated’ and ‘There is, then, a natural progression from the Washington to the post-Washington 
Consensus from an analytical point of view.’ Fine, ‘Neither the Washington Consensus nor the post-
Washington Consensus’, 6, 10. Indeed, even more surprising, is that in his analysis in the book and 
elsewhere Fine, more than most, has indeed pointed out the important elements of continuity and 
change evident in the respective intellectual foundations between the Washington consensus and the 
PWC. As such his work is drawn upon extensively throughout this thesis, though it is embedded in a 
different framework to his own. 
62 Paul Cammack, ‘The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective’, Historical 
Materialism, vol. 11 no. 2 (2003), 37. 
63 Cammack, ‘The Governance of Global Capitalism’, 37-38. Paul Cammack, ‘What the World Bank 
Means by Poverty Reduction, and Why it Matters’, New Political Economy, vol. 9 no.2 (June 2004), 
190. 
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New materialism applies the concepts derived from Marx’s ‘historical 
materialism to the circumstances of the global political economy of the twenty-
first century. It takes as its starting point the perspective that capitalism has 
developed to a point where the idea of the “completion of the world market” 
provides an appropriate focus of analysis. Its focus is on the unstable and 
conflict-ridden nature of emergent global capitalism, and on class struggle as 
reflected in the efforts of capitalists and pro-capitalist forces to secure, and of 
subordinate forces to resist, the hegemony of capital over labour upon which 
capitalist reproduction ultimately depends…It assumes that the governments of 
such states have an interest in the general conditions of capital accumulation 
and realization…; it assumes, too, that as a consequence of the uneven and 
combined character of development, varying domestic configurations and 
locations in the global economy will give rise to distinct arrays of interests and 
distinct projects from state to state in the system; and it sets this doubly 
complex picture of relations between states in the context of the fundamental 
capitalist framework in which capitalist enterprises are obliged to compete 
with each other to lower the cost of labour and increase the rate of profit. … At 
the level of global economic management, this situation is reflected in the 
emergence of global regulatory agencies (international organisations), and 
regional and inter-regional initiatives sponsored and carried forward by state 
leaders in an effort to mitigate the difficulties they face in advancing what they 
take to be their “national interest”.
65 
 
The potential within Cammack’s new materialist approach for looking at the PWC in 
practice as an important element of a project that seeks to complete a world market is 
clear. Indeed, the new development agenda is undoubtedly what Cammack sees as an 
important part of this project, evidenced by his work on the Bank and poverty 
reduction.
66 However, it is perhaps fair to observe that such an analysis has not been 
sufficiently undertaken of the new development agenda. At least part of the problem 
here may lie with the hitherto application of the approach, which is used to look at what 
Cammack calls ‘the Wolfensohn-Stiglitz project’ and World Development Reports. This 
can preclude an analysis of the Bank’s actual influence, which in reality can be 
promoted and or curtailed and circumscribed by myriad interests.
67 Importantly, such an 
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omission can also miss the important political machinations that more concretely 
support some of Cammack’s essential points. Here again, what is crucial is the need to 
understand the politics of neoliberalism in the field. The SIN framework proposed in 
this thesis pays particular attention to the politically contested nature of neoliberalism  
and thus requires that we move beyond the focus upon a ‘Wolfensohn-Stiglitz project’, 
as important as this is, to explain the new development agenda in practice.
68 This is 
essential if we are to understand where the new development agenda has come from and 
what it does. It is also important if we are to suggest where it might be heading. 
 
A new framework based around SIN 
 
Neither the analysis articulated by Pincus and Winters, nor the Stiglitzian post-
Washington consensus (as it is conceived by both Stiglitz and, critically, by Fine et al.) 
present a framework to assist us in deconstructing the existing PWC, to which the Bank 
is so strongly connected. While Cammack’s new materialist framework has significant 
potential, his analysis of a ‘Wolfensohn-Stiglitz’ project hasn’t yet revealed all that it 
perhaps can, and undervalues the role of politics associated with the PWC in practice. 
This thesis proposes a qualitatively different framework for understanding the Bank and 
the new development agenda. It argues that the new development agenda is best 
understood as a new form of neoliberalism that is a qualitative departure from the 
Washington consensus. It does matter, as the Pincus and Winters volume makes clear, 
that the Bank has had to address competing demands from its member countries (made 
evident by such processes as those associated with the Asian miracle report, dealt with 
in the next chapter), and that it suffers from ‘bureaucratic inertia’ and is under threat 
from the right in regard to its lending.  
                                                                                                                                               
by the systemic ‘logics’ of accumulation and legitimation. From this framework, the World Bank is 
derived in a structural-functionalist manner as an autonomous institutional fix necessary to safeguard 
the aforementioned ‘logics’ of global capitalism. The end result of Cammack’s theoretical framework 
is to endow the organisation with an independence, omniscience and power that it simply does not 
possess, primarily owing to the exclusion of contradiction and struggle from his representation of the 
Bank.’ Marcus Taylor, ‘Opening the World Bank: International Organisations and the Contradictions 
of Global Capitalism’, Historical Materialism, vol. 13, no. 1, 154. This said, in this thesis Cammack’s 
framework is seen as one that can deal with many of these issues, if its application includes a specific 
elaboration of the role of politics associated with the Bank.  
68 Cammack correctly points out that what he calls the ‘Wolfensohn-Stiglitz project’ ‘as a sustained 
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However, what is crucial, is that despite such influences (and sometimes 
because of them) the content promoted by the Bank is ideologically consistent, evident 
in a multitude of elements that are all clearly focused upon one goal – market extension 
and the embedding of institutional structures to assist with generating market efficiency. 
My intention here is not to argue what the World Bank should look like. Rather, it is to 
look at the paradigm and practice to which the organisation is inextricably connected. 
This, by its very nature, requires a framework that involves an analysis of both the 
PWC’s intellectual and prescriptive underpinnings as well as providing an 
understanding of the politics of its implementation. In short, rather than presenting a 
prescription for what the organisation should do, this thesis is concerned with what the 
Bank is doing and the broader structural and political reasons for why it is doing this. 
Furthermore, also important are the various political factors facilitating and frustrating 
the Bank’s agenda.
69  
In contrast to the Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus volume, I chart the PWC as 
something more than an upgrade of neoliberalism based around certain intellectual 
traditions and economic prescriptions. The PWC is viewed as the promotion of a new 
form of neoliberalism – SIN – which is assembled from a variety of theoretical, 
historical and political lineages. In this, figures such as Stiglitz play a role. However, 
what is essential is that the SIN of the PWC extends itself well beyond the orthodox, or 
‘basic’, neoliberalism of the previous consensus in important areas – areas which are 
not sufficiently detailed by looking merely at economic prescriptive content in abstract. 
What is new in this form of neoliberalism is especially evident the attempt through SIN 
to rectify the implementation problems that plagued the original consensus. Indeed, SIN 
equates to nothing less than a highly political attempt at altering state and societal 
formation.  
In many ways, what the framework developed in this thesis reveals that is 
different from other analyses of the new development agenda derives from its shift in 
focus. What is crucial is not simply understanding the new development agenda through 
key figures and documents associated with it but how it actually pans out. Crucially, 
this, in turn, tells us much about what it actually is. In this framework, both history and 
theory (especially a critique of NIE) play an essential role in understanding SIN, and 
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this is covered in detail in chapter three. So too does an analysis of SIN’s policies (or 
what I call the ‘new basics’) and those elements within SIN that are used to aid policy 
implementation (understood in the framework as delivery devices and political 
technologies). These are dealt with in chapters four and five respectively. This 
framework is then applied to an analysis of empirical evidence from the field (chapters 
six through eight), to demonstrate the presence and effect of SIN in practice. 
The framework proposed and tested in the thesis, which is based around the 
concept of SIN, draws influence from a variety of sources, including some the work of 
those covered above and others. In essence, what draws the core approaches that have 
influenced the thesis together is both a critical bent and an emphasis upon class power 
as a central concern in social analysis. In this regard, social conflict theory, associated 
with Richard Robison, Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison and Kirin Aziz Chaudhry has had 
an indelible impact upon the framework developed in the thesis.
70 It is seen as explicitly 
useful to the thesis on two separate levels. Firstly, social conflict theory is useful for 
dissecting SIN’s theoretical foundations, which are based around new institutional 
economics (NIE). Within the social conflict approach, power and, vitally class power, 
matter, especially in relation to institutional form and operation.
71 From this 
perspective, historical factors are seen as essential when explaining the demand for or 
presence of particular institutions. But more than this, institutions aren’t simply viewed 
as efficiency mechanisms (as they are by NIE proponents) or path dependent (as they 
are in historical institutionalist analyses). Crucially, they are related to the allocation of 
power for specific interests, which can both facilitate and impede reform processes – 
neoliberal or otherwise.
72 Secondly, social conflict theory is used in the thesis in a way 
that extends beyond its use as a critique of the dominant approaches to institutional 
theory. Indeed, it is drawn upon in a meta sense to understand the very power of an 
organisation such as the World Bank and the factors that both affect, assist and impede 
it. 
The use of social conflict theory doesn’t preclude drawing upon other critical 
approaches associated with understanding PWC (or elements of it). For example, 
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Cammack’s new materialist approach has been highly influential on the development of 
the framework presented in this thesis. In essence, the thesis accepts Cammack’s 
analysis that views the World Bank’s efforts as relating to a project of proletarianising 
the world’s poor. However, the projected outcomes implied by the framework here are 
perhaps less resolute than those implied by Cammack’s work, with more emphasis 
placed here upon the conflict and contradiction and their impact upon the Bank’s 
attempts to implement reform. Furthermore, the framework moves beyond an analysis 
of a ‘Wolfensohn-Stiglitz project’ to understand both the broader influences that have 
generated the PWC and the very impact of the real-existing PWC itself. Nevertheless, 
Cammack’s work is seen as significantly contributing to an understanding of the PWC’s 
potential when it is actually embedded.  
John Harriss’ work on the World Bank and social capital, Ben Fine’s extensive 
critique of neoliberalism and social capital, and the contributions of others have also 
been critical to the framework developed here, both for their respective analyses of 
issues relating to the Bank’s work and the manner in which such authors seek to 
understand what the Bank does and why.
73 Furthermore, in addition to this work, a 
specific remark should be made about the influence of the work of both the work of 
Jayasuriya and Gill on the development of the framework presented in this thesis. 
Jayasuriya’s work on governance, antipolitics, the regulatory state and the new 
development agenda and Gill’s concepts of disciplinary neoliberalism and new 
constitutionalism have been an important influence upon the conceptualisation of SIN.
74 
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Indeed, SIN, should be seen as part of the project of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, that 
attempts the extension of processes of ‘commodification and alienation based on the 
intensification of the discipline of capital in social relations’, and its ‘quasi-
constitutional political and legal frameworks’ – what Gill calls ‘new 
constitutionalism’.
75 These concepts also relate very closely to Jayasuriya’s work on the 
economic constitutionalism, the regulatory state, market citizenship, the ‘new 
transnational regulatory governance’ and antipolitics.
76 These concepts are drawn upon, 
where relevant, throughout the thesis.  
Finally, the PWC is unashamedly seen here as a project that attempts to achieve 
hegemony, with varying results, in the Gramscian sense. A neo-Gramscian influence, 
derived largely from Gill and Susanne Soederberg, is undoubtedly present in the thesis. 
In particular, SIN is seen as the product of a ‘crisis of authority’ for the Bank and 
neoliberalism generally that created the terrain for battles over institutional form, 
without a fundamental reordering of social institutions.
77 But this thesis goes further 
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than much of the neo-Gramscian work in mapping out in detail the levels of resistance 
and assistance associated with this project. It also suggests doubt with regard to the 
potential of the project to attain and maintain the hegemony of neoliberalism (seen here 
as related to but distinct from the hegemony of capital). It is here that a framework 
centred around SIN allows us to analyse the array of intersecting and conflicting 
interests associated with the implementation of the PWC. SIN by its very form 
represents an attempt to marginalise those that are opposed or incompatible to it and to 
harness the support of elements congenial to it. Yet distinct limits to this attempt at 
hegemony are more than apparent, as will be made evident. A strength of the 
framework is that it isn’t just focused upon policy content, but is also concerned with 
the way in which SIN’s proponents, and in particular the Bank, use particular political 
techniques and devices in attempts to embed and maintain specific reforms. As will be 
made clear these methods meet various political responses, including the thwarting and 
distortion of reform by sections of capital, that mean that the hegemony of SIN is 
incompletely realised on the ground. Indeed, the most significant contribution of this 
thesis to the analysis of the PWC is the development of a framework that allows the 
systemic consideration of political dynamics and the implications that these carry for 
the new development agenda. To this end, understanding intra-Bank politics, the 
positions of class-based and other interests (including domestic and transnational 
capital, labour and the influence of powerful states) and the manner in which all of these 
intersect is critical. Absolutely pivotal is an acknowledgment of the manner in which 
different interests are included and/or marginalised by the PWC’s delivery devices and 
political technologies. 
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Chapter 2 
SIN Rising 
 
The ascendancy of SIN should be seen as originating out of an evolving political 
process. Myriad pressures and influences, which originate from both inside and outside 
the World Bank have been crucial in the generation of SIN over time. An important 
consolidation phase for SIN, around the turn of the millennium, clearly generated 
pressures between the Bank and its ‘sister’ organisation, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
78 However, more important than this relatively recent ‘internal’ tension in 
explaining SIN’s rise and form, has been the broader and, often, earlier politics of 
neoliberal development, especially those related to its implementation and its perceived 
legitimacy. Indeed, in many ways, the expansion of institutional analysis, which is such 
an essential part of SIN, and SIN’s emphasis upon participatory elements (dealt with in 
chapters four and seven), can be understood in relation to efforts within neoliberalism to 
legitimise, embed and maintain liberal market systems. 
This chapter details the rise of SIN in an historical and political context, 
providing an explanation as to why it has come about in the form that it has. Simply put, 
SIN is seen as a politically-conditioned response generated from within the confines of 
neoliberalism to the significant problems in practice that the Washington consensus 
encountered. These problems in practice related to both the implementation of reform 
programmes and what I have called ‘dilemmas of explanation’ – that is, the explanation 
of both economic success and crisis respectively. In particular, the chapter highlights 
the politically contested nature of neoliberal development policy over the last decade 
and a half, in the context of challenges within the global political economy, such as the 
Asian crisis and the post-communist transformations in Eastern Europe. The earlier 
experiences of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment operations in Africa are also 
considered as important. Beyond this macro-styled explanation for SIN’s genesis, the 
chapter also associates the embryonic formation of some of the themes within SIN, such 
as participation and consultation, back to the rise of specific elements within the Bank, 
notably, those associated with environmental and social development.  
                                                 
78 As is discussed later in the chapter, the tensions between the two Bretton Woods organisations were 
obvious during the Asian crisis and the drafting of the 2000/2001 World Development Report and the 
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What is also clear, is the overt role of certain core protagonists in the 
contestation over neoliberal development. Notably, the US Treasury (and the US state 
more generally), key organisations within Japan (its Ministry of Finance, for example) 
and particular staff within the IMF and the Bank have, at times, been key players in the 
battle over neoliberalism’s form. Civil society has also brought pressure to bear on the 
evolution of SIN. Pressure from activist groups and critical academia on the Bank and 
the Fund has been pronounced and has undoubtedly impacted upon the crisis of 
legitimacy for neoliberalism, to which SIN is a response. However, the core elements 
within SIN’s final form are more robustly related to the outcomes of conflict of the 
aforementioned figures than a result of the critical pressure brought upon the 
multilateral organisations by specific activist groups or critical academia, for example. 
In short, SIN has been largely forged out of a battle waged by and between the 
representatives of the interests aligned with the reproduction (and legitimisation) of 
global capitalism – broad as they are – over time. 
 
The World Bank and the political evolution of neoliberal development 
   
Previous to SIN, the so-called Washington consensus (explained below) held sway at 
the Bank. It is worth briefly charting the intellectual precursors and contextual 
influences on the Washington consensus to illustrate the political evolution over time of 
neoliberalism and its relationship to development policy. The Washington consensus 
was preceded and assisted, in a ‘path breaking’ and thematic sense, by the ‘counter-
revolution’ within development theory that began in the 1970s and rose to paradigmatic 
ascendancy in the 1980s.
79 This counter-revolution was complemented politically in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s by conservative administrations in Britain and the United 
States which, apparently confident of the ability to tame inflation by way of the control 
of the money supply, focused upon monetarist policies.
80 Incorporated in the monetarist 
approach, which was diametrically opposed to previous Keynesian fiscal policy, was 
the notion that government should not engage in too much economic management.
81 
Debate, both academic and popular, over monetarism was vigorous in the mid 1970s 
                                                 
79 John Toye dubbed the ascendancy of neoliberal influences in the 1970s and 1980s the ‘counter-
revolution’ in development theory because it countered the previous revolution in economics: 
Keynesianism. See John Toye, Dilemmas of Development (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 22.  
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and the end of the consensus around neo-Keynesian approaches to macroeconomics 
also led to debates which questioned the relevance of development economics.
82 
As Mosley, Harrigan and Toye have shown, the ascendancy of early 
neoliberalism, both political and intellectual, was consolidated in a very specific global 
economic environment, where fifteen years of slowing world economic growth from the 
mid-1960s to 1980 was followed by a debt crisis in the Third World: 
 
The fifteen-year-long slow down of world economic growth is best understood 
in terms of two critical events. These are the two great oil price rises of 1973 
and 1979-1980 and the consequent debt crisis which erupted in 1982. They are 
linked together in a chain of turbulent events. The governments of the 
industrial countries allowed an expansion of aggregate demand that provoked a 
strong bout of inflation in the industrialised world in 1972-73, which in turn 
triggered off a brief boom in non-oil primary commodities in 1972-74. The 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) took advantage of the 
prevailing shortage psychology to raise the price of petroleum threefold. This 
shock cut back real growth of output in OECD countries, although inflationary 
conditions persisted until the end of the decade.
 83 
 
The oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979 had a significant dampening effect upon 
the growth of industrialised countries, with the hike of 1979 bringing them close to 
recession.
84 As Mosley et al. stipulate, the arrival in the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, of right-wing governments keen to 
implement monetarist policy ‘implied a rise in nominal interest rates’ which actually 
occurred in tandem with the deflationary effect of the second oil hike.
85 An upward 
swing in real interest rates and a downward shift in the value of underdeveloped country 
exports, presented an obviously dire situation for underdeveloped countries, resulting in 
a massive debt crisis.
86 This debt crisis stemmed from the borrowing by underdeveloped 
countries of cheap ‘petrodollars’, accrued by oil producing countries from the earlier 
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increase in the oil revenues, which had sent international debt to unprecedented levels.
87 
In total, this global context provided both an important backdrop to, and catalyst for, the 
ascendancy of neoliberal approaches in both the developed and underdeveloped world. 
Intellectually, the counter-revolution in development theory was led by several 
key individuals, such as Harry Johnson, Anne Krueger, Peter Bauer and Deepak Lal.
88 
While it has been emphasised by writers that it is important to recognise the differences 
between these and other neoliberals, for our purposes here several general remarks can 
be made to clarify the broad neoliberal position at the time.
89 Neoliberals rejected many 
of the key tenets of structuralist development thought – which, while also containing a 
divergent and eclectic membership, emphasised interventionist approaches.
90 For 
structuralists, it had been important to recognise the difference between the structures 
of the industrialised world and the underdeveloped world and to understand that, 
consequently, ‘…economic outcomes in response to similar events in each environment 
will systematically reflect such differences.’
91 Neoliberals, in contrast, critical of the 
sluggish progress of the underdeveloped world, apportioned blame on government 
intervention.
92 They emphasised the cost of ‘rent-seeking’ and highlighted the 
purportedly distorting effect of government intervention on the price mechanism and 
thus efficient resource allocation.
93 In short, as Colclough has noted, their solutions 
echoed ‘those of early liberal economists from Smith to Marshall’.
94 They revolved 
around rolling back state influence on the economy and ‘liberating the market’, which, 
while being acknowledged as imperfect, was seen as preferable to government 
intervention.
95 
  Several of the key individuals related to the intellectual consolidation of 
neoliberalism had a very direct influence within the World Bank, in an environment 
where ‘bilateral and multilateral development agencies and banks…were searching for 
stronger guarantees of repayment of loans in an increasingly indebted developing 
                                                 
87 Ibid, 6-9. See also Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (London: James Currey, 
1996), 21. 
88 Christopher Colclough, ‘Structuralism versus Neo-liberalism’, in Christopher Colclough and James 
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world.’
96 By the early 1980s neoliberals including Anne Krueger and Deepak Lal, and 
others such as Bela Balassa, were working at senior levels within the World Bank.
97 
Indeed, around this time the organisation was beginning to undergo a metamorphosis, 
displaying a shift in policy, approach and ideology. Poverty alleviation approaches were 
being dropped in favour of policies influenced extensively by rational choice theory and 
neoliberalism. This was reflected in structural adjustment programs (SAPs), designed 
by the Fund and the Bank, that would make lending conditional on pursuing particular 
neoliberal policies.
98  
Such an approach was substantively different to the Bank under most of Robert 
MacNamara’s Presidency. As Berger and Beeson have emphasised, MacNamara’s 
incumbency (1968-81) reflected some of the ‘…optimism characteristic of the wider 
cold war liberalism (liberal developmentalism or classical modernisation theory) which 
had emerged after 1945.’
99 Under MacNamara, the Bank had often criticised 
industrialised countries for their protectionist trade regimes and their inadequate aid 
contributions.
100 It had also substantially increased lending in new areas. Small and 
medium farms, health, education and urban infrastructure were all recipients of 
increased lending during MacNamara’s term as Bank President.
101 Berger and Beeson 
explain that the approach by MacNamara and ‘other cold war warriors of his 
generation’ was influenced by the notion that communism’s expansion and poverty 
were related.
102 However, by the end of MacNamara’s term as President in 1981 the 
Bank was expressing concern with regard to the ‘…international financial system’s 
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ability to recycle enough funds to maintain economic growth and systemic stability.’
103 
The global context noted above and a belief by people in the Bank that the price of 
energy would continue to rise, convinced MacNamara that there had been permanent 
change in the global economy.
104 
With Alden Clausen’s ascension to the Bank’s top job in 1981, change in line 
with the new political economy approach firmly arrived.
105 While some sections of the 
Bank, such as the research department, were more dogmatically neoliberal during the 
early to mid-eighties than others, the Bank , for some analysts, became more diversified 
in certain ways than it was under MacNamara.
106 Nevertheless, there was a definitive 
shift in the Bank’s principal theoretical position, with the market increasingly reified 
over the state in a way that starkly contrasted with the previous status quo.
107 Succinctly 
put, modernisation essentially acquiesced to neoliberalism in the development policy 
debate.
108  
By 1989, the influence of this specific form of neoliberalism on the Bank and 
the Fund was clear enough for the economist John Williamson to be able to discern the 
ten broad neoliberal prescriptions that defined what he called the ‘Washington 
consensus’.
109 Reflecting on the moniker in 2000 for a World Bank publication, he 
remarked that it referred to the ‘lowest common denominator’ of policy advice that was 
being given by the IMF and the Bank to countries in Latin America at the time.
110 The 
policies were as follows: fiscal discipline; the redirection of pubic expenditure priorities 
towards areas of high economic returns; tax reform; liberalising interest rates; a 
competitive exchange rate; trade liberalisation; liberalisation of foreign direct 
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investment; privatisation; deregulation and secure property rights.
111 As Moisés Naím, 
(Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy and a former Executive Director at the World Bank) 
has noted, the term was Williamson’s summary of the general agreement for neoliberal 
orthodoxy evident between the ‘…political Washington of the US Congress (at the 
time), the Administration and the ‘technocratic’ Washington of the IMF, the World 
Bank and the think-tanks.’
112 Over a period, it principally evolved to denote not only 
the ideological congruence but also the working relationship between the Bank, the 
Fund and US Treasury, a relationship that comprised the most influential proponents of 
free market approaches.  
  While the term has entered common usage and therefore has accrued meaning, 
this section should be prefaced with a word of caution to avoid characterising the 
political atmosphere within Washington at the time, the sources of the individual 
prescriptions and the main bodies associated with the consensus, as a completely 
homogenised entity. Indeed, Williamson and others have since made it clear that many 
of the influential groups that developed and pushed for policies of the Washington 
consensus actually hailed from places other than Washington and outside the main 
organisations. There were also often disagreements on points of emphasis within the 
neoliberalism of the Washington consensus.
113 Demonstrative of this divergence, 
Williamson notes that an emphasis upon competitive exchange rates was not an 
accurate conceptualisation of Washington opinion.
114 By 1989 a majority of economists 
in Washington and elsewhere preferred either a firmly fixed or freely floating exchange 
rate rather than an intermediate regime of the sort that Williamson advocated as more 
likely to be of benefit in the medium term.
115 Additionally, reaffirming the point about 
exogenous influences on the consensus, he notes that the importance of secure property 
rights was derived from the law and economics school of Chicago and the work of 
Hernando de Soto, rather than being something distilled from Washington.
116 These are 
important points of detail. Williamson also makes clear the distinction between earlier 
forms of neoliberalism and the consensus that he was describing. For example, he notes 
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that by 1989, when he coined the term, the ‘market fundamentalism’ of Reagan had 
already been ‘superseded’ by a more ‘rational’ economic policy environment.
117 
Crucially, though, both variants of neoliberalism preferred markets to government (and 
Keynesian intervention) and shared some fundamental ideological affinity.  
Despite this detail and Williamson’s concern for his term being used in 
particular ways,
118 the term is used here to describe a general agreement by the Bank, 
the Fund and US Treasury for a form of neoliberalism based around fairly simple policy 
prescriptions (of the sort noted by Williamson) – what I call ‘simple neoliberalism’.
119 
Importantly, the definition used here also refers to the working relationship evident 
between the Bank and the Fund at the time and the promotion by both organisations of 
policies, purportedly universal in their applicability, which were suggested and 
prescribed with regularity in the underdeveloped world. This understanding is not a 
static understanding of the Washington consensus and both degrees of divergence and 
evolution within and over its elements are accepted.  
 
Problems in practice for neoliberal development 
 
The Washington consensus was fortuitously timed for its proponents with the rather 
sudden collapse of the only other serious ideological contender to capitalism.
120 
However, simple neoliberalism had been far from problematic in the 1980s, both in 
terms of its ability to be implemented and the results that its policies often translated 
into. In 1989, even Barber Conable (World Bank President, 1986 – 1991), in an 
introduction to Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth noted the 
continuing crisis in Africa, despite development efforts by the Bank, the IMF and 
others:  
 
Africa’s continuing economic crisis presents an extraordinary challenge to the 
development community – to both intellectuals and policy makers. Responding 
to this challenge during the past decade, the Bank has issued a series of reports 
on Sub-Saharan Africa. These have increasingly concentrated on urgent 
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measures needed to set Africa on the path to recovery, as have the efforts of the 
development community at large. Yet the crisis has continued to deepen.
121  
 
He continued:  
 
Most African countries are now embarked on comprehensive programs of 
economic adjustment. The nature of these programs has evolved significantly 
as we have all learned from our experiences and mistakes. We have come to 
appreciate that fundamental structural change is needed to transform African 
economies and make them competitive in an increasingly competitive world. 
The adjustment efforts must be continued and the reforms broadened and 
deepened.
122 
 
What is particularly revealing in this report – now, almost two decades old –  is the 
manner in are the remedies that are suggested for sub-Saharan Africa’s maladies. 
Indeed, the suggested solutions offered in the document can be considered an early 
glimpse at what would later become SIN: 
 
A central theme of the report is that although sound macroeconomic policies 
and an efficient infrastructure are essential to provide an enabling environment 
for the productive use of resources, they alone are not sufficient to transform 
the structures of African economies. At the same time major efforts are needed 
to  build African capacities – to produce a better trained, more healthy 
population and to greatly strengthen the institutional framework within which 
development can take place. … 
  A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the 
failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms 
are important, but the must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public 
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service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration 
that is accountable to its public.
123 
 
Also, indicative of SIN rising, is Conable’s summary of the report’s recommendations 
for ‘empowering ordinary people’, ‘measures that foster grassroots organization’ and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and a ‘growing conviction…that development 
must be bottom-up [and] less top-down’.
124 However, these emphases only gained more 
momentum as the coming decade of the 1990s rolled on, as pressures upon simple 
neoliberalism’s legitimacy increased.  
As is made clear below, problems were evident beyond sub-Saharan Africa that 
related to the both the capacity for neoliberal development organisations to embed 
liberal market regimes and the outcome of such attempts. But, importantly, the nascent 
attention to elements that now play an important role in SIN, like consultation processes 
and participation, to some degree stemmed from the fallout associated with some of the 
Bank’s large-scale infrastructure and other projects in the 1980s, and the rise of a group 
within the Bank related to ‘social development’. Gloria Davis’ history of the World 
Bank’s Social Development Network details this influence:  
 
In support of rural development, and economic development more broadly, a 
number of Bank-assisted projects appraised in the 1980s supported 
infrastructure development on a very large scale. One of the most controversial 
projects involved a series of dams on the Narmada River in western India. But 
other large projects (Itaparica, Yacyreta), and land settlement projects such as 
the Polonoreste project in Brazil, transmigration in Indonesia, also got their 
share of public attention.
125  
 
Responding to this, during a major reorganisation of the Bank in 1987, ‘Environmental 
Units’ were set up for each of the organisation’s four regions.
126 While initially 
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involving people with environmental expertise, in time social emphases were also 
developed.
127 In 1993, the creation within the Bank of a division for social policy and 
resettlement, which dealt with ‘the social dimensions of natural resource management, 
social assessment, and an emerging social policy agenda’, in addition to resettlement 
issues, further enhanced the enmeshing of social and environment foci at the Bank.
128 
This emerging emphasis upon social issues was later to be represented by the formation, 
at the start of Wolfensohn’s tenure, of a task force on social development and the 
creation within the Bank of the Social Development Network.
129 
Furthermore, throughout the mid-to-late1980s, the Bank altered the way that it 
worked with NGOs, hinting at the growing emphasis upon ‘participation’. Davis states: 
 
…the NGO-World Bank Committee formed in the early 1980s within the 
International relations Department, underwent a series of transformations 
which helped make the Bank more open and responsive to external concerns 
and set the stage for the Bank’s work on participation. … With the growing 
participation of northern NGOs, such as OXFAM, and the addition of 
developing country NGOs representing regional interests, NGOs were soon 
setting the agenda for the Committee. Specifically they put pressure on the 
Bank to make greater use of participatory approaches so that external voices 
could be better heard in the development process. In response, a Bank-wide 
Learning Group on Participatory Development was formed in 1990… . When 
John Clark from OXFAM was hired to head the NGO unit in 1992, the 
emphasis on poverty reduction and participation was further increased.
130 
 
Yet the Bank’s growing acknowledgement of institutions, which was to become 
a central component in SIN, was heavily influenced by some major global events 
throughout the 1990s. It was during this decade that there was a growing awareness that 
the macroeconomic reforms of the Washington consensus were not enough on their own 
to guarantee prosperity.
131 While the consensus presented a relatively basic roadmap for 
reforms, Problems were bountiful. Naím captured this well: 
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  Unfortunately, the relative simplicity of the Washington consensus was not 
reflected by the experience with market reforms in this decade. What was 
implemented was usually an incomplete version of the model and its results 
were quite different from what politicians promised, the people expected, and 
the IMF and World Bank’s econometric models had predicted.
132 
 
The collapse of Eastern European communism, that began in 1989 and continued 
through the first years of the following decade, was to arrive at a time when 
neoliberalism was firmly in the ascendant, though still riddled with problems. For some 
within the Bank, notably Lewis Preston (President, 1991 – 1995), the demise of the 
Soviet countries had led to a ‘…broad convergence of development thinking which has 
replaced ideological conflict.’
133 However, while an ideological victory in the Cold 
War had apparently been won, the demise of the communist bloc was only going to 
further highlight problems within neoliberalism. Even with the agreement of Russian 
reformers, Western advisers and the IMF for market-led development as the solution 
for Russia, the big test was going to be implementing it. Indeed, the disaster that was 
the Russian transformation gave neoliberals a wake-up call. When the collapse of the 
state in Russia occurred it was accompanied by veritable chaos. Between 1989 and 
1997 gross domestic product (GDP) in Russia almost halved while inequality soared, 
with poverty, defined as living on US$4 a day, rising from two million to over sixty 
million by the mid 1990s.
134 Above all, it was becoming dramatically evident for some 
that the state was required for the enforcement of rules and regulations that markets 
required for their operation.
135 
  The theoretical limits to the Washington consensus were especially apparent in 
the unanticipated outcomes of privatisation in Russia. Rather than a broad-based 
transfer of assets from public to private hands, what eventuated was subsequently 
dubbed ‘asset grabbing’.
136 Where privatisation in other countries sought to deliver 
certain theorised efficiency gains that were purported to accompany such a transfer of 
assets, the central role of privatisation in the transformation process had been developed 
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with other accompaniments in mind. Attached to the more traditional benefits accorded 
to privatisation, it was thought that there would be other ‘dividends’. The formula was a 
theoretical stretch at best.
137 It was thought that by creating a broad base of shareholders 
there would be a blossoming of a middle class of property owners that would become a 
catalyst for the evolution of democracy in Russia.
138 In turn, these stakeholders would 
provide a bulwark against calls for renationalisation down the track.
139 As such, 
privatisation sought to promote nothing less than a ‘fundamental restructuring of 
Russian society and Russian culture.’
140 
  However, to suggest that privatisation could be the main engine of 
transformation was naïve. Such an account underestimated the political, cultural and 
social separation between the old communist order and free market capitalism. Little 
serious concern was given to legal requirements, social safety nets, social institutions or 
other structural realities. Of significant importance here was a lack of even a concept of 
property rights.
141 While the West had developed concepts of the rights attached to 
private property over centuries, Russia had no such tradition.
142 Even prior to the 1917 
revolution, there was a tradition of autocracy that was, at times, accompanied by 
complete ownership of productive assets.
143 Thus, there was no historical pretext to 
base a system of property rights upon. Instead, what existed was a long history of 
repressive rule without property rights, mutual obligations, reciprocity and the 
inevitable accompanying set of informal interpersonal networks that operated to avoid 
the realities of conforming to the rules that characterised each oppressive order.
144 To 
marry this historical reality with the neoliberal shock therapy approach that emphasised 
rapid reforms and a minimal state apparatus was always going to be problematic. 
  The Russian transformation relied heavily upon an agency-centred or ‘passive’ 
approach to institutional change. This approach, which has been promoted by 
neoclassical economists and rational choice theorists, emphasises the role of ‘political 
elites, bargaining, and incentives in the institutional design process.’
145 Within this 
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perspective the role of institutional legacies are deemed relatively unimportant and the 
hardiness and resilience of existing institutional structures is undervalued.
146 There is a 
focus upon a requirement of rapid economic and political change, where elites or 
‘policy entrepreneurs’, benefiting from the uncertainty of extraordinary political 
situations and the structural blows that these situations inflict upon existing institutions, 
can replace untenable and ‘inefficient’ institutions with market compatible structures.
147 
This approach stands in stark contrast with the structure-based theories of historical 
institutionalists that emphasise path dependency and the influence of cultural and social 
legacies and their constraining influence upon institutional character.
148 It also contrasts 
significantly with the social conflict theory of institutional change which emphasises the 
role of power and interests in relation to institutions, and which views institutions as 
power allocation mechanisms (covered in detail in the next chapter).  
  However, the dominance of rational choice theory and neoliberalism in the late 
eighties and early nineties meant that the policy set available to reformers was always 
going to be defined by one specific paradigm which was to provide, at the time, the only 
viable and plausible trajectory (at least in the minds of Western and Russian elites) out 
of the Soviet quagmire. The shock therapy approach initially began with the liberalising 
of most prices with the important exceptions of those of core natural resources, such as 
oil, which were kept low.
149 This triggered a bout of hyperinflation which wiped out the 
savings of many Russians, requiring fiscal stringency to attempt to reduce the 
problem.
150  
 However,  hyperinflation  meant that by the time the privatisation process began 
very few people had any money with which to buy into those state assets being 
privatised.
151 Secondly, keeping the resource prices low meant that for those who could 
afford to buy oil at low prices and turn it around, selling it in the West at a substantial 
profit, there were significant rent seeking gains to be had.
152 What resulted was not the 
development of new operations or the positive restructuring of old ones but rather the 
extraction of profit resulting from mistaken policy.
153 Interestingly, as Stiglitz has 
noted, this actually caused many of the advocates of the shock therapy approach to 
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criticise the reforms for being too slow, emphasising a preference where all prices 
would have been liberalised in unison.
154  
In short, the Russian situation demonstrated to some neoliberals the importance 
of functioning political and economic institutions for liberal capitalism. More than this 
though it demonstrated the relationship between institutions, markets and societies in 
general. Here was a definitive illustration for many neoliberals that neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies alone were basically unfeasible without a complimentary and 
compatible institutional matrix. For example, the social networks, known as blat, 
evident within the Soviet economy, were not examples of institutions that were 
complimentary or compatible with the impersonalised neoclassical model of a 
market.
155 In fact, they perhaps provided some insight into why neoclassical economics 
and neoliberals had typically eschewed social and cultural dimensions in their 
methodologically individual analyses. Even though the attention to social capital in the 
late 90s attempted to correct the disdain held by neoliberals for ‘the social’, Russia 
presented an example of the ‘dark side’ of social capital and social institutions for the 
neoliberal market. If institutions were useful for reducing transaction cost, the mafia and 
other networks were examples of how a reduction in ‘transaction cost’ for some could 
result in a collective disaster, not to mention neoliberal market reform failure.
156 
  Additionally, fiscal stringency, which was and remains a hallmark of neoliberal 
and, in particular, IMF reforms, only exacerbated the problem. The state limited 
expenditures to the point where it failed to pay wages and pensions. This, in part, 
starved the economy of money, which was caught within a nasty circular relationship 
where the state didn’t spend, the private sector was starved of capital and the state had 
nothing it could tax.
157 It was rapidly becoming evident that for neoliberal reforms to be 
successful they required a more complex analysis of the reform process. All in all, the 
experiment with overnight free market capitalism was hardly an advertisement for the 
universal benefits of simple neoliberalism. While the reforms were supposed to set the 
preconditions for a successful market economy they actually became part of something 
that helped to create just the opposite. 
  While Russia might have been the largest example of the theoretically 
problematic nature of simple neoliberalism, being particularly illustrative of the lack of 
                                                 
154 Ibid, 142. 
155 Hedlund, 224. 
156 This issues are picked up on a theoretical level in the next chapter. 
157 James Galbraith, ‘The Crisis of Globalization’, Dissent (June 22, 1999), 14. SIN RISING 
 
 
  50 
institutional content in its key precepts and the related and ever present conundrum of 
implementation, it wasn’t the only one. There were numerous other examples of 
problems in practice and dilemmas of explanation that emanated from Latin America 
and Asia throughout the 1990s. Indeed, in both regions simple neoliberal theory was 
found wanting.  
  In Latin America, a region which had experienced problems with inflation and 
poor rates of growth throughout the 1980s, neoliberal reforms of the 1990s were to be 
coupled with a new era of growth, with the region posting annual growth of 4 percent 
per annum.
158 But the results of reform were mixed. For a region famous for inequality 
the onset of reform and the subsequent inflow of capital failed to raise all boats. Reform 
did make some welcome changes in the region as far as neoliberals were concerned. It 
had brought an end to high rates of inflation and reinvigorated growth.
159 Furthermore, 
trade liberalisation prompted a significant increase in intraregional commerce.
160 
Reform also contributed to foreign capital worth US$66bn heading to Latin America 
between 1990 and 1995.
161 The reform period coincided in part with a massive shift in 
financial patterns in industrialised countries that increasingly witnessed people in the 
developed world buying stocks and bonds rather than depositing their in money 
banks.
162 The reforms being pursued in Latin America made it an attractive destination 
for international investors. Yet, while the implementation of neoliberal reforms was 
associated with a boom in investment, the Mexican financial crisis that followed the 
peso devaluation of late 1994, and the shudders it sent through the region and 
elsewhere, brought excitement for investors and others back into check.
163 For some 
neoliberals, Latin America still had ‘deeper’ issues to address. For Naím, in particular, 
‘…high income disparities, low productivity, low international competitiveness, and – 
most important of all – ineffectual public institutions’
164 were ‘masked’ by the benefits 
that were reaped in the early stages of the boom. This, along with some of the examples 
given below, seemed to imply to neoliberals that there remained room for a more 
expansive form of reform that included the state in a more substantive way and an 
expansion of the ‘role and function’ of institutions, including social institutions. 
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Welcoming the state back in and the Asian ‘miracle’ 
 
Throughout the decade of the nineties the World Bank had increasingly drawn the state 
back into its development analysis in a more robust way, and one of the key initial 
documents that articulated this position was the organisation’s seminal East Asian 
Miracle report, published in 1993.
165 This theme of ‘drawing the state back in’ was 
developed further in the World Development Report 1997, The State in a Changing 
World. Previously to this, the state had been largely, though not entirely, ostracised 
from the neoliberal development approach with public choice logic and the 
accompanying influential notion of ‘rent seeking’ having exacted a toll. However, now 
the state was seen as an important ‘supplier of institutions’ and its reintroduction 
highlighted the ascending importance of political institutions in the support of 
globalisation.
166 This reanalysis, which has become a vital part of SIN, in many ways 
gained momentum via a concessional, yet determinedly selective, appraisal of the so-
called ‘miracle economies’ of Asia. While welcoming the state back into the 
development debate, albeit in a cautiously prescriptive way, this analysis was to 
encounter several key problems that would provide yet another catalyst for an ‘upgrade’ 
of neoliberal policy and emphasis. It was also to provide a fertile setting for conflict 
between the Bank and one of its most important member states, Japan. 
The main problem with the Bank’s analysis of the Asian miracle, was its 
emphasis upon the Asian economies ‘getting the basics (neoliberal market friendly 
principles) right’. This analysis underestimated and largely ignored the respective 
structural realities of each of the Asian economies – which varied significantly between 
Northeast and Southeast Asia in particular, and which hardly bore wholesale 
resemblance to any variant of the simple neoliberal model.
167 Secondly, when the crisis 
of 1997 arrived there was the rather problematic issue, in terms of a continuity of 
paradigmatic logic and legitimacy, of accounting for the failure of countries that had 
just been praised as neoliberal models. While this was never going to be an easy 
                                                 
165 This said, Cammack has noted that the state still notably figured in Bank documents before this, such 
as the 1991 World Development Report, The Challenge of Development. Additionally, as we saw with 
the Sub-Saharan Africa report (covered earlier in this chapter), which predates the 1991 WDR, an 
emerging emphasis by the Bank on the state was returning as early as the late 1980s. See Paul 
Cammack, ‘What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduction and Why it Matters’, New Political 
Economy, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 2004), 191-192. 
166 Rodan, Hewison and Robison, 12. 
167 As Rodan, Hewison and Robison state: ‘it became difficult to ignore the fact that Asian 
industrialisation had often been accompanied by state intervention.’ Rodan, Hewison and Robison, 12. SIN RISING 
 
 
  52 
explanatory exercise, it was to be one where institutions, and specifically an emphasis 
on institutional quality and its relationship to market operation – ‘good governance’ – 
were to play an important role in the attempt to resuscitate the multilateral 
organisations’ legitimacy. Indeed, welcoming the state back in, as both an institution 
and supplier of institutions, helped the Bank and others prior to the crisis explain the 
Asian miracle through the lens of neoliberalism. Here, emphasising institutional quality, 
through the language of good governance gave neoliberalism a way out of the apparent 
contradiction brought about by the crisis; if Asia’s ‘miracle economies’ were a model of 
neoliberalism at work why did they fail? The answer for them was largely one of 
institutional integrity. The following deals briefly with an elaboration of the two 
aforementioned problems sequentially and emphasises the rise of the role of institutions 
– which is a core element within SIN – by the Bank, the IMF and others to deal with 
these issues. 
  The development of the East Asian Miracle report, several years prior to the 
crisis, exemplified the tensions between the ascendant paradigm of Washington 
consensus-style neoliberalism and alternative readings of development, in particular 
those emanating from Japan. It also signalled a change in the Bank’s approach, 
presaging SIN’s consolidation, with its cautious reintroduction of the state and market-
complementing institutions. Throughout the 1980s, Japan, with its strong domestic 
economic position, channelled significant amounts of aid and investment into East and 
Southeast Asia.
168 Indeed, in the early part of that decade Japan had become the 
principal co-financier of World Bank loans and was the biggest supplier of bilateral aid 
to Asia.
169 It had also become, after the United States, the second largest shareholder in 
the World Bank.
170 By the early 1990s it had become the world’s leading manufacturing 
economy and retained fifty percent of the world’s net savings, becoming the most 
significant source of foreign investment and also facilitating the financing of the US 
state’s deficits.
171 Japan’s economic success and its development assistance placed it in 
an imposing position and it is understandable that Japanese officials, in particular those 
                                                 
168 Robert Wade, ‘Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle 
in Political Perspective’, New Left Review, no. 217 (May-June, 1996), 4. 
169 Wade, ‘Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance’, 6. 
170 Wade, 6. 
171 Ibid, 7.  SIN RISING 
 
 
  53
within the Ministry of Finance (MOF), felt that they had both something to offer the 
development landscape and a legitimate right to assert it.
172 
  However, despite the impressive track record of the Japanese economy and the 
Japanese position in the global political economy generally at the time there was 
pressure within and upon the World Bank to severely limit the replication and reverence 
of policies that were seen as inimical to the ascendant neoliberal orthodoxy.
173 Prior to 
the report, tensions had been growing between both Japan and the multilateral 
organisations and Japan and the US over development strategies.
174 Much of this could 
be attributed to conflicting ideas over directed credit and alternative conceptions of the 
marketplace generally.
175 In 1991 the Bank had restated a firm neoliberal line in that 
year’s World Development Report. The original drafts had been tempered by then chief 
economist and vice-president Lawrence Summers who had dismissed Japanese 
economists as ‘second rate’.
176 While it was Summers who would introduce the term 
‘market friendly’ in an attempt to tone down the extreme neoliberal position of the 
drafts, this wouldn’t be sufficient to placate the officials within the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) who found the report far from moderate.
177  
  In attempting to rectify what was reasonably assessed by MOF officials as a sort 
of ideological myopia on the part of the Bank there was some effort undertaken to 
achieve recognition of the experience of Japan and other East Asian economies and 
their respective approaches to development.
178  The East Asian Miracle report was 
envisaged as the document that would do this, however the initial hesitance on the part 
of the Bank to undertake the report was to be indicative of the apprehension associated 
with what was always going to be a politically complex undertaking given the divergent 
approaches of the main parties involved. It was funded significantly from a  Japanese 
trust fund, and Stiglitz has asserted that the Japanese offer to fund it (together with the 
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pressure they brought to bear on the Bank) was the only reason that it went ahead,
179 it 
was of course to be a Bank publication. The conflict between the MOF and the Bank, 
and the Bank’s concern for neoliberal influences, meant that, in the words of Berger and 
Beeson, it ‘was a profoundly political document’.
180  
Fitting the Asian ‘miracle’ into the neoliberal model while addressing MOF 
concerns was surely going to require ‘imagination’ on the part of Bank staff. For the 
Japanese this was probably more than slightly patronising if not intellectually offensive. 
But the final report, while clearly wedded to the neoliberal paradigm, was not an 
example of complete orthodox obstinacy on the part of the Bank. Indeed, as Wade has 
made clear, its final form was indicative of a ’three-way tussle’ between the Bank’s 
research vice-presidency, its East Asian vice–presidency and Japan.
181 Importantly, a 
concession by the Bank vis-à-vis government intervention and its role in economic 
development in Asia had been made in a significant Bank publication.
182 Given the 
persecution of government (vilified for its alleged pecuniary irresponsibility, rent 
seeking and distortional influence upon the price setting mechanism) by neoliberals in 
the previous decade, this was no mean concession. 
  However the report’s emphasis upon neoliberal fundamentals was clear. The 
report emphasised the ability of the Asian economies to ‘get the basics’ right. Growth 
could be largely attributed to good macroeconomic management and the promotion of 
an environment that was conducive to private investment.
183 The high performing Asian 
economies (HPAEs) had grown more rapidly than any other region and this remarkable 
growth had been surprisingly equitable.
184 The sustained growth, coupled with 
reductions in inequality and the associated increases in life expectancy had to be 
explained within the Bank’s ideological framework. If neoliberalism and its 
prescriptions were universally applicable, then these countries couldn’t be ‘rationally’ 
explained in any other way. To assert otherwise would be to suggest that neoliberal 
prescriptions were highly questionable. This made the report more than difficult, 
presumably for both some readers and authors alike. 
Nevertheless, the concessions that were made signalled another stage in the 
evolution of neoliberalism towards SIN. Indeed, Stiglitz later asserted that the East 
                                                 
179 Ibid, 18; Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, 91. 
180 Berger and Beeson, 495.  
181 Wade, 23.  
182 Wade, 23. 
183 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 5. 
184 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, 1 – 2. SIN RISING 
 
 
  55
Asian Miracle report ‘stimulated the recent rethinking of the role of the state in 
economic development.’
185 The report’s acknowledgement of the state’s role in 
development did, however, treat the causal connections between state intervention and 
growth very carefully. For example, Lewis Preston’s foreword offers, rather timidly, 
that in certain situations intervention did contribute to growth but also carefully 
stipulates the importance of the ‘right’ institutional context as being as important to 
‘success or failure as the policies themselves’.
186 It is careful to provide the following 
disclaimer: 
 
The market-oriented aspects of East Asia’s policies can be recommended with few 
reservations, but the more institutionally demanding aspects, such as contest-based 
interventions, have not been successfully used in other settings.
187 
 
While Preston’s foreword refers to the concessionary elements of the report as 
‘breaking new ground’, this is really only true in relation to Bank attitudes. There was 
at the time, and remains, a plethora of alternative readings of Asian development that 
emphasise the role of the state and the importance of institutions, with subsets of 
opinion emphasising certain elements over others.
188  
While the report wasn’t as explicitly welcoming of the state as the later World 
Development Report 1997, it did illustrate the further expansion of the emphasis upon 
institutions into the neoliberal lexicon. For example, the institutional basis of shared (or 
more equitable) growth received a significant portion of attention in the report – one 
whole chapter. This chapter emphasised the importance of institutional mechanisms 
that facilitated the sharing of growth beyond non-elites. There was also an emphasis in 
the report upon universal education, land reform, and the proliferation of small and 
medium enterprises and public housing programmes in Singapore and Hong Kong.
189 
The main case here was to make a correlation between political elites driving for 
‘legitimacy’ and the institutional basis for shared growth that was posited to do this.  
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Notably, a developed discussion of authoritarianism and the guaranteeing of 
‘legitimacy’ – a reasonable focus for an analysis of East Asia’s development – is   
omitted. This is unsurprising when we see some of the elements that the East Asian 
Miracle report covers rather favourably. Illustrative of this, the sections in the chapter 
on ‘cooperative unions’ and the ‘insulated technocracy’ display a fondness for a 
depoliticised conception of institutions.
190 For example, in the section on competitive 
unions there is tacit approval for limiting the political role of unions and supporting the 
‘promotion’ of company or enterprise based unions. However, the report’s focus upon 
political technocracy is particularly revealing in relation to depoliticised institutional 
emphases (which are a staple of SIN). While it notes that the sharing of growth was 
important for guaranteeing legitimacy, it stipulates that growth itself was vital also. 
Crucial in this respect, the report argues, was the ability for technocrats to insulate 
themselves in an environment which allowed them to develop and implement ‘rational’ 
economic policies while being ‘isolated’ from vested interests.
191 In short, the report’s 
message – one which continues to resonate in Bank work – is that institutions are good 
when they reduce political instability, and guarantee and encourage market transactions 
for economic growth. 
Two years after James Wolfensohn’s arrival at the Bank in 1995, the 
organisation was making more explicit statements about the state within the World 
Development Report 1997, The State in a Changing World. Indeed, Wolfensohn’s 
foreword to the report is particularly illustrative of the functional role the Bank was 
now advocating for the state and institutions generally:  
 
History and recent experience have also taught us that development is not just about 
getting the right economic and technical inputs. It is also about the underlying 
institutional environment: the rules and customs that determine how these inputs are 
used. As this Report shows, understanding the role the state plays in the this 
environment – for example, its ability to enforce the rule of law to underpin market 
transactions – will be essential to making the state contribute more effectively to 
development.
192  
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In the report, which set in train a lasting thematic influence, the state fundamentally 
matters as a market complimenting device. As Leen Boer in a feature review for Third 
World Quarterly noted, the report essentially emphasises a two-part argument for the 
state. The first part emphasises matching a state’s activities to its capability. The second 
element of the argument focuses upon building state capability via a reinvigoration of 
public institutions.
193 Crucially, capability and reinvigoration are both seen in relation 
to market function. The logic behind the first element, while ‘welcoming the state back 
in’, is indicative of the apprehension neoliberals have long held for the state:  
 
Matching the state’s role to its capability is the first element in this strategy. 
Where state capability is weak, how the state intervenes – and where – should 
be carefully assessed. Many states try to do too much with few resources and 
little capability, and often do more harm than good. A sharper focus upon the 
fundamentals would improve effectiveness.
194  
 
Capability here is defined as ‘the ability to undertake and promote collective actions 
efficiently’.
195 Berger and Beeson posit the influence in this regard of ‘an extremely 
influential strand of predominantly North American theoretical literature centred on 
rational choice theory economics and the increasingly prominent position of 
institutional theory.’
196  
Subsequently, the report is less than ambiguous with regard to what it sees as 
‘the first job of states’:
197 
 
Five fundamental tasks lie at the core of every government’s mission, without 
which sustainable, shared, poverty-reducing development is impossible:  
 
•  Establishing a foundation of law 
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195 Italics in the original. World Bank, World Development Report 1997, 4. 
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•  Maintaining a non-distortionary policy environment, including 
macroeconomic stability 
•  Investing in basic social services and infrastructure  
•  Protecting the vulnerable 
•  Protecting the environment
198 
 
Beyond this highly functional focus upon capability, the second part of the argument in 
the World Development Report 1997 shows evidence of the rise of the importance of 
good governance (and later social capital and civil society) into Bank thinking.
199 It is 
concerned largely with keeping the state in check.  
  Berger and Beeson have described the report as a significant departure from the 
Bank’s previous position. For them it is an important reference point for what has been 
‘…the ongoing reinvention of liberalism in which the Bank has played an important 
role.’
200 What is important here is that the report demonstrates the shifting position of 
the Bank in relation to the role of the state.
201 While earlier Bank reports posited a role 
for the state – World Development Report 1997 expanded upon this, calling for an 
‘increase in its capability’ – further specifying exactly what this entailed.
202  
  The increasing prominence of the Bank’s articulation of a role for the state and 
the attached emphasis upon good governance (in short the presence of a certain type 
and quality of institutions for the market)
203 related to an increasing tendency to talk 
about ‘aid effectiveness’ within donor circles. Questions within this discussion related 
to the capacity (or lack thereof) for donors to generate policy change, the problems 
associated with aid conditionality, and broader debates about the benefits of 
development assistance generally.
204 Wil Hout has noted how a now-famous World 
Bank working paper from 1997 by David Dollar and Craig Burnside and the influential 
1998 Bank report, Assessing Aid, ‘gave new impetus to the discussion about aid 
effectiveness, and made a connection between aid and good governance.’
205 Within 
                                                 
198 Ibid. 
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Assessing Aid it was specifically argued that aid worked best in environments of 
‘healthy’ policy and particular institutional settings and that the ‘value’ of development 
projects was seen in their ability to improve institutions and policies in the interest of 
providing better services.
206 Here the there was a strong push that fitted in neatly with 
the Bank’s repositioning as a ‘knowledge’ provider.
207 Crucially related to this, the 
report also argued that, in environments that exhibited ‘poor policies’ and little appetite 
for reform, ‘idea dissemination’ and training, rather than money, were the best 
medicine.
208  
Importantly,  Assessing Aid was critical in drawing a link between aid 
‘selectivity’ and good governance.
209 The research illustrated by Dollar and Burnside 
and Assessing Aid buttressed a shift in the nature of conditionality, where aid allocation 
was increasingly linked to a particular country’s policy and institutional setting.
210 This 
tendency to correlate aid allocation with policy and institutional factors, only became 
stronger as time went on, and it has been used by donors other than the Bank – such as 
the US Government’s Millennium Challenge Account.
211 What is critical here, is that 
frustration with reform and aid performance were another subset of the issues faced by 
neoliberalism more generally, which encouraged a reassessment to take place in 
relation to the role of institutions and particular policy environments and their 
relationship to aid allocation. Combined with larger crises in the global political 
economy, many of the emphases within the aid effectiveness debate were only going to 
receive increasing attention in SIN’s ascendancy.  
 
The Asian crisis and beyond  
 
1997 wasn’t just an important year because it significantly evidenced the systematic 
reaffirmation of the state by the Bank (in the form of that year’s World Development 
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Report). It was also the start of a tumultuous period for the World Bank, the IMF and 
their critics, with the onset of financial meltdown in Asia. Analyses varied as to the 
causes of the financial catastrophe, which began in the middle of the year as a currency 
crisis in Thailand. However, neoliberalism, the IMF and the Bank came under 
significant fire. Some argued that the IMF and liberalisation policies had actually 
played a crucial role in the financial collapse. Specifically, in Indonesia, where 
corruption and cronyism was cited as a massive crisis-related problem, the Bank was 
heavily criticised for working closely with the Suharto regime (that was implicated in 
the state affairs) and failing in its monitoring and assessment duties.
212 Furthermore, the 
remedial response that the IMF demanded of crisis-afflicted countries in Asia, in 
exchange for financial assistance, was heavily criticised by non-neoliberals and 
neoliberals alike. 
For K.S. Jomo, the series of crises in Asia were in part the result of 
liberalisation undermining previous economic orders, at both a national and 
international level, rather than the sudden result of ‘crony capitalism’ and rent 
seeking.
213 While crony capitalism and chronic rent seeking were often evident in the 
countries affected, the explicit causal connection between such behaviour and the onset 
of the crisis was seen as problematic.
214 Crony capitalism was, after all, not a new 
phenomenon in Southeast Asia and critics of the neoliberal position asserted that 
different forms of ‘crony rentierism’ actually helped maintain growth in the region for 
decades.
215 Stiglitz, while also not letting the countries off the hook entirely, explicitly 
stated sometime after the crisis that rapid financial and capital market liberalisation 
were its main causes, allowing irrational market optimism and then pessimism to exact 
their toll.
216 In this analysis, Stiglitz was clear in partly implicating the IMF’s policies 
for being responsible for the onset of the crisis.
217  
For the IMF, however, explaining the Asian meltdown came down to 
fundamental neoliberal concerns (such as large foreign debts and appropriate exchange 
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rates) and, importantly, governance and the quality of a country’s institutions. 
Generally, the Fund highlighted the Asian crisis as an example of what happens when 
market laws are ignored and free markets are obstructed.
218 Former IMF Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus (1987-2000) offered suggestions to avoid a similar 
calamity. These suggestions related to neoliberal macroeconomics, the role of 
government and tackling crony capitalism. In an article for The Jakarta Post in 
December 1997, Camdessus emphasised simple neoliberal (Washington consensus) 
themes, such as the need for countries with imbalances to take early macroeconomic 
action, and the importance of maintaining an appropriate exchange rate and exchange 
rate regime.
219 Crucially however, he also highlighted the strengthening of market 
supporting policies, emphasising the role of institutions and the importance of 
accountability and transparency.
220  
Indeed, throughout the Asian crisis, the language of ‘good governance’ was 
increasingly drawn upon by the IMF to emphasise the importance of providing a quality 
environment for liberal market operation. Here transparency and accountability were 
seen as key, although both concepts were narrowly contained to market function.
221 For 
example, Camdessus stated at the time that ‘a broader consensus has emerged on the 
central importance of transparency and good governance in achieving economic 
success’.
222 While governance had been on the agenda earlier,
223 it was now part of an 
emerging and consolidating consensus between the IMF and the Bank on institutions, 
institutional quality and their association with the confidence important to market-led 
growth. Demonstrative of this, Stanley Fischer, former First Deputy Managing Director 
of the IMF stated:  
 
in many respects, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea do face similar problems. 
They have all suffered a loss of confidence, and their currencies are deeply 
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depreciated. Moreover, in each country, weak financial systems, excessive 
unhedged borrowing by the domestic private sector, and a lack of transparency 
about the ties between government, business, and banks have both contributed 
to the crises and complicated efforts to defuse it.
224 
 
The Fund’s programs to afflicted countries called for increases in interest rates (to 
target currency depreciation) and efforts to restructure the financial sector. But the 
emphasis upon the need to alter ‘the role’ of government for market operation was 
palpable:  
 
Institutional changes are under way to strengthen financial sector regulation 
and supervision, increase transparency in the corporate and government 
sectors, create a more level playing field for private sector activity, and open 
Asian markets to foreign participants. Needless to say, all of these reforms will 
require a vast change in domestic business practices, corporate culture, and 
government behavior, which will take time.
225 
 
Yet, the IMF’s prescribed remedies for the crisis ran into significant difficulties. Firstly, 
there were major problems associated with the implementation of reform measures that 
were attached to bailout packages.
226 Secondly, the pursuit of austerity measures often 
had serious side effects. Further to this, for some, the emphasis upon good governance 
was an all too convenient way for the IMF to explain the failure of reform programmes 
without critically analysing the prescriptions themselves.
227 The Fund’s austerity push 
during the crisis provides an obvious example of just one of the problems that the 
organisation generated. For example, in Indonesia, IMF prescriptions had taken fiscal 
stringency to the extreme, removing petrol and rice subsidies at a time when income 
had been dramatically reduced and drought had seen millions of farmers facing 
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starvation.
228 By late 1997, Stiglitz was making the case that the Fund’s austerity 
measures were only making things worse, in an environment where East Asian 
economies were already in surplus.
229 Rising interest rates and heavily indebted firms 
coupled together to generate ‘a rash of bankruptcies.’
230 Overall, the Fund’s austerity 
measures were highly criticised by many as erroneous at best, and destructive at worst. 
This criticism stemmed from both inside and outside the orthodoxy.
231  
Crucially, in terms of the political evolution of SIN, Stiglitz used the East Asian 
crisis and the earlier growth of East Asia as a springboard to substantively start an 
assault (within the confines of neoliberalism) on both the IMF, the US Treasury and the 
limited nature of Washington consensus policies, more generally. This was more than 
evident in one of his most important speeches in which he articulated his vision of the 
PWC, which used East Asia’s growth and then crash as examples for the need to 
expand neoliberalism.
232 As will be made evident below, this assault only grew in its 
intensity as time went on. 
However, while Stiglitz was pushing his vision for reinvigorating neoliberal 
development approaches, drawing upon East Asia in the process, he and others were 
testing the boundaries of the consensus between the Bank and the Fund. The criticism 
that he levelled at the promotion of IMF and World Bank policies in East Asia drew the 
attention of US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who called upon President 
Wolfensohn to ‘rein’ Stiglitz in.
233 And while Wolfensohn and Stiglitz shared some 
affinity of ideas, Summers evidently made his (crucial) support for Wolfensohn’s 
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second term as Bank President conditional on Stiglitz’s departure from the post of 
Chief Economist.
234 
Further to this, the development of the draft of the World Development Report 
2000/2001 and the departure its editor Ravi Kanbur (a high-profile development 
economist) prior to its completion, further demonstrated the pain associated with the 
Bank’s ongoing shift.
235 The report, entitled Attacking Poverty, and the conflict 
associated with its drafting clearly, demonstrated the unequal and uneasy uptake of 
some of the more progressive elements that were coming to the fore midway through 
Wolfensohn’s tenure. The draft contained plenty to upset US Treasury, groups within 
the Bank and the IMF, and several high profile neoliberal academics.
236 Not only was it 
echoing some of Stiglitz’s criticisms with regard to the Asian crisis (and the opening up 
of capital controls), it stressed concepts such as ‘empowerment’, ‘security’ and 
‘opportunity’, along with the more traditionally neoliberal mainstay of growth.
237 Wade 
offers that the section upon empowerment was particularly controversial:  
 
Highly controversial, in IMF/World Bank circles, was the section on 
empowering the impoverished: how to create or scale up organizations of the 
poor – networks, cooperatives, trade unions and the like – so as to articulate 
their interests in the political and market realms; and how to make state 
organizations more responsive to their citizens.
238 
 
It should be mentioned here that the tension associated with the WDR was not the first 
time that there had been controversy over the annual report’s production.
239  However, 
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the draft in many ways represented the conflict between Stiglitz’s PWC (and some the 
more progressive factions within the Bank supported under Wolfensohn’s tenure)
240 
and the more conservative, though now institutionally focused, Washington consensus 
neoliberals within the Bank, US Treasury and the IMF. Interestingly, many of the foci 
that were controversial in the WDR draft resonate very strongly with the work of 
Stiglitz and its intermeshing and compatibility with some of the work associated with 
the social development section of the World Bank.
241 Here, conflict was arising over 
the ascendancy of a form of neoliberalism that now had a place for social institutions 
and their ‘social capital’, and promoted more expansive forms of participation, a 
stronger ‘role’ for civil society. In relation to participation and empowerment, the draft 
of the WDR had been heavily associated with the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project, also 
known as ‘Consultations with the Poor’.
242 This was an initiative that the Bank had run 
for some time, based around participatory processes that involved 60,000 people, and 
which was run to allow the views of the poor ‘to inform and contribute to the concepts 
and content’
243 of the WDR. The Bank had received positive responses for ‘Voices’, 
and, notably, it was lead by Deepa Narayan, a key figure in the Bank’s growing work 
on social capital.
244   
However, the draft created a storm with orthodox neoliberals, around the same 
time that protesters were descending on Washington for the annual IMF – World Bank 
Spring Meetings, in April of 2000.
245 After pressure from the US Treasury over the 
draft, and Wolfensohn urging Kanbur to alter the report more in line with Treasury’s 
requests, Kanbur resigned in late May of that year.
246 The published version of the 
report reintroduced Washington consensus elements in a more robust way:  
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In the end, the Report was published with three substantive changes. First a 
chapter was added on growth and poverty, even though, in the eyes of some, its 
Washington Consensus message was inconsistent with the rest of the argument. 
Second, the chapter on free-market reforms and unemployment, ‘Making 
markets work for the poor’, no longer emphasized the need for the prior 
establishment of social safety nets but called for them to be put in place 
‘simultaneously’ with labour-shedding reforms – which might provide more 
excuse to delay them altogether. The original emphasis on other hazards of 
free-market reforms was also softened, and that on their benefits strengthened. 
Finally, the long section on the need for capital controls was cut to a fraction of 
the earlier draft’s… . The need for a ‘cautious approach’ to liberalizing 
financial markets was substantially watered down, with capital controls now 
appearing only as transitional measures en route to free capital markets. This 
last change was particularly dear to treasury’s heart.
247 
 
Yet, the report’s final version did allow some of the social development content to get 
through. Indeed, the report’s bibliography contained many references to important 
figures, both within the World Bank and outside it, associated with the work on ‘social 
capital’.
248 Importantly in this regard, there was a whole chapter devoted to ‘Removing 
Social Barriers and Building Social Institutions’ – which contained a substantive 
section on social capital.
249 The maintenance of this chapter within the section on 
‘empowerment’, signalled that, despite the hostility of orthodox neoliberals, some of 
the social influences on the Bank could get through in a limited way. However, like the 
earlier focus upon political and economic institutions, they had to be sufficiently placed 
within the dominant neoliberal framework and subordinated to roles associated with 
generating growth and facilitating market access and participation. 
  In the first half of 2000, not only was the Bank submerged in the conflict 
surrounding the WDR and the protests surrounding the Spring Meetings, but a report of 
experts appointed by the US Congress had emerged that was heavily critical of both the 
Bank and the IMF.
250 The so-called ‘Meltzer Report’, (named after the chairman of the 
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committee that produced it, Allan Meltzer), was generally critical of the Bank for 
‘overstepping its mandate and failing to direct resources to the poorest developing 
countries.’
251 Of the Bank, the report stated: 
  
At the entrance to the World Bank’s headquarters in Washington, a large sign 
reads: ‘Our dream is a world without poverty.’ The commission shares that 
objective as a long-term goal. Unfortunately, neither the World Bank nor the 
regional development banks are pursuing the set of activities that could best 
help the world move rapidly toward that objective or even the lesser, but more 
full achievable, goal of raising the living standards and the quality of life, 
particularly for the people in the poorest nations of the world.
252 
 
As Pincus and Winters note, this attack ‘gave voice to’ conservative legislators who 
wanted aid used more selectively and an increased reliance upon private capital flows 
in approaches to development.
253 In short, the report recommended that the World 
Bank, along with the other regional development banks, should move away from capital 
transfers and become ‘sources of technical assistance, providers of regional and public 
goods, and facilitators of private sector resources to the emerging countries.’
254 It also 
suggested an important role for the development banks (including the World Bank) was 
to encourage ‘institutional reforms that permit growth, development and release from 
poverty’ – a process that the Report wanted linked to external auditing and certain 
conditionalities.
255  
However, what was perhaps most revealing in the case of the Meltzer Report 
was the resistance of the US Treasury to its suggestions. While Treasury had had its 
difficulties with the Bank (or, more specifically, elements within it), it was now 
determined to articulate its support for both the Bank (and the Fund) in the face of the 
Meltzer Report criticisms. Here, the defense of organisations perceived by Treasury to 
be at the forefront of defending US interests was paramount. In reply to the report’s 
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recommendations, it was less than ambiguous. Indeed, a Treasury statement made it 
clear that it saw the Bank and the Fund as the ‘most effective and cost-efficient means 
available to advance US policy priorities worldwide.’
256 It thus disagreed 
fundamentally with the majority of the Meltzer Report’s recommendations, which were 
portrayed as having the potential to weaken the multilateral organisations and, 
therefore, their promotion of US interests.
257 This fact is also interesting in light of 
Treasury’s determination to shape the draft of the 2000/2001 WDR at around the same 
time.  
  By the World Development Report 2002, Building Institutions for Markets, over 
a decade of contested narrative development within and over neoliberalism had taken 
place. In the report’s foreword, Wolfensohn  talked of innovating to ‘…identify 
institutions that work – and those that do not.’
258 He continued: ‘Countries can gain 
from expanding successful public innovations and adopting private innovations. But 
they must also have the courage to drop failing experiments.’
259 Another one of the key 
points in the foreword is the focus upon connecting communities of market players 
through information flows and open trade. This, it is emphasised, creates a ‘demand’ 
for institutional change.
260 While the report underlined that that there is no one, unique, 
institutional structure that guarantees market-led development,
261 it reiterated the 
functionalist line, built up over previous the decade, of institutions as market-
supporting structures. The report assembled many of the elements covered earlier in 
this chapter relating to institutions and markets, and presented some rather vague 
propositions on ‘building institutions’. Crucially, despite Stiglitz’s unglamorous 
departure, the ideas within the report resonated with both his theoretical approach 
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(relating to the economics of information, which is discussed in the next chapter), and 
many of his pronouncements when he was the Bank’s Chief Economist – especially in 
relation to deep societal change.
262  
 
Conclusion 
 
By the early part of the first decade of the new millennia, the Bank had firmly carved 
out its position on institutions – especially political and economic ones. However, it 
was now more interested in ‘the social’ too. For example, it was now making much 
louder noises about participatory processes and civil society. In much synergy with the 
argument made above for the evolution of SIN, although with less overt reference to the 
role of specific conflicts, Soederberg explained the Bank (and the Fund’s) efforts as 
part of a ‘passive revolution’ in response to the contradictions of neoliberalism over 
time: 
 
…the recent attempts of the IFIs to recast themselves as invaluable and 
democratic institutions are closely linked to growing criticism of their 
effectiveness in managing free capital mobility in the South. The production by 
the IMF and the World Bank of copious, cross-conditional second generation 
reforms (SGRs), such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the 
Comprehensive Development framework (CDF), and the Poverty Reduction 
Growth Facility (PRGF), are examples of a passive revolution that is 
attempting to freeze the contradictions created by two decades of top-down, 
economistic and growth oriented policies.
263 
 
The passive revolution that Soederberg describes, of course refers to the 
Gramscian notion of a period of history where a ‘crisis of authority’ is observed and 
battles ensue relating to the reorganisation of state power, although without a 
fundamental change in social structures.
264 The formation of SIN and the associated 
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shifts at the Bank, responding to both the contradictions and conflict inherent in earlier 
neoliberal approaches, can be understood succinctly in such a way.  
Importantly, non-paradigmatic change continues to be evidenced in neoliberal 
approaches to development. For example, in 2003, former World Bank Chief 
Economist Nicholas Stern (2000 – 2003) urged a more cautious approach to private 
sector involvement in some traditional public sector services.
265 His successor, Francois 
Bourguignon, emphasised concern for social inclusion and equity.
266 And, importantly, 
in 2003, the Fund toned down its unreserved endorsement of capital account 
liberalisation.
267 However, such emphases – when set against the Bank’s broader push – 
are merely more evidence of the ongoing crisis of legitimacy (or crisis of authority) 
within the evolution of neoliberalism. Indeed, they compliment the problems associated 
with the earlier Washington consensus that assisted in generating SIN.   
This chapter has charted the contested evolution of neoliberal development 
policy, in order to explain the ascendancy of SIN. It has argued that change can be seen 
in neoliberalism and that evidence exists to explain this change. The shift to this new 
form of neoliberalism has been especially obvious in the growing emphasis placed 
upon institutions and the increasing focus upon areas such as participation and the 
social conditions required for neoliberal reform. What we are left with after several 
decades of contested and contradictory neoliberalism is a form of neoliberalism that is 
both distinct and remains in the ascendant, and which is promoted by those who have 
an interest – material or ideological – in the reproduction of a particular type of global 
capitalism. Within this new form of neoliberalism the market is just as central as it 
always was. Indeed, a case could be made that it is even more central than it previously 
was, for it exhibits a pathological concern with the market’s ‘deep embedding’ through 
institutions and the wholesale reconfiguration of social relations in line with 
establishing and maintaining a liberal market system. However, in this task, civil 
society and participatory process are drawn into the neoliberal reform project in an 
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attempt to maintain hegemony of the paradigm and extend its influence through 
concrete reforms. It is here that SIN really distinguishes itself from earlier forms of 
neoliberalism. It is not just an array of policies to be adopted – it also includes an array 
of new delivery devices and political technologies (which reframe notions of 
conditionality) to assist with policy promotion and adoption.  
  
 
Chapter 3 
The Theoretical Underpinnings of SIN 
 
The previous chapter charted the politico-historical ascendancy of SIN. It argued that 
SIN was the product of contestation and crisis, within and over neoliberalism. In this 
story, critical events and key actors played important roles, responding in various ways 
to problems with neoliberal policy implementation and dilemmas of explanation. In 
order to deal with the ever-increasing crisis of legitimacy that neoliberal development 
faced, there was an ascending importance placed upon the role of institutions in market 
operation. This growing emphasis by the multilateral financial organisations on 
institutions was borne out in both the World Bank’s annual World Development Reports 
and in the IMF’s explanation of the Asian crisis. In many ways, considering the role of 
institutions in relation to market operation presented neoliberal proponents with a core 
weapon in the re-legitimisation of market-led development in a period where it was on 
the ropes. 
This increasing emphasis by the World Bank upon institutions has been highly 
influenced by a distinct theoretical lineage of institutional analysis, broadly known as 
new institutional economics (NIE).
268 Given NIE’s central influence upon SIN, it is 
crucial that we critically evaluate the approach. NIE proponents essentially view 
institutions as critical to reducing ‘transaction costs’ within liberal markets. It is an 
approach that partly modifies some of the assumptions of neoclassical economics (the 
assumption of rationality, for example) and argues that individuals require particular 
structures that minimise the costs (risks) associated with conducting market 
transactions. The approach is associated with highly influential academics such as 
Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, Joseph Stiglitz, George Akerlof and others.
269 In a 
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formative sense, NIE owes much to the work of Coase and his theory of ‘the firm’ 
dating back over seventy years.
270  
Given NIE’s core influence upon SIN (a point that will only become more 
evident throughout this thesis), this chapter takes a critical look at this now-dominant 
approach to understanding institutions. The chapter begins by introducing some of the 
core elements within NIE and explaining the theoretical dilemma that prompted 
theorists working within the approach to refine orthodox economic assumptions. 
Indeed, what is particularly evident is that just as institutions were useful to neoliberal 
proponents interested in re-legitimising market-led development, NIE (as we will see 
below) actually stemmed from a similar dilemma of legitimacy – or theoretical gap – 
for neoclassical economics. Here, Coase’s theory of the firm is a seminal influence.  
However, the explanation used to plug this theoretical gap has distinct problems 
which make NIE analytically deficient. This is highly significant given that the 
approach is so influential on many of the so-called poverty reduction policies and 
programs within SIN (as we will see in the next chapter and beyond). NIE practitioners, 
working within the confines of orthodox economics, sought to explain why certain 
structures like the firm were present, despite the radical individualism postulated in the 
tenets of neoclassical economics. The reason offered was to be found in the logic of 
transaction costs. Yet, this has generated an approach to understanding institutional 
function nearly completely devoid of any recognition or analysis of power. In this 
regard, NIE posits a functionalist role for institutions in relation to facilitating liberal 
market efficiency, rather than presenting us with a framework for understanding 
institutional form and operation. This trait is genetically inherited by SIN at a policy 
level. 
Crucially, NIE’s functional bind makes it weak in assisting us to understand 
institutions. Such a task requires us to move beyond the politically-anaemic language of 
transaction costs, politicising seemingly technical notions of efficiency. Such an 
analysis must necessarily delve into the issues of efficiency of what and for whom. 
Subsequently, the penultimate section of the chapter presents social conflict theory as a 
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preferable analytical tool to NIE for analysing institutions. Here it is argued that rather 
than transaction cost reducing devices, institutions – including the market – should be 
considered social structures that allocate power in asymmetric ways. Here, power – and 
in particular, class power – constitutes the most important variable in analysis. This 
analysis suggests repercussions (which are taken up further in later chapters) relating to 
the very capacity of organisations like the World Bank to implement reforms and, 
where they are implemented, the assumptions made about the outcomes of such 
reforms.  
 
‘The firm’, NIE and the modification and extension of neoclassical economics 
 
NIE has arguably had the most significant impact on the study of political economy in 
the last fifteen years. For Douglass North, one if its leading proponents, NIE seeks to 
modify and extend the contributions made by neoclassical economics, attempting to 
incorporate a theory of institutions into economics.
271 Within the approach, institutions 
are explicitly concerned with the lowering of transaction costs – a concept that stems 
from Ronald Coase’s essay (from 1937) that looked at ‘the firm’ and posited a reason 
for its existence.
272  
From this approach, transaction costs exist between transacting or potentially 
transacting parties, and are perceived as arising from incomplete and asymmetrically 
dispersed information and or the divergent mental models of agents who have differing 
conceptions of the way in which the world in which they operate works.
273 For 
example, when two parties enter into a potential transaction neither party has complete 
information about the other. Such information can help each respective party determine 
whether the transaction would be a good transaction (where neither party reneges on its 
part of a deal) or a costly one to enter into (where one party doesn’t adhere to its part of 
the bargain). In such a situation, systems of law (incorporating contracts), for example, 
can provide incentives and disincentives for both parties to adhere to the terms of their 
agreement, thus lowering the risk of breeching an agreement. Thus, the transaction cost-
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reducing function of institutions is seen as potentially contributing significantly to the 
efficient operation of markets. This is a crucial point, charting as it does a functional 
role for what are quintessentially socially embedded structures. 
North, indicative of NIE theorists, views institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ 
or, more specifically, ‘…the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.’
274  For North, NIE retains the neoclassical assumption of scarcity and 
competition while challenging the underlying assumption of rationality, which he 
contends made neoclassical economics an ‘institution free’ approach.
275 While the 
modification is important, what is retained shapes the transaction cost approach within 
NIE significantly, as we will see below. In a world where unlimited rationality cannot 
be presupposed, individual mental capacity is limited and information is presumed to be 
incomplete, institutions are suggested by North as the inevitable structures that are 
constructed by humans to facilitate exchange.
276 He notes that the structures that evolve 
may not be ‘efficient’, with ideational impact being influential on choices made and the 
existence of transaction costs generating imperfect markets.
277 
The reality of incomplete information and the varied mental models of 
individuals – partially attributed to cultural transfer of differing values, norms and 
knowledge among ethnic groups and societies – and their limited capacity is asserted by 
North to determine the cost of transacting.
278 This, in turn, posits a reason for the 
existence of institutions – they reduce risk and uncertainty and thus reduce transaction 
cost in the exchange process.
279 These are the fundamental building blocks of the NIE 
approach – although its nuances will be elaborated upon later. It is methodologically 
individualist
280 – like neoclassical economics – and while it provides both a theory for 
why institutions exist, their potential influence and asserts the importance of social and 
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cultural factors – mainly as a justification for why institutions are required
281 – it is a 
politically deficient analysis. NIE updates neoclassical economics, emphasising the 
importance of structures that facilitate exchange, but it provides little indication as to 
how societies beset by the desperation and scarcity of underdevelopment set up 
‘efficient’ versions of these structures.
282 It also underestimates the tendency for such 
structures to represent the interests of certain groups and, in particular, specific classes 
or fractions thereof.  
To talk generally about NIE without elaborating its detail and history would 
mean omitting important information that provides an indication of its influences, its 
political position and the source of its deficient analysis of power. As noted above,  the 
NIE approach to institutions, and in particular the logic of transaction costs, is derived 
significantly from Ronald Coase, firstly, through his explanation for the existence of 
‘the firm’, and secondly, through his essay, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, which was 
influential in connecting ‘…institutions, transaction costs, and neoclassical theory.’
 283 
Coase sought to fill an important gap within neoclassical economics which related to 
the existence of institutional ‘decision makers’ rather than, simply, rational individuals. 
The logic that ‘filled’ this gap became the kernel of the NIE – transaction costs. Bates 
has succinctly described the gap in logic, or ‘crisis of embarrassment’ as he terms it: 
 
Given the centrality of radical individualism, it was profoundly embarrassing to modern 
economics that in its models market forces did not rest on the choices of individuals. On 
the side of demand, households made consumer choices; on the supply side, production 
decisions were made by firms. Neoclassical models analysed the choices of these 
entities as if they were made by individuals. But even Milton Friedman’s (1953) 
spirited defence of ‘as if’ explanations served only to paper over the basic reality: that 
the social science most profoundly committed to radical individualism rested on 
‘collective’ foundations.
 284 
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In attempting to solve this paradigmatic ‘bug’, Coase explained the existence of the firm 
as being explicitly connected to the reduction of cost associated with using the ‘price 
setting mechanism’.
285 Essentially he posed a simple question. If the price setting 
mechanism is the most efficient manner in which to organise resource allocation 
between economically self interested individuals why would it be circumvented by the 
entrepreneur or coordinator within the firm? For Coase the answer is that there is a cost 
associated with determining prices – there is a cost associated with using the price 
setting mechanism. Coase argued that firms exist because they reduce cost through 
internalising operations that would otherwise require expensive contractual 
arrangements – along with all the associated structures that these arrangements rely 
upon – due to the incomplete information and risk that is associated when two or more 
separate parties transact.
286 Even when parties are bound by contractual agreements, 
property rights are well defined and structures of recourse and regulation are established 
with the power to mediate and settle disputes – using this comes at significant cost to 
commercial entities. For Coase, internalising operations within the firm is a logical 
response to minimise this inevitable cost. 
  Before we move on from Coase’s seminal insight to see just how it influenced 
later thinking, it should be pointed out that this description suffers from two 
fundamental thematic flaws – exhibiting a tendency to be both depoliticised and highly 
reductionist. Indeed, politics in the Coasean firm is completely undervalued and such an 
abstracted and politically deficient description is highly problematic.
287 To talk of ‘the 
firm’ as a relationship eventuating from the cost of ascertaining price misses some 
important factors, perhaps not from the perspectives wedded to classical economics but 
surely for those of critical political economy.  
Crucially, any conception of the firm that fails to incorporate a theory of 
interests, both within the firm and within a broader social context leaves much to be 
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desired. Reasons for the existence, size and ‘behaviour’ of firms and the relationships 
within them, can be better conceptualised in a political and social analysis. For example, 
firms can be seen as evolving in response to myriad influences – the ideational and 
motivational influences of specific people within the firm and price fluctuations for 
example – across time. Vitally, they are political units – hierarchical in nature 
(characterised by a division of labour and power asymmetries) which allow owners to 
maximise opportunities.
288 They are constructed over time by key individuals, families 
and groups with particular beliefs, ‘world views’ and, crucially, class-related interests. 
For example, owners and managers within the social arrangement of ‘the firm’ have 
vastly different interests and allocations of power to other employees. Finally, firms are 
often hierarchically ordered against one another (although they do form coalitions of 
mutual interest at times) and other organisations and institutions in a complex amalgam. 
As we will see in the discussion of the NIE below, if Coase’s firm was going to provide 
a basis for analysing social organisation such foci would have to be incorporated. 
While the Coasean approach to the firm suggests an explanation helpful for 
resolving tensions within classical economic theory, it fails to adequately elucidate the 
conflicting, competitive and acquisitive pressures of capitalist markets (exerted by other 
firms, governments and consumers, and the employee/employer dynamic) that might 
provide alternative explanations for the firm’s existence and size. It is essentially an 
explanation for the integration of processes (internalisation) in relation to price. Yet 
even if we were to accept that the firm exists to reduce costs associated with using the 
market by internalising operations, a socially accurate analysis requires significantly 
more detail. After all, which firms can internalise which processes at certain times and 
who decides those operations that are to be internalised or externalised? And, perhaps 
most important of all, who benefits most from the reduction in cost associated with 
internalising or devolving processes?   
Importantly, the firm provides a strategic structure of advantage in a competitive 
market environment for its owners. While Coase hints at some of these relationships,
289 
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just as North hints at the importance of power in his discussion of institutions as we will 
see later, the respective ideological starting points of key NIE practitioners impede their 
descriptive analyses, undervaluing and ignoring the socially embedded and structured 
nature of both ‘the firm’ (for Coase et al.) and institutions more generally (for North et 
al.). Indeed, it is an exercise in extreme abstraction to assert that the firm simply exists 
to reduce costs. After all, are costs reduced for all those within the firm? Is it just a 
matter of rational calculation to determine what constitutes reducing cost or do ideology 
and narrow self-interest and relative power play a central role? In short, the concept of 
transaction cost is conceptually limited, merely undergirding a stylised analysis of the 
firm that refines problematic neoclassical economic assumptions, rather than dispense 
with them. 
A counterview of Coase’s conception of the firm, could argue that firms are 
social structures where power matters both internally and externally – it conditions their 
existence, their form, size and effect. Furthermore, the reduction of transaction cost, as a 
result of internalising operations, doesn’t occur equally for those within and without. 
Firms exist in competition with other firms and in this scenario an understanding of 
power is essential as a force that both impedes the interests of some and facilitates the 
interests of others. Internally, the hierarchical nature of ‘the firm’ means that it isn’t just 
a reflection of its constituent parts equally resulting in general efficiency – it is an 
image that is shaped by some parties more than others, for some parties more than 
others. What matters here is that stylised conceptions of ‘the firm’ chronically 
undervalue political facets and realities, couching the discussion in the sterile language 
of transaction costs. Transaction cost becomes an abstract concept where the 
connections and description that could give it a realistic grounding never get elucidated. 
The firm (like any social relationship) can only be understood concretely and critically 
by analysing its internal and external relationships, politically. Indeed, it is these that 
give it form. This critical observation becomes even more important when North, 
Williamson, Stiglitz and others (including Coase himself) extend Coaseian insights 
associated with transaction costs to a theory of institutions. 
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From ‘the firm’ to NIE through the logic of transaction costs 
 
It has been argued above that the transaction cost approach to understanding ‘the firm’ 
negates many factors – most centrally, the importance of power. Not surprisingly, the 
NIE approach that draws so significantly from transaction cost logic inherits the very 
same ailments. What it leaves us with is a set of tools that partially explain why certain 
social structures might have arisen and what benefits certain conceptions of structures 
might provide. However, questions associated with influence and interest remain as 
pertinent as ever. The NIE approach, almost unconsciously, suggests a focus upon 
certain institutions (those associated with liberal capitalist organisation) over others. 
Ironically, this may indeed provide some insight into the way in which particular 
institutions are established and evolve, especially in relation to ideology and class 
power. Interestingly, however, the approach provides little insight in to how to build 
particular institutions. To discuss such issues of institutional embedding (or failure to 
embed) actually requires a qualitatively different understanding of the role of interests 
in institutional evolution and operation to that of NIE.  
  Pranab Bardhan has noted two distinct strands within the NIE approach that 
share substantive compatibilities and some distinct differences: the so-called 
‘transaction cost’ school exemplified by North, Williamson, Demsetz and Alchian and 
the ‘imperfect information’ school led by Stiglitz, Akerlof and Spence.
290  As Bardhan 
observes, the two schools share a certain compatibility through the logic of transaction 
cost ‘…since information costs constitute an important part of transaction costs’.
291 
They both attempt to rectify problems within classical economics by introducing 
institutions as market facilitating devices and by questioning the assumption of basic 
rationality as a reason for institutional development. This ‘mission task’ colours the 
analysis significantly, painting a generally functionalist picture of institutions that sees 
liberal markets as a primary focus and certain conceptions of ‘important’ institutions as 
a compliment to their efficient operation. 
For North, it is important to understand the ways in which economies develop 
through time – not just the way they operate at any one point in time.
292 This is an 
acknowledgement of the deficiencies of neoclassical economics for providing insights 
into the way in which economic development actually takes place. However, it is not a 
denial of classical economics per se, rather, more of an upgrade which is used to 
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promote a certain institutional blueprint. In the Northian view, the two major problems 
with the approach of classical economics relate to its negation of institutions and its 
failure to introduce the dimension of time.
293 In contrast, the new perspective retains the 
assumptions of scarcity and competition and the tools of microeconomics and it adds 
time and modifies the behavioural assumption of rationality that is so important to 
methodologically individualist approaches.
294 It is vital to note here that it does not 
dispense with the notion of ‘rationality’ that so significantly underwrites much of 
neoclassical economics – it simply adjusts it, toning down the rigid conception of before 
in order to explain why institutions are created and, indeed, necessary. Here, the 
concepts of ‘bounded’ or ‘constrained rationality’ are vital elements within the NIE 
approach: 
 
Individuals typically act on incomplete information and with subjectively derived 
models that are frequently erroneous; the information feedback is typically 
insufficient to correct these subjective models. Institutions are not necessarily or 
even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, 
are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new 
rules.
295 
  
This quote from North encapsulates the NIE explanation for institutions – the need to 
get around the subjectivity of individuals and the reality of limited information in order 
to better facilitate exchange – and introduces the propensity for institutions to be 
socially inefficient, created to accommodate the interests of the powerful.
296 The last of 
North’s points has significant repercussions for, firstly, building institutions in a 
particular image and, secondly, how we should generally conceptualise institutional 
function. Somewhat ironically, however, NIE approaches don’t take such factors into 
consideration in any substantive sense. Rather, an assumption of the inherent benefits of 
individualist organisation leads to the advocacy of particular institutions as sensible.  
The transaction cost approach to institutions tends to conceive of particular 
types of institutions (systems of property rights and rule of law, for example) and 
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incarnations of those institutions as generally beneficial to the market (which is 
implicitly assumed to be an intrinsically good institution), despite the evidence that 
institutions (including the market) can be both empowering for some and marginalising 
for others. The approach downplays the conflict evident between institutions (and 
organisations) and those who compete to affect and ‘build’ them. Its complete neglect 
of class power in this regard is innate and this substantively diminishes its utility as an 
approach for understanding institutional form and function. 
The second important school within the NIE is that of ‘imperfect information’. 
Bardhan has encapsulated the relationship between this school and the ‘transaction cost’ 
school well:  
 
The imperfect-information theory of institutions is closely related to that of 
transaction costs, since information costs constitute an important part of transaction 
costs. But the former theory is usually cast in a more rigorous framework clearly 
spelling out assumptions and equilibrium solution concepts, drawing out more fully 
the implications of strategic behavior under asymmetric information and sharply 
differentiating the impact of different types of information problems. Imperfect-
information theory yields somewhat more concrete and specific predictions about 
the design of contracts, with more attention to the details of the terms and 
conditions of varying contractual agreements under varying circumstances, than the 
usual presentations of transaction cost theory.
297 
 
For Stiglitz, writing within this school in the late 1980s, individual rationality 
(reasonably consistent behaviour) could still be assumed.
298 However, a critical 
assumption for this approach is that information is costly and this means that 
individuals will not attain ‘perfect information’, which is seen as having an important 
behavioural impact, contrasting with how the individual might have behaved if they had 
perfect information.
299  
From this perspective, certain institutional structures ameliorate the problems 
that a lack of information, or uncertainty about its quality, generate. Thus, signals that 
convey information – such as guarantees for products, or the amount of education that a 
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particular individual has received (indicating potential ability)
300 – are important 
devices highlighting the centrality of information to market operation. The reality that 
individuals might want to conceal information (when it is to their advantage to do so) is 
also emphasised.
301  
This school has had a palpable influence on the World Bank and SIN – with 
Stiglitz being one of its main exponents.
302 The approach has some utility in 
interpreting problematic situations and even potentially implying progressive policy (in 
respect to political transparency for example), but in the end it suffers from many of the 
same problems associated with the transaction cost school above – especially in relation 
to undervaluing power. While an acknowledgement in the imperfect information 
approach that information asymmetries (where one party has more information than 
another in a given situation) can be used to advantage by specific parties is a tentative 
recognition of power,
 303 bound by the logic of the market as the approach is, it informs 
fairly orthodox solutions in terms of development initiatives. For example, policies and 
programs related to the transfer of very particular forms of ‘knowledge’, and the 
importance of accountability and transparency in market operation are preferred, while 
ignoring redistribution of capital and technology. 
 
Social conflict theory and the importance of power 
 
In stark contrast to the approach of NIE outlined above, is that of social conflict theory 
associated with Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Garry Rodan, Richard Robison and Kevin 
Hewison among others. Social conflict theory offers a preferable analytical alternative 
to the methodologically individualist assessments of NIE above. In social conflict 
theory power, and importantly class power, is placed at the very centre of the analysis, 
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being the most essential facet to focus upon when describing a social structure or set of 
structures.
304 From this perspective, institutions aren’t simply viewed as efficiency 
mechanisms – they facilitate power allocation.
305 This doesn’t necessarily mean 
dispensing with the notion of efficiency altogether but it does mean expanding it 
beyond its limited understanding within methodologically individualist approaches. 
Using efficiency as an analytical concept from the social conflict theory perspective 
entails placing it within a political and social context where the efficiency of what and 
for whom must be specified. For example, the protection of the intellectual property 
rights of an individual or company over certain crops or pharmaceuticals, which could 
be seen as improving economic efficiency from a NIE position, can occur at the cost of 
the extreme marginalisation of the poor. In short, the problem is that if the definition of 
efficiency remains general and individualist (as it does with NIE) it remains 
problematic. 
  The ‘job description’ of social conflict theorists is very different to that of NIE, 
as Rodan et al. make clear with regard to Asian development: 
 
The point of the analytical exercise, therefore, is not to uncover the magic 
responsible for market growth. Instead, it is to explain the particular structure of 
power and the politics accounting for the form and extent of Asian development. So 
social conflict theorists focus analytical attention on different but competing 
interests that structure the development, spread, and enforcement of capitalist 
markets. This assists in understanding how policy and institutional transformation 
take place within broader patterns of social and political power.
306 
 
Thus, the exercise is one of ‘political diagnosis’. It is concerned with mapping out the 
interests and conflict associated with class relations and global capitalism that give rise 
to specific complexions of social structures.
307 In this approach institutions and policy 
are seen as being socially constituted – subjected to the influences of social and political 
power. Furthermore, markets, from this perspective, are not abstract – they are political 
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constructs.
308 Neither are they natural or ‘politically neutral’.
309 Indeed, ‘Wrenching 
social struggles precede and shape the rules that govern the economy.’
310 For Chaudhry, 
writing from the social conflict position, to describe something as a market regime is 
essentially meaningless unless the particular regime’s political, social and economic 
complexions are delineated.
311 
Drawing from this perspective, the products of institutions (whether they are 
economic capital, social capital, human capital, or other forms of individual or 
collective gain etc.) can thus be thought of as forms of power. Power, in turn, influences 
the composition of individual institutions and institutional matrices. The broader 
argument here is that this relationship is often dramatically unequal, with specific 
groups being able to garner resources via particular sets of institutions to the detriment 
of other groups. Here, class divisions are essential lines of demarcation in explaining 
the capacity or lack thereof to shape institutions and also benefit from their output. 
Additionally, social conflict theory implies that institutions exist and are the product of 
particular political amalgams over time and that efforts to change existing structures are 
fraught with problems, challenging as they do existing formations of power. Notably, 
this insight has implications for neoliberal reform processes, or other attempts at reform, 
where ‘inefficient’ institutions for liberal markets may exist for an extended period 
where the current arrangement of power supports such structures, or, more specifically, 
where the structures help sustain certain elite positions.
312 Alternatively, reform might 
be possible if it helps to weaken the position of competitors to existing elites.
313 Vitally 
though, the point is that power, and in particular class power, should be central to any 
approach for understanding both institutional form and function. 
 
 NIE’s underpinning of SIN and the reconfiguration of the development agenda 
 
Putting aside, for a moment, the deficiencies of NIE, let us briefly consider what 
underpinning SIN with NIE facilitates for organisations like the World Bank. In short, it 
allows a whole new effort that is concerned with specifying the particular frameworks 
purportedly required for successful development (which is now significantly seen as 
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related to the existence of particular institutions and their capacity to reduce transaction 
cost). This demands that issues that are the domain of politics are turned into technical 
issues of ‘governance’. Indeed, even the benefit of social institutions is converted into 
‘social capital’, which is seen as useful in assisting individuals to endure the market and 
also to facilitate the market’s operation more generally (a point delved into in later 
chapters). Politics, from this perspective, is only important insofar as it impedes or 
facilitates the adoption of normative neoliberal institutional arrangements – what Peter 
Evans has called ‘institutional monocropping’ and what Gill has associated with his 
concept, ‘the new constitutionalism of neoliberalism’.
314  
In dealing with this politics, new emphases on civil society, ‘ownership’ and 
‘partnership’ have been mobilised, in particular by the Bank. The logic of ‘good 
governance’ takes on all-pervasive, normative qualities, specifying the adoption of the 
‘right institutions’ and the maintenance of their integrity (transparency and 
accountability). Importantly, the focus extends beyond the ‘building’ of certain types of 
political and economic institutions and extends into the realm of social institutions and 
the ‘social capital’ they produce or contain. Indeed, the inclusion of social institutions 
via the logic of NIE is a stunning example of the way that SIN allows the extension of 
economic analysis into previously uncharted territory.
315  
The institutional specification by the Bank in the NIE image reiterates that the 
responsibility for development largely remains the preserve of national (and local) 
governments and largely diverts attention from present multilateral inadequacies, the 
past failures of the policies of the multilateral agencies and the global structural 
impediments to more equitable global development (such as rigid systems of property 
rights over important technology for example and the narrow capital flows). What is 
actually being specified within the SIN approach of the Bank (drawing heavily upon 
NIE) is nothing less than systemic political interference (with social engineering 
qualities) on a grand scale.
316 The crass simplicity of structural adjustment has now 
been replaced by a project of state and social overhaul for market operation. The 
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circumscription of political choice and the reinterpretation of social structures as 
functionally beneficial for enduring and benefiting from the market is a highly political 
exercise, preferencing certain incarnations of institutions as technically superior and 
requisite for efficient market-led development. 
The focus upon good governance presents a lucid illustration of the way that 
NIE has been ubiquitously influential on Bank policy. The World Development Report 
2002,  Building Institutions for Markets, is standout in this respect, specifically 
referencing North, Coase and other NIE protagonists: 
 
What limits market opportunities? Transaction costs from inadequate information, 
incomplete definition and enforcement of property rights, and barriers to entry for 
new participants. What increases them? Institutions that help manage risks from 
market exchange, increase efficiency, and raise returns.
317  
 
The chapter in Building Institutions for Markets that deals in particular with political 
institutions and governance is illustrative of how this transaction cost conception of 
institutions assists in the depoliticising of what are inherently political structures. The 
chapter begins implying (by setting up the notion of good governance) an ‘ideal state’ 
supplying ‘ideal institutions’ for markets: 
 
Many of the institutions that support markets are publicly provided. The ability of 
the state to provide these institutions is therefore an important determinant of how 
well individuals behave in markets and how well markets function. Successful 
provision of such institutions is often called “good governance”. Good governance 
includes the  creation, protection, and enforcement of property rights, without 
which the scope for market transactions is limited. It includes the provision of a 
regulatory regime that works with the market to promote competition. And it 
includes the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable 
environment for market activity. Good governance also means the absence of 
corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy and undermine the legitimacy of 
the public institutions that support markets.
 318 
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What is particularly evident here is the technical and functional way in which NIE has 
heavily influenced SIN. The advocacy of particular incarnations of institutions is 
coupled with an attempt to depoliticise such structures, by removing them, analytically, 
from political context and attempting to establish particular incarnations of institutions 
that are shielded from political influence incompatible with liberal markets. However, 
in any form, such institutions are inherently political structures that are the result of 
particular historical and political processes. The institutions promoted by the Bank are 
no different. Furthermore, there is nothing technical about creating them, maintaining 
them or changing them. Neither is there is anything technical about their impact when 
they are implemented. As we will see in later chapters, NIE’s influence upon SIN has 
generated projects and policies that bear this out. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that NIE assists in plugging up theoretical gaps in neoclassical 
economics, but analytically it misses much that should be of primary concern in 
understanding institutional form and operation. Its inadequate analysis of power and 
preference for narrow conceptions of efficiency (seen through the lens of ‘transaction 
costs’) are systemic flaws which unequal development can ill afford. An explicit 
recognition of the connection between power, and in particular class power, institutional 
design, operation and change and the allocation of resources and opportunities is far 
more important – especially in environments of intense scarcity and conflict. 
Institutions are social structures that allocate power, often in dramatically uneven ways. 
Indeed, they are not simply facilitating structures – they can also be ‘attenuators’, where 
a given structure or set of structures selectively facilitates the interests and actions of 
some, while other groups are marginalised.  
Somewhat ironically, these questions are not just concerns for those interested in 
more equitable development – they are also of pertinence for neoliberal reformers. As is 
made evident in subsequent chapters, SIN based on its NIE foundations continues to 
face many of the very same implementation problems that often frustrated proponents 
of the Washington consensus. Building certain incarnations of institutions to support 
liberal market efficiency in the underdeveloped world means nothing less than 
challenging politically constructed regimes, requiring the reversal of both the outcomes 
of previous conflict and the interruption and settling of present clashes within an 
environment of intense scarcity and inequality. Notably, this political challenge for the THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SIN 
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broad neoliberal institution-building project hasn’t stopped the Bank developing 
particular reform delivery devices and political technologies (covered in chapter five) 
that attempt to circumscribe impediments to implanting neoliberal institutions. 
Crucially, however, the degree of success that these mechanisms have is varied and 
often far from obvious.  
 
Chapter 4 
Getting the ‘New Basics’ Right: SIN’s Prescriptions 
 
The previous chapter took a critical look at NIE, which so significantly underpins SIN. 
We saw how the logic of transaction costs within NIE was offered as an important 
element in refining the assumptions of neoclassical economics. From the NIE approach, 
where transaction costs and information asymmetries abound, institutions are required 
to reduce such costs and are thus seen as essential for efficiently operating markets. 
Overall, the approach was criticised for its abstraction and omission, in particular, of the 
role of power – especially class power – in relation to institutional formation and 
operation. The final section of the chapter briefly noted the manner in which this logic 
has influenced the new development agenda. This chapter logically follows on from the 
foregoing analysis of NIE, taking a detailed look at the very prescriptions that NIE 
underpins in the World Bank’s SIN.   
The first part of the chapter title is a reference to a now-well known line in the 
World Bank’s report, The East Asian Miracle (covered in chapter two), which was used 
to broadly explain East Asia’s spectacular growth. The report’s argument was 
essentially that the countries of East Asia ‘…achieved high growth by getting the basics 
right.’
319 Here, of course, the phrase ‘the basics’ referred to a normative Washington 
consensus conception of development, with particular emphasis upon neoliberal 
macroeconomic prescriptions. The SIN of the PWC includes a new version of what 
constitutes ‘the basics’ – what I call ‘the new basics’. Crucially, these prescriptions (the 
new basics) form one half of SIN, with the other half being SIN’s delivery devices and 
political technologies (covered in the next chapter). Analysing these new prescriptions 
within SIN further makes clear the evolution of neoliberalism, which is the product of  
the attempt of those promoting market-led development to legitimise it in the face of the 
problems that it faced (covered in chapter two). 
We saw briefly in chapter two how a central theme within the Bank’s promotion 
of SIN is the idea that the deep-embedding of liberal capitalist markets is central to 
reducing poverty. The now-acknowledged reality of transaction cost and market 
imperfections by neoliberal development protagonists means that specific complexions 
of institutions are now seen by the Bank as essential for both the establishment of 
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liberal markets and their efficient function (chapter three). Importantly, these NIE-
informed prescriptions move substantively beyond older Washington consensus 
fundamentals. They entail nothing less than the construction of a particular state and 
society to regulate and support the market. While some of the old Washington 
consensus policies are still evident (such as privatisation and macroeconomic policy), 
even these have often been dramatically modified, out of a concern for their political 
palatability and longevity, demonstrating further the politics of neoliberalism’s 
evolution.
320  
As was made evident in chapter two, the Bank’s focus on institutions began with 
the state being brought into the neoliberal development framework, to a large degree as 
a supplier of institutions. However, with the consolidation of SIN, the project of 
institutional advocacy has gone much further than just articulating a role for the state. 
For example, institutional specification, function and quality in SIN now includes 
expanded foci on human and social capital. Indeed, these are often connected to a more 
rigorous proclamation of the importance of  ‘good governance’, which is now so 
heavily associated, within Bank discourse, with the role of the state. This chapter takes 
a detailed look at these prescriptive elements within SIN, beginning with good 
governance (as a bundle of SIN prescriptions) and then proceeding with an analysis of 
some of SIN’s other key elements such as social capital, social risk management and 
human capital.  
As we will see in this chapter and in the later case study chapters, adopting the 
NIE approach to institutions opens up a whole new world for the Bank and 
neoliberalism more broadly – allowing significant latitude to specify what markets (and 
for neoliberals, ergo, societies) require to successfully develop. This exercise in 
institutional specification entails a dramatic exercise in neoliberal policy 
reinterpretation and advocacy, which has potentially massive implications for the state, 
education, social networks and societies more generally. However, neoliberal 
transformation in line with these new prescriptions is far from assured, despite the 
vigorous efforts of the Bank and others. Just as NIE suffers from functionalist 
tendencies that neglect power, and in particular the centrality of class power in 
understanding institutions, the prescriptions of SIN suffer from the very same maladies. 
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This suggests both problems for the implementation of SIN reforms based around such 
prescriptions and, where they are implemented, the outcomes of such reforms.  
Furthermore, we should be clear from the outset that some of SIN’s 
prescriptions – especially social capital – enjoy less-than universal endorsement within 
the Bank. This demonstrates that while sections of World Development Reports and 
Bank working papers may get produced around certain prescriptive elements and 
themes, their uptake is politically conditioned from within the organisation as well as 
without. Thus, we need to avoid analysing certain prescriptions as monolithically 
associated with the organisation. Indeed, as will be made evident below, social capital, 
for example, was far from consistently endorsed within the Bank. Indeed, while it has a 
place within SIN, it seems, especially to those that were associated with its promotion in 
the Bank, to be on the demise. Here, however, we see how the ‘S’ within SIN is not 
simply understood as relating to the relationship between social institutions and growth 
(as dealt with through the discourse on social capital). To be sure, while human capital 
and safety nets play some role here, the ‘socio’ of SIN is also fundamentally associated 
with its more instrumental concerns with ‘civil society’, ‘participation’ and 
‘partnership’ which continue to be strongly associated with policy implementation, 
more than immediately concerned with growth.
321 
 
Good governance and attempting state homogeneity   
 
The focus upon good governance within the Bank’s framework draws together, in one 
bundle, many of SIN’s various prescriptive elements. Given its centrality, it makes 
sense to begin our analysis of SIN’s prescriptive content with it. While the Bank’s 
emphasis on good governance predates the consolidation of SIN, good governance is an 
important bridge between the Washington consensus and the PWC – building in much 
from the earlier Washington consensus. However, the emphasis on good governance by 
the Bank has now been further refined and linked up in a more robust way with other 
prescriptive elements, such as roles projected on to civil society in relation to 
accountability. As we saw in chapter two, it is also connected strongly to the debates 
around aid effectiveness. 
Over the last decade and a half, good governance has proved useful 
(increasingly so with the consolidation of SIN after the Asian crisis) for the Bank in 
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legitimising the persistence of negative reform-related issues. As Bøås and McNeil have 
emphasised (and as was highlighted in chapter two), governance was a particularly 
attractive concept to the Bank given the experience of structural adjustment, especially 
in relation to Africa.
322 With the problems faced by structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) in countries overloaded with reform and where poverty persisted, there was a  
perception by the Bank of endemic corruption and a lack of commitment to reform by 
recipient countries. Here, emphases upon governance provided a way of both explaining 
the Bank’s failure in Africa and a justification for a new direction.
323 Interestingly, this 
use of good governance was eerily similar to the way in which similar emphases were 
later highlighted by the IMF to explain the shattering of the East Asian ‘miracle’ in the 
late 1990s (see chapter two). Nevertheless, good governance, albeit in an expanded 
form, is now a central component in the Bank’s prescriptive platform, and is critical in 
the relegitimising of the organisation’s work and neoliberalism more broadly. 
  The Bank’s governance agenda – like many other facets of the Bank’s output – 
takes a highly functionalist approach emphasising the ‘…economic, management 
dimensions of governance.’
324 It draws strongly upon the logic of NIE, entailing a 
rigorous specification of the particular institutions and institutional quality that should 
be supplied and maintained by the state.
325 As we will see, the homogenised 
institutional set associated with the Bank’s promotion of good governance implicitly 
and explicitly indorses both political interference on a grand scale and the limiting of 
pluralist politics. However, the moniker of good governance is used to pitch such a 
prescriptive bundle, in a normative manner, as self-evidently rational, sensible and 
beyond politics.  
 The  2002 World Development Report, Building Institutions for Markets, lucidly 
details what the Bank means by good governance. In short, it emphasises four core 
areas that the state should be concerned with: the establishment and protection of 
property rights, the provision of market-compatible regulation, adherence to neoliberal 
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macroeconomic policy and the absence of corruption.
326 Each of these deserves some 
brief elaboration here. What is particularly evident in the following analysis of good 
governance is that the market is the core institution to be served in a functional sense 
by a homogenised institutional set significantly associated with the state. 
The first of the four main foci noted in the Bank’s definition of good governance 
– the creation, protection and enforcement of property rights – is central within the 
organisation’s institutional agenda. Confirming this, the 1997 WDR,  The State in A 
Changing World and the WDR 2002, make clear that one of the most important tasks for 
government is the establishment of a foundation of law and property rights.
327 Within 
this prescriptive precondition for liberal markets, three sub-conditions to the efficacy of 
property rights are delineated: that there is protection from theft, violence and predatory 
behaviour; that there is protection from arbitrary government action (including 
unpredictable taxation, regulation and corruption); and that the judiciary is reasonably 
fair and predictable.
328 Here, and in the WDR 2002, the tasks projected on to the state in 
relation to property rights draw heavily upon the language and assumptions of NIE, 
with the delineation, protection and enforcement of property rights being viewed by the 
Bank as important in providing particular signals and incentives to economic agents.
329 
The provision of ‘sound’ macroeconomic policy and a regulatory regime are the 
second and third foci of good governance in the above definition, respectively. Like the 
attention to property rights, both of these are emphasised for their intimate relationship 
to liberal market operation. Essentially, the logic within good governance on 
macroeconomic stability relates to the importance of providing a sound investment 
environment for foreign and domestic investors.
330 The basic macroeconomic vision of 
stability articulated here displays significant continuity with the Washington consensus, 
emphasising ‘sound economic policies’ concerned with achieving low inflation, low 
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fiscal deficits, maintaining a competitive exchange rate and avoiding progressive tax 
regimes so that clear positive signals and incentives are sent to the private sector.
331   
However, also important in terms of macroeconomics within SIN is the so-
called ‘microeconomics of macroeconomics’, which is related significantly to 
regulation of the financial sector and contrasts significantly with the financial 
liberalisation of the Washington consensus.
332 Here, the influence of Stiglitz’s 
theoretical approach centred around asymmetrical information and its connection with 
financial system regulation is clearly evident.
333 Indeed, no less than a whole chapter in 
the WDR 2002 is dedicated to financial systems and their regulation, and the ideas 
within the chapter connect almost seamlessly with Stiglitz’s. What is critical from this 
perspective is that policymakers improve the ‘legal and regulatory environment’ in 
order to facilitate the availability of accurate information to instill ‘quality’ forms of 
‘effective’ market discipline..
334 
Subsequently, within SIN, Washington consensus prescriptions such as the 
dramatic deregulation of financial markets are not the key foci of reform. What matters 
more is the regulatory framework that should go along with financial markets.
335 So, in 
the new consensus some of the old macroeconomic fundamentals in the Washington 
consensus (emphasising fiscal austerity and low inflation to attract investors) are 
inextricably attached to the construction and operation of regulatory structures, 
underpinned by the logic of NIE. Crucially, what we see is a reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the state and the market, where a very particular state form is 
promoted for the maintenance of the market.   
  The emphasis upon regulation in good governance also extends through to a 
demand upon the state to promote competition and the regulation of infrastructure. In 
relation to the promotion of competition, independent authorities are endorsed to 
regulate in favour of competitive markets, and the benefits of liberalised trade regimes 
that expose domestic markets to competitive influences are also advocated.
336 With 
respect to infrastructure, the Bank’s preference for the private provision of 
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infrastructure remains clear (as it did in the Washington consensus), however, here too 
regulation and competition are both seen as having important roles.
337 
The final significant element within SIN notions of good governance concerns 
corruption – which drew increasing attention from the Bank during James 
Wolfensohn’s presidency.
338 In the World Development Report 1997, the Bank defined 
corruption ‘…as the abuse of public power for private gain.’
339 Essentially corruption 
for the Bank undermines markets ‘…as a tax, as a barrier to entry, and by subverting the 
legitimacy of the state and its ability to provide institutions that support markets.’
340 
Again, the Bank’s concerns here are market-centred and intimately linked with the logic 
of transaction costs and, in particular, asymmetrical information. Corruption, from this 
perspective, has impacts upon investor confidence and foreign direct investment, raising 
costs and undermining competition by deterring new firms from entering the market.
341 
It is also seen as undermining public trust and ‘corroding social capital’.
342  
The analysis of corruption through the lens of NIE continues in the assessment 
by the Bank that countries that are more open to international trade are presented as 
having lower levels of corruption. It is suggested that this might be a result of increased 
competition, which is connected to fewer opportunities for corrupt behaviour and rent-
seeking. Here, a NIE-based link is established between openness to international trade 
and levels of corruption that suggests  ‘…greater openness also improves information 
flows’.
343 Furthermore, a correlation is also made between inflation and its effects on 
corruption. This too makes use of the transaction cost/asymmetrical information logic 
of NIE 
344 Finally, a range of suggestions is presented by the Bank for tackling 
corruption, including roles for the press and civil society, and even particular electoral 
arrangements and decentralisation.
345 
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  In total, these four key foci within the good governance of SIN display just how 
functionalist the approach is and how heavily it draws upon NIE. From the SIN 
perspective, these four elements (property rights, the provision of a regulatory regime, 
sound macroeconomic policy and the absence of corruption) should be the normative 
concern of the state to provide the structure for embedding and maintaining liberal 
markets. These, in turn, are almost seamlessly linked to growth and poverty reduction. 
One of the problems here is that reality seems to suggest that these issues are not as 
simple as the good governance agenda would have some believe. In this regard, there 
are both issues relating to the political nature of the prescriptions themselves, which 
advocate institutional homogeneity based around a highly political (neoliberal) 
ideology, not to mention the political nature of their embedding (with its anti-pluralist 
implications). 
Dealing very briefly first with the political nature of the good governance 
prescriptions, there is obviously little doubt about the logic that underpins it. It is 
essentially premised upon the poverty reduction potential of liberal markets. However, 
there are certain issues that challenge such a simple causal connection implied by the 
prescriptions within good governance. For example, the protection and enforcement of 
some people’s property rights occurs at the expense of others who might not share in 
the benefits of certain technologies and knowledge – a phenomenon that occurs 
globally, as well as nationally and locally. Secondly, the macroeconomic policy within 
SIN, which still has a very distinct Washington consensus flavour to it, is designed to 
satisfy the interests of capital first and foremost, and leaves no room for alternative 
development paths, such as counter-cyclical efforts or public expenditure to foster 
industry. Finally, there exists a tension within the Bank’s dominant approach to   
corruption as a largely national problem, when in actuality the developed world is often 
complicit in the corruption of the underdeveloped world and structural inequalities 
abound that can only further the incentives for corrupt behaviour and rent-seeking 
opportunities.
346 
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There also exists a meta-problem with the Bank’s approach to good governance, 
which also plagues SIN generally. While the issues addressed by the good governance 
framework are intensely political, SIN proponents fundamentally attempt to depoliticise 
them. At best, their normative specification undermines democratic process by 
advocating policy sets and institutional structures that are pitched as ‘beyond politics’. 
At worst, the approach is a conscious attempt to insulate institutional arrangements 
from popular participation in a social engineering project of mammoth proportions that 
is deeply suspicious of political pluralism and zealous in its reification of the market – 
which is to be ‘locked-in’ with ‘ideal, complimentary’ institutions. 
A further clarifying note should be made here about the term good governance. 
While good governance implies a SIN conception of what good government is, this 
should in no way be confused with ‘democracy’ (in any form) or ‘pluralist 
representation’. Indeed, good governance actually demands quite the opposite, as the 
WDR brashly states: ‘Good governance requires the power to carry out policies and to 
develop institutions that may be unpopular among some – or even a majority – of the 
population.’
347 Here, the depoliticising tendency within SIN is notably evident. Highly 
political issues are reconceptualised as technical issues of ‘governance’, that should be 
beyond (that is insulated) from the realm of politics. In marketing this, the approach 
implies a set of dichotomies such as prudent and imprudent macroeconomic policies, 
the presence or absence of corruption, ‘sufficient’ protection and enforcement of 
property rights or a lack of such protection and enforcement, and – perhaps the mother 
of them all – good and bad governance. Good governance binds together the elements 
the Bank wants to promote within these dichotomies and drums them home with tiring 
repetition. However, this consistency (through often false or highly-simplistic 
dichotomies) neglects essential issues that should be at the heart of development issues. 
For example, that the property rights of some impinge upon development potential for 
many receives no serious attention. Furthermore, the SIN analysis of corruption would 
have one believe that corruption is a central problem of the underdeveloped world and 
entails following the ‘clean’ government and business of the industrialised world. These 
dichotomies within SIN’s attention to good governance derive from its focus upon 
capitalism as requiring certain functional institutions, rather than understanding 
capitalism in relation to the social and economic relationships which actually constitute 
it in practice. 
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  We should be clear here about just how political the good governance agenda of 
the Bank is. In this regard, the WDR 2002 is particularly telling. Indeed, it covers areas 
such as balanced budget rules (and how they should be designed and enshrined), 
electoral rules, electoral cycles and their relationship to fiscal policy and fiscal 
outcomes, along with other examples of institutional reforms.
348 The individual sections 
in the WDR that deal with each of these issues, articulate a concern for the problems 
associated with different institutional arrangements for liberal market development and 
then specify or at least imply, if not advocate outright, preferable structures. The section 
in the WDR on electoral rules and their relationship to fiscal outcomes reveals just how 
rigorous the institutional specification can be within the good governance of SIN. Here, 
as elsewhere, the concerns of the market are given primacy. It notes that in countries 
where governments are formed by coalition ‘…fiscal outcomes are often worse than 
when majority governments are in power.’
349 Proportional electoral systems that are 
more likely to result in coalition arrangements with less preferable fiscal outcomes are 
the obvious targets of the report’s institutional advocacy. Not surprisingly, the 
consideration of the importance of pluralist representation is conspicuous in its absence. 
The predominant point of interest are the institutions (and the politics associated with 
them) that get in the way of establishing liberal markets. 
  In essence, the Bank’s promotion of good governance is a continuation of an 
approach that sees significant development impediments and impediments to neoliberal 
reform, which are unproblematically linked by the Bank, existing within 
underdeveloped countries. The issue, from this perspective, is getting the patient to take 
the right medication and follow instructions. All of this is done for broader-than 
national goals though. Indeed, good governance can be thought of as an important part 
of what Gill has called new constitutionalism
350 – the attempt to institutionalise 
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neoliberalism on a global scale, establishing the permissible boundaries of institutional 
acceptability. This involves the locking-in of reforms via ‘mechanisms of restraint’,
351 
which make it costly to backtrack and which limit democratic influence in the interests 
of securing institutional insulation. As Gill notes, 
 
…ideal-typical neo-liberal state formation incorporates legal and quasi-legal, 
indeed constitutional “mechanisms of restraint” in (sic) to lock in not only 
macroeconomic but also microeconomic policy in ways that involve a clear 
separation of the economic and political to lessen the possibility for democratic 
accountability.
352  
 
In short, good governance within SIN involves state building in an advanced neoliberal 
image which is anti-pluralist and which attempts to depoliticise highly political issues. 
 
Social institutions and social capital: networking for neoliberalism? 
 
If good governance has been a prescriptive element within SIN that has been 
predictably endorsed by many neoliberals, one of the most controversial prescriptive 
elements within the new basics has been the promotion of social institutions and the 
social capital that they are supposed to embody and/or produce. Indeed, this controversy 
has been associated with critiques emanating both from within the Bank and outside it. 
While the focus within SIN upon social institutions and social capital connects with the 
good governance agenda (see below and the case study in chapter eight), in isolation the 
prominence placed upon social institutions and social capital by the Bank has perhaps 
been overemphasised. While many became interested in the Bank’s attention to social 
capital and social institutions, both critically and within neoliberalism, it now appears 
that the social capital push within the Bank was far from broadly endorsed within the 
organisation, explaining its seemingly short life span. Indeed, the promotion of social 
institutions and social capital is now nowhere near as visible as it was several years ago, 
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giving way substantively to the more politically palatable (within the Bank) and fluid 
discourse of partnership, participation, empowerment and civil society.
353  
Of course, these elements (partnership, civil society etc.) are often linked to the 
social capital discourse. However, it is critical to separate definitions and discussions 
about social capital and civil society in the literature and look at the manner in which 
these have been interpreted and operationalised by the Bank. For this reason the link 
between social capital and civil society as the two are put into practice in the Bank is 
played down in the analysis below, with social capital seen just as another prescriptive 
element (albeit a marginalised one) within SIN that is related in a fairly specific way to 
growth. Further to this, civil society as it is used by the Bank, is seen explicitly as a core 
part of the Bank’s work on partnership and participation – which are seen in the 
framework for this thesis as political technologies for implementation (dealt with in the 
next chapter). 
This disclaimer aside, social capital and social institutions still constitute an 
element within SIN and require analysis. As the case study in chapter eight makes clear, 
social capital has been associated with the social development section of the Bank, who 
in part used the language of social capital as a sort of ‘Trojan Horse’ in an attempt to 
shift the Bank’s development agenda from within.
354 However, this social capital push 
was associated with significant battles in and around the Bank that indicated the limits 
upon Trojan Horse-style attempts at change. The controversy surrounding the attention 
to social capital and the promotion by the Bank of a role for social institutions was most 
evident in the World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking Poverty (see chapter 
two). This conflict should perhaps be unsurprising, given the reservations that people 
working within the confines of classical economics and neoliberalism more generally 
have traditionally had for social relations. Indeed, as Biggart and Castanias make clear, 
for those working from a classical economics perspective embedding liberal-market 
capitalism necessitated a shift from ‘the entanglements of social relations to the 
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impersonal, individuated economies of the West.’
355 Traditionally, social relationships 
were viewed by those working within classical economics as distorting the price setting 
mechanism and facilitating collusion, thus inhibiting the efficient operation of markets. 
Social institutions, such as families, friendships and communities were perceived as 
interfering with the rational calculations of individuals.
356 Yet more recently rational 
choice social scientists have drawn ‘the social’ back into economics – albeit in a highly 
constrained way.
357  
The Bank, through various internal groupings, has promoted a role for social 
institutions and social capital within market-led development that fuses elements of this 
shift within economics with the ideas of people like Robert Putnam (see below). For 
example, the Bank has an extensive social capital website and has published a plethora 
of material on it.
358 Furthermore, the controversial WDR 2000/2001, despite undergoing 
significant revisions, still dedicated a section to social institutions and social capital – 
following on from the WDR 1997, which had laid out an early definition of how the 
Bank saw social capital (clearly showing the influence of Putnam).
359 Finally, social 
capital has made it to the field also, influencing significant Bank projects on the 
ground.
360 
Social capital has somewhat confusingly been used in myriad ways, over time, 
and has several distinguishable broad strands, each differing rather dramatically.
361 For 
example, it can often mean networks or norms themselves, the benefits derived from 
them or ‘…anything ranging over public goods, networks, culture etc.’
362 As Fine 
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states, ‘[t]he only proviso is that social capital should be attached to the economy in a 
functionally positive way for economic performance, especially growth.’
363 Without 
trying to downplay the ambiguity surrounding social capital, the way in which it is 
drawn upon by the Bank essentially refers to the benefit, in the form of trust and 
reciprocity, associated with social institutions such as norms and networks. However, it 
is a form of benefit (conceived as efficiency in ‘facilitating coordinated actions’) that 
has an explicit function relating to market participation.
364 
  Social capital is perhaps most famously associated with the work of the 
American social scientist Robert Putnam, who has undeniably influenced the Bank’s 
work on social capital.
365  Putnam’s work, has strong intersections with new 
institutionalist economists such as Douglass North (see chapter two), and can be traced 
back to the work of the late American sociologist James Coleman.
366  Importantly, 
Coleman used social capital as an explicit attempt to introduce ‘…social structure into 
the rational action paradigm.’
367 For Coleman, it is the trust, reciprocity and predictable 
adherence to convention that pertains to social organisation that provides an 
environment for implicit, if not explicit, guarantees – allowing the existence of a system 
of social ‘credit slips’, entailing reciprocity.
368 Crucially also, he emphasised that social 
capital could also be useful in providing information which is costly to acquire 
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(showing much compatibility here with the imperfect information school of NIE) that 
facilitates action.
369 
 In  the  World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking Poverty, the Bank 
promoted the importance of building social institutions and social capital. Here, echoing 
Coleman and Putnam and the emphasis by the Bank (and NIE) upon other institutions, 
social institutions (such as networks and community organisations) are of function 
because they can assist people to operate and exist within the market.
370 In this 
functional role charted for social institutions the language of NIE is never far away: 
 
Poor entrepreneurs operating local firms in traditional industries form 
‘solidarity networks,’ sharing personal information about members’ conduct 
and intentions in order to reduce risk and uncertainty. … Studies of agricultural 
traders in Madagascar show that social relationships are more important to 
traders than input prices. Close relationships with other traders are used to 
lower the transaction costs of exchange, while ties to creditors and others who 
can help out during times of financial hardship are vital sources of security and 
insurance.
371 
 
Notably, outside of the World Development Report 2000/2001, writers for the Bank 
have spent significant effort theorising social capital in relation to market-led 
development.
372 As a concept it has been expanded and effort has been expended on 
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measuring it and its influence. Yet a lack of theoretical precision is evident and the 
Bank’s social capital literature (especially that outside the WDR 2000/2001) doesn’t 
seem to achieve any real consensus in several fundamental areas. For example, in 
Christiaan Grootaert’s approach to social capital one gets the impression that structural 
and historical context together matter – something that unfortunately has little 
meaningful presence in much of the Bank’s other social capital material.
373 Grootaert 
also acknowledges that agreement is lacking over which aspects of interaction and 
organisation constitute social capital and that doubts exist over whether the use of the 
term ‘capital’ is even appropriate.
374 These would seem to be fundamental issues 
affecting social capital’s theoretical utility. As Harriss notes, social capital actually is 
‘…a very doubtful label for quite familiar notions. The phenomena that are thus labelled 
mean nothing (‘social capital’ is devoid of meaningful content), except in relation to 
social and political contexts that have to be historically specified.’
375  
  What is striking about social capital in the hands of people working in the Bank 
is that it seems to exhibit several irresolvable theoretical dilemmas which invariably 
turn the attention of social capital enthusiasts towards discussions about measuring ‘it’ 
or the importance of further understanding ‘it’, or broadening its definition rather than 
dispensing with the concept and its problematic context sensitivity and associated 
ambiguity. Indeed, the more one delves into the World Bank’s social capital literature 
the more confusing it becomes, in no small part because numerous distinctions are made 
to account for the contradictions and ‘exceptions’ to the rule, based upon differing 
conceptions of what social capital is and how it relates to development. For example, 
one of the most theoretically interesting implications of Grootaert’s paper is that social 
capital seems to be good for growth but that the trends associated with lots of growth 
are bad for social capital.
376 Another unexplained, or less convincingly explained, 
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contradiction is that even when ‘social capital’ is evident in poor communities it often 
doesn’t seem to help achieve significant positive socioeconomic movement for those 
communities.
377 Additionally, the reality of good and bad social capital is also 
problematic for some of the social capital literature.  
  However, the explanation drawn upon by the Bank for both the seemingly 
contradictory nature of social capital for the ‘networked’ poor, and good and bad social 
capital, appears to be that there isn’t one type of social capital but at least three; 
‘bonding’, ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’. ‘Bonding social capital’ refers to the strong links 
between family, friends and work colleagues. ‘Bridging social capital’ refers to the 
weaker links that bridge the divide between individuals from different backgrounds of 
occupation and ethnicity and ‘linking’ refers to the vertical ties that link people of 
different political status – the poor and the influential.
378 However, even when these 
distinctions are made, context sensitivity and politics still remain problematic for social 
capital. 
  The more convincing World Bank social capital practitioners, like Michael 
Woolcock and Deepa Narayan who employ a ‘synergy approach’ which views networks 
as both good and bad and influenced by the formal institutional setting, answer some of 
these criticisms.
379 The focus for Woolcock and Narayan’s synergy view is to 
understand the composite social relationships and formal institutions within a given 
society and to nurture and promote the good and attenuate and inhibit the bad. Yet how 
one does this in extremely polarised and iniquitous situations (the staple target 
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environment of any development agenda) is a fundamental issue that these authors do 
not address.
380 
  In any case, there is little to indicate that an emphasis upon social capital will 
play a significant role in market-led development approaches and the Bank’s work in 
the future. Indeed, the analysis of social capital debates at the Bank provided by 
Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock (all closely associated with debate and 
practice related to social capital in the World Bank), suggests a short life for social 
capital in the market-led development discourse.
381 This perhaps tacitly explains the 
reason for social capital’s confusing form in the hands of the Bank – being associated 
with a group that was essentially waging a battle of ideas against the Bank’s power 
group – the economists.
382 This said, social capital at its most sophisticated (eg the 
approaches of Woolcock and Narayan), seems simply irreconcilable with the most 
powerfully supported agenda’s within the Bank, which are often associated with a more 
economistic focus and the more instrumental concerns of implementation. Indeed, what 
is left of the emphasis seems to be increasingly subsumed within the now-dominant 
discourse of good governance, dominated by that discourse’s more palatable (for 
orthodox neoliberals) core themes.  
 
Social risk management, social safety nets and securing the market  
 
An element which is not exclusively removed from the good governance agenda (or the 
social capital focus for that matter) detailed above and which is important within the 
new basics of SIN is the attention to role of safety nets and ‘risk management’ within 
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market-led development. This attention is also, once again, demonstrative of the 
influence of NIE, given that risk can be seen as a transaction cost or the result of 
asymmetric information. It is also critically connected to a concern for market 
implementation. Within SIN, ‘coping’, ‘risk reduction’ and ‘risk mitigation’ strategies 
are posited to help the poor deal with the pressures of the market and nature. The 
approach is a perfect continuation of the remodelling of the social as the economic – a 
hallmark of neoliberalism – and the language used by the Bank in relation to safety nets 
is reminiscent of the vernacular associated with investment and insurance. Crucially, 
while the use of the word ‘social’ implies a communitarian approach to sharing risk, 
what is actually advocated is more in keeping with an individualist/user pays theme.  
  Emblematic of this is the chapter on managing risk and social safety nets in the 
World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking Poverty.
383 Towards the beginning of 
the chapter the Report states:  
 
Poor people are among the most vulnerable in society because they are the most 
exposed to a wide array of risks. Their low income means they are less able to save 
and accumulate assets. That in turn restricts their ability to deal with a crisis when 
it strikes. 
Economic growth is one way of reducing the vulnerability of poor people. As 
their incomes rise, they are better able to manage risks. However, at any point in 
time those who are poor will see their vulnerability lessened if mechanisms to 
reduce, mitigate, and cope with risks are available to them.
384 
 
It continues: 
 
The policy response to vulnerability must be aimed at helping poor people manage 
risk better by reducing and mitigating risk and lessening the impact of shocks. Such 
policies address the immediate problems of shocks and inability to cope with them. 
But they also lay the foundations for investment by poor people that can take them 
out of poverty. This report advocates a modular approach to risk management that 
adapts safety nets to the specific pattern of risk in each country and complements 
existing risk management strategies.
385 
  
                                                 
383World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001, 135-159. 
384 Ibid, 135. 
385 Ibid. GETTING THE ‘NEW BASICS’ RIGHT 
  110 
What is notable here is that the responsibility for risk mitigation and reducing the 
vulnerability on the poor falls largely on the poor themselves. This ignores the structural 
situation that the poor find themselves in, which has often been made more volatile 
within an environment of liberalisation or neoliberal austerity. The approach, of course, 
takes liberal markets as the ideal norm, and thus suggests ways for the poor to adjust to 
the implications of this. Indeed, one of the underlying assumptions of the chapter is that 
the poor are risk averse (because a minor loss can be devastating for the poor) and that 
this hinders their ability to undertake higher risk activities that could yield benefits.
386  
Another concern that is associated with the Bank’s emphasis upon safety nets, which is 
central to SIN itself, is the issue of securing neoliberal reform.
387 Here, the promotion 
of workfare programs , ‘targeted human development programs’ and social funds (in 
tandem with income diversification, the management of labour market risk and access 
to credit) are seen as crucial not only for poor people to pull themselves out of poverty 
but also for making ‘reform socially and politically feasible’.
388  
The functional, market-focused concern on the part of the Bank over risk 
mitigation and safety nets is palpable. Yet the influence of these social foci extend 
beyond purely helping to secure reform. Jayasuriya’s work on new contractualism (with 
its liberal aims and illiberal outcomes) has summed this up well.
389 For him, market-
based social policies, such as workfare programs, are significant in that they 
substantively alter the relationship between the state and citizen, resorting to a 
‘…distinctive form of contractual governance’, which can result in illiberal 
outcomes.
390 The emphasis here is on individual responsibility in the context of 
neoliberal globalisation:  
 
Responsibility, in this context, refers to the ability to manage in a pro-active way 
the accentuated risks that flow from living in a globalised economy. Therefore, 
welfare recipients should seek to become active and responsible managers of their 
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lives and seek to enhance their economic independence. The goal of social policy is 
to promote this form of responsible agency and apply sanctions to those who refuse 
the norms of responsibility. This notion of responsible agency pervades a whole 
spectrum of new forms of regulatory governance…but it is in the new contractual 
social policy that its illiberal consequences are most keenly felt.
391 
 
The social safety net approach of the Bank is obsessed with making sure that liberal 
markets become further embedded and function efficiently. Here, what is important is 
ensuring that people have risk reduction and mitigation strategies (that operate in 
concert with risk coping strategies), while ensuring that the price of labour is ‘distorted’ 
as little as possible. Essentially, these strategies are seen as allowing the poor to be less 
risk-averse as market participants and limiting the ‘…unwanted distributional effects of 
policy reforms’
392 – making reforms less likely to be reversed or rejected. What is 
noticeable, yet completely unsurprising, in this approach is that it is only those 
institutions that are ‘liberal-market compatible’ that are emphasised. Crucially, SIN’s 
social safety net promotion is concerned not with the equality of distribution but the 
equality of opportunity (that is, inclusion within the market), problematically de-linking 
the relationship between the two.
393 Ironically, this point may make its target within the 
broader SIN framework – securing and sustaining market-led development given the 
reality of imperfect markets – extremely difficult to achieve.  
 
Supplying markets with human capital and knowledge 
 
In SIN’s attention to good governance, social institutions, social capital and social 
safety nets, a consistent string that joins them all together is their conceptual 
preoccupation, as institutional prescriptions, with market functionality. This theme of 
supporting the market, by addressing information asymmetries and transaction costs 
with institutions, is carried through to the Bank’s attention to human capital and 
knowledge. Indeed, this focus, seeks nothing less than to redefine notions of education 
and knowledge and expressly relate them to participation in the market. As Fine and 
Rose have noted, the Bank’s attention to human capital goes back some way. Stiglitz’s 
promotion of human capital actually rearticulated and pushed a position for human 
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capital, which was present in the previous consensus.
394 However, the Bank’s attention 
to human capital and knowledge is now vastly more robustly promoted and integrated 
into the broader SIN framework. Here, NIE has also been influential, with education 
and knowledge emphasised in relation to the need to close ‘information gaps’ (in NIE 
lingo these could be called ‘information asymmetries’) – which are seen as being at the 
heart of problems of the poor.
395 
Indicative of the Bank’s work on education, a 1995 World Bank report, Priorities 
and Strategies for Education, charted a highly functional role for learning that saw it 
directly linked to economic growth and poverty reduction. Here, education was seen as 
vital because it both satisfied the ‘…growing demands for adaptable workers who can 
readily acquire new skills’ and ‘support[s] the continuing expansion of knowledge.’
396 
Vitally, what is at the heart of this approach to education is the emphasis upon 
supplying a source of labour that is relevant to the evolving demands of industry. 
Cammack has summed up the importance of education for the World Bank lucidly:  
 
Education, of course, is a good thing. The two points to note here, though, are that 
within the World Bank framework it is specifically geared towards equipping the 
poor to compete in the labour market, and that beyond that it aims to educate the 
emerging proletariat in social terms to accept the ‘sound economic and social 
policies’ the Bank promotes.
397 
 
This functional attention to education has only increased with the ascendancy of SIN 
and is clearly evident in the current attention to ‘lifelong learning’ and the need for 
workers to adapt to the ‘ever-increasing competition’ of the global economy, in order to 
reduce ‘knowledge gaps’.
398  A 2003 report by the Bank, Lifelong Learning in the 
Global Knowledge Economy, Challenges for Developing Countries, further 
demonstrates the emphasis upon education as human capital accrual in relation to the 
new economy. From this perspective, inexorable forces associated with globalisation 
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mean that lifelong learning (for the ongoing development of relevant human capital) is 
critical for workers in underdeveloped countries to remain competitive in the 
knowledge economy.
399 Features of the knowledge economy – such as the increase of 
trade and competitive pressures, shorter product cycles, the new application and 
development of knowledge and the increasing importance of small and medium 
enterprises in the service sector
400 – require that a whole new effort is pursued that 
delivers a constant stream of ‘up to date’ workers ready for the next product cycle or 
technological shift.  
  The report describes the ‘four pillars’ (originally cited by the World Bank 
Institute) of the knowledge economy and, in doing so, highlights not only the highly-
functional role of education within SIN but the way in which education for SIN 
proponents is incorporated in a reconfiguration of society as a site of production. The 
pillars are as follows: 
 
• A supportive economic and institutional regime that to provide incentives for 
the efficient use of existing and new knowledge and the flourishing of 
entrepreneurship. 
• An educated and skilled population to create, share, and use knowledge. 
• A dynamic information infrastructure to facilitate the effective communication, 
dissemination, and processing of information. 
• An effective innovation system of firms, research centers, universities, 
consultants and other organizations to tap into the growing stock of global 
knowledge, assimilate and adapt it to local needs, and create new 
technology.
401 
 
Education, from this perspective, is to be completely overhauled, with new roles for 
teachers and students alike, where learning is transformed ‘to meet lifelong needs of 
learners’ and where teachers become lifelong learners themselves and ‘guides to 
sources of knowledge’ rather than ‘the source of knowledge’.
402 The private sector is 
also seen as playing an increasing role in education, ‘challenging and complementing’ 
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what is seen as the poor quality and coverage of the public sector (in middle income 
countries), alleviating fiscal burdens and ‘promoting innovation’.
403  
  There is also an unsurprising preference for market-friendly ‘cost-sharing’ 
funding arrangements for lifelong learning.
404 Government’s main role is seen as solely 
financing basic education, which is perceived as being associated with high ‘social 
returns’, and guaranteeing equity in access.
405 Subsequently, education simply becomes 
another investment, where individuals take the risk of investing in their advanced 
education (accruing human capital) in expectation of reaping the future private 
rewards.
406 However, as Fine and Rose have made clear, the human capital approach to 
education, which draws upon human capital theory, is highly problematic. Human 
capital theory is the particular use of orthodox economic methods, where human capital 
is ‘…the accumulated capacity to be more productive’.
407 While this allows it to follow 
certain traditions in theory, empiricism and policy, it exhibits many of the flaws that 
taint other analyses based around neoclassical economics.
408 Notably, human capital 
theory reduces education to a cost-benefit analysis for both individuals and the general 
economy.
409 The problem here is that education is seen as a ‘black box’ of inputs and 
outputs, with such an analysis neglecting the socially embedded nature of education.
410 
Even the refinement and incorporation of other factors beyond simple cost-benefit 
analysis is problematic for human capital theory because, ‘The more social factors are 
introduced to explain how education is produced to create human capital or to examine 
its effects in terms of returns, the more education is revealed to be linked to social 
relations, processes and structures.’
411 Much like the notion of social capital covered 
earlier, one is left thinking that what really matters remains outside the human capital’s 
field of view.   
  Yet, like social capital, the human capital approach to education fits nicely with 
the imperfect market logic of SIN, where certain goods will be underprovided by the 
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market and therefore require state intervention in their provision to maintain efficient 
market operation. Key here, however, are that the limits for state provision are 
stipulated and, where private returns are seen to be significant, that individuals make 
investments in their own education.
412 Crucially, from this position, the market should 
ideally operate in the provision of education and education’s significant role is to train 
and socialise people for productive, market-based output. In short, the attention to 
education through the lens of human capital by the Bank is yet another element in the 
attempted embedding of liberal market function.  
 
Conclusion: Complementarity within the New Basics 
 
The nexus between the different elements of the new basics is elegantly tight, 
displaying a thematic consistency that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, forms an 
important part of a clear SIN blueprint for development. Transaction costs, information 
asymmetries and imperfect markets justify and unite a new range of prescriptions to aid 
in reducing the impediments to successful market function. All of these prescriptions 
are woven together in a way that comprises one half of the complete SIN structure (the 
second half is described in the next chapter). Essentially, what we see described above 
is a set of mutually complementary prescriptions that can perform, in terms of policy 
generation, harmoniously together. Take for example, the illustration of 
complementarity that is evident between social capital and human capital, articulated in 
the Bank’s 2003 Lifelong Learning in the Global Knowledge Economy: 
 
By improving people’s ability to function as members of their communities, 
education and training also increase social capital (broadly defined as social 
cohesion or social ties), thereby helping to build human capital, increase economic 
growth, and stimulate development. Social capital also improves education and 
health outcomes and child welfare, increases tolerance for gender and racial equity, 
enhances civil liberty and economic and civic equity, and decreases crime and tax 
                                                 
412 This sentiment, of balancing between private and public provision, runs through SIN. It is well 
summed up by Stiglitz in his 1998 WIDER Lecture, where the ultimate goal is getting the market to 
operate: ‘The government should serve as a complement to markets, undertaking actions that make 
markets work better and correcting market failures. In some cases the government has proved to be an 
effective catalyst – its actions have helped solve the problem of undersupply of (social) innovation, for 
example. But once it has performed its catalytic role, the state needs to withdraw.’ Stiglitz, ‘More 
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evasion. Education must be viewed as fundamental to development, not just 
because it enhances human capital but because it increases social capital as well.
413  
 
  Yet, on the whole, the prescriptions of SIN, like the NIE that underpins them, 
are open to substantive challenge for their negation of power and structure. The 
analytical weakness of the prescriptive content of the SIN does not, however, mean that 
it is weak in its utility and influence for the Bank. While SIN’s prescriptions are pitched 
as beyond politics, this specification of institutional prerequisites is far from apolitical. 
Indeed, there should be no doubt as to where the balance of emphasis lies for SIN, 
focused as it is on the deep embedding of a highly market-based social arrangement. In 
sum, from the SIN perspective, what development needs is still the market, only now it 
also requires a ‘sensible’ complimentary institutional set – the new basics. 
 
                                                 
413 World Bank, ‘Lifelong Learning in the Global Knowledge Economy’, 3-4.  
 
Chapter 5 
Embedding the New Basics: the Delivery Devices and Political 
Technologies of SIN 
 
In the previous chapter we looked at SIN’s new prescriptive set – the new basics. The 
purpose of this chapter is to detail what are described here as the ‘delivery devices’ and 
‘political technologies’ of SIN: that is, those mechanisms and methods that are used by 
the Bank in an attempt to embed the new basics. In short, SIN builds in particular 
delivery devices and complimentary political technologies to aid with implementation. 
These are a critical element in distinguishing between the Washington consensus and 
the PWC. In the past, neoliberalism had, of course, been linked with particular delivery 
devices – in the form of projects, programs (notably structural adjustment programs) 
and other mechanisms. However, with the ascendancy of SIN, the nature of these 
delivery devices has changed. Indeed, many of these devices seek nothing less than to 
construct complex institutional sets (covered in the previous chapter) where previously 
they simply demanded certain policy shifts, such as the pursuit of fiscal austerity or 
liberalised trade. Furthermore, and crucially, these delivery devices are now coupled 
with political methods and processes (‘political technologies’,  for short) that are 
focussed upon implementation, to get around earlier reform resistance.
414 In tandem 
with the prescriptive elements of SIN, these elements have intensely political 
ramifications, implying massive repercussions for both the state and society.  
Delivery devices here are understood as those instruments that attempt to deliver 
SIN’s prescriptive content. They include the now-familiar Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs), the increasingly ‘participatory’ Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), 
and individual projects and programs (although individual projects and programs are 
not considered in this chapter, as several are dealt with in the subsequent case study 
chapters). Political technologies are those methods and tools that attempt to shape the 
political terrain towards reform delivery. Here, a progressive-sounding language (whose 
lexicon includes words like ‘empowerment’ and ‘holism’), and an emphasis upon 
                                                 
414  The use of the term ‘political technologies’ came out of numerous discussions with Kanishka 
Jayasuriya on the methods and mechanisms within SIN and he deserves some credit for the expression. 
Furthermore, I was originally attracted to the term ‘delivery device’ after hearing its use numerous 
years ago to describe the function of cigarettes (as delivery devices for nicotine). Of course, the term is 
used here in a substantively different manner. The terms ‘delivery device’ and ‘delivery mechanism’ 
are used interchangeably in this thesis.  
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policy-focused ‘stakeholder’ participation and partnership are key examples. Together, 
these delivery devices and political technologies warrant substantive attention in any 
discussion of the PWC, having been undervalued in the critical literature, which has 
focused predominantly upon SIN’s policy prescriptions.
415 Indeed, one of the key 
strengths of the framework proposed in this thesis, centred around SIN, is that (in 
tandem with taking into consideration the politics that the PWC is enmeshed in at local, 
national, international and organisational levels), it clearly identifies these delivery 
devices and political technologies and explains exactly what their purpose is and how 
successful they are at fulfilling that purpose. This brings us back to the crux of 
understanding SIN and its relationship with implementing neoliberal reform. This 
analysis is further consolidated in the case study chapters. 
Like the new basics, in total and in isolation SIN’s delivery devices and political 
technologies exhibit an anti-politics tendency and cannot be ignored in analysis of the 
PWC. Indeed, these delivery devices and political technologies attempt to shape both 
national and supra-national political terrains in order to harness those elements that are 
amenable and congenial to the market extension project (of which the Bank is part), 
while impeding and obscuring those that are inimical or problematic to it. When 
operationalised, these devices and technologies have important roles within the Bank’s 
work and the broader legitimacy-building project associated with embedding SIN as a 
hegemonic paradigm. For example, participatory processes (as political technologies) 
used by the Bank attempt to contain and indeed marginalise the conflict – especially 
class conflict – endemic to market relationships, while at the same time seeking to 
further capitalist relationships that indeed exacerbate such conflict (this is elaborated in 
detail in the case study in chapter six). 
This chapter first outlines and provides a critique of what can be understood as 
the  über-delivery device of SIN – the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF). Essentially, the CDF provides a structure for the advocacy of SIN’s 
highly specific institutional set – the new basics (which were covered in the previous 
chapter) at both a national and supra-national level.  It also encapsulates many of SIN’s 
                                                 
415 Indeed, as was explained in the first chapter, while there has been a great deal of useful literature 
related to understanding the PWC and the World Bank, it often suffers from a neglect of this very 
point, concentrating instead on policy content rather than the political approaches to managing the 
embedding of policies themselves. See for example Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds), 
Reinventing the World Bank, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and 
Jonathan Pincus (eds), Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century – Beyond the post-Washington 
Consensus (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) or Paul Cammack, ‘What the World Bank Means 
by Poverty Reduction, and Why it Matters’, New Political Economy, vol. 9, no.2 (June 2004). EMBEDDING THE NEW BASICS 
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broader themes – such as empowerment and holism. In the analysis of CDF below, we 
see how its language of ‘holistic approaches to development’, ‘country ownership’ of 
the development agenda, ‘partnership’ and a focus upon ‘development results’ connects 
with a conception of ‘knowledge’ which embodies roles for ‘civil society’ and ‘good 
governance’ for example.
416 It is important to look in detail at the language of SIN itself 
(as a political technology within a delivery device – the CDF) which, on the surface, 
looks extremely progressive and promising. This is because, when we interrogate SIN’s 
work at a lower level this appearance is substantively challenged.  
The second section of the chapter looks at two more critical delivery 
mechanisms of SIN – the PRSPs and CASs – which are both related to affecting change 
at the national level and below. Both of these, along with individual projects and 
programs that are associated with these devices, constitute the ‘business end’ of SIN, 
connecting intimately with the CDF. Crucially, these devices bundle up for delivery the 
ideas highlighted in the second and third chapters – NIE and the ‘new basics’.  
However, these devices are only one part of SIN’s scaffolding for embedding 
policies. Vitally, devices like the CASs and the PRSPs are connected with specific 
political technologies that actually attempt to shape social and political topographies in 
ways that are congenial to embedding SIN reform. Here, highly circumscribed 
processes of participation, partnership and consultation with civil society are key 
examples. Furthermore, all of SIN’s delivery devices and political technologies are 
joined together in a reframed version of conditionality. These are covered in the final 
section of this chapter. 
All of this challenges the rhetoric of SIN (most evident in its progressive-
sounding language) substantively. What in fact is being attempted is nothing less than 
the deep-embedding of the prerequisites for liberal market capitalism. SIN’s delivery 
devices and political technologies provide a new framework for what is to be adopted 
and the method of adoption/imposition respectively. These are very important facets of 
the PWC, illustrating the highly ambitious nature of it as a political project and making 
illusory its apolitical, ‘common sense’, projection. In short, the Bank seeks to embed 
certain highly political prescriptions with a set of tools and methods that are designed to 
overcome the implementation issues of the Washington consensus. However, as the 
                                                 
416 World Bank, ‘Comprehensive Development Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’, available 
online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/CDF/0,,contentMDK:20
072923~menuPK:60755~pagePK:139301~piPK:139306~theSitePK:140576,00.html , accessed January 
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case studies make clear (especially that within chapter seven) the limits of these 
delivery devices and political technologies are more than evident in their ability to 
circumvent reform impediments. 
    
The CDF as an über-delivery device of SIN 
 
Launched in early 1999, the Bank’s CDF is an über-delivery device that packages up 
the prescriptive content covered in the previous chapter and connects it with other 
delivery devices and political technologies. Notably, the CDF, like the Bank under 
Wolfensohn generally, has drawn criticism from various groups and individuals across 
the political spectrum and within the Bank also.
417 However, it is important not to 
undervalue the significance of the CDF within SIN and its ascendancy – both in terms 
of its central position within the Bank’s work, pulling together many of the 
organisation’s foci, and its influence outside of the Bank. For example, the CDF has 
influenced the PRSPs and CASs
418 – two core facets of the operational relationship 
between the Bank and individual countries which, in-turn, influence projects and 
programs (see figure 1 below). Importantly, also, the CDF has played a catalysing role 
in attempting to generate policy and implementation harmonisation. In this regard, its 
themes are also found in the IMF’s Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) – the 
Fund’s low-interest lending facility for low-income countries – which is targeted 
specifically at the organisation’s main concern of macroeconomics. Furthermore, the 
CDF (and the PRSPs) directly link up with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).
419 Finally, key initiatives and ideas that bear the influence of both Stiglitz and 
                                                 
417 See for example Stephen Fidler, ‘Who’s Minding the Bank?’, in Foreign Policy (September-October 
2001), 45-46; Interestingly, in an interview with one senior Bank country staffer, it was noted that the 
role that the CDF now played in day-to-day operations was significantly downplayed. Furthermore, the 
CDF was portrayed by this person, merely as a more overt articulation of what people in the Bank had 
been working on well before Wolfensohn’s signature discussion draft on CDF was circulated to Bank 
staff.  Interview with senior World Bank country office staffer, Manila, 2005; James Wolfensohn, ‘A 
Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework’,  Discussion paper circulated to World Bank 
staff, January 21, 1999, available online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDF/Resources/cdf.pdf , 
accessed January 9, 2007. 
418  World Bank, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’, available online:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120705~menuPK:515
57~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html , accessed July 14, 2004. 
419 The MDGs are a set of goals designed to focus the development agenda on achieving mutually agreed, 
quantitative results in terms of poverty reduction – which stemmed from conferences and summits held 
in the 1990s by the United Nations. World Bank, Getting Serious About Implementing the Millennium 
Development Goals, A Comprehensive Development Framework Report, available online: http://0-
siteresources.worldbank.org.library.vu.edu.au/CDFINTRANET/Resources/MDGReport.pdf , accessed 
January 9, 2007, 7; International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, United Nations, World Bank, ‘2000, A Better World for All’, available online: 
http://www.paris21.org/betterworld/pdf/bwa_e.pdf , accessed July 13, 2004, 2. EMBEDDING THE NEW BASICS 
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Wolfensohn, such as the ‘Development Gateway’
420 and the ‘Knowledge Bank’ (with 
its focus upon ‘knowledge sharing’) connect with and echo many of the CDF’s 
components. In this way, it is a delivery device that attempts to target national and 
supra-national levels with its policy and thematic set.  
The Bank sees the CDF not as a normative ‘blueprint’ but as providing a 
‘compass’.
421 Interestingly, though, on further analysis the CDF (and the programs and 
projects it informs and is connected to) is highly prescriptive and advocates a 
harmonisation in line with a very narrow set of policies. As will be made evident, the 
prescriptive fundamentals are not up for discussion – rather the thematic focus is upon 
how best to achieve or ‘deep-seat’ the new basics (covered in the previous chapter).  
  At first glance the CDF appears all encompassing and somewhat sanguine. It 
endorses a recognition and consideration of the social, environmental and human 
aspects of development – giving it a distinctly progressive appearance.
422 There are 
emphases upon the importance of ‘country ownership of the development agenda’ and 
‘partnership’ between the Bank and its key development partners: civil society, 
business, donor organisations and government.
423 And, according to the Bank, the CDF 
forms an acknowledgement that the nature of its work has changed, moving ‘beyond 
simply financing projects – and even beyond supporting only discrete policy reforms, 
such as trade liberalization – to addressing broader issues (such as human and social 
development, governance and institutions)’..
424 In this light, the CDF looks distinctly 
different from the top down and decidedly technocratic approach of Washington 
consensus. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that technocratic neoliberal stalwarts 
such as Lawrence Summers have had grave reservations about some of the elements 
associated with CDF and Wolfensohn’s incumbency more generally.
425 Nevertheless, 
the CDF is actually an important articulation of the importance of key constituencies in 
the implementation of neoliberal reform rather than a departure from neoliberalism.   
                                                 
420 The Development Gateway Foundation, which operates the Development Gateway portal, is another 
initiative conceived by Wolfensohn and is described as an independent, not-for-profit organisation 
designed to facilitate the use of information technology to ‘increase knowledge sharing’, ‘the 
promotion of more effective government’, and the promotion of partnerships with developing country 
organisations. The portal (Development Gateway) constitutes one of the main programmes of the   
Foundation. See Development Gateway Foundation, ‘About this Portal’, available online:  
http://home.developmentgateway.org/editor/aboutportal.do , accessed January 9, 2007, and 
Development Gateway Foundation, ‘About DGF’, available online: 
http://www.dgfoundation.org/about.html , accessed January 9, 2007. 
421 World Bank, ‘Comprehensive Development Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’ 
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid. 
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In addition to recognising the ‘interdependent elements’ and important groups 
within the development reform process, the CDF appears to offer choice in approach. 
For example, the country is conceived of as being ‘in the lead’, ‘owning’ and ‘directing’ 
the ‘development agenda’. Both ‘ownership’ and ‘direction’ allude to traditional 
conceptions associated with the selection of property: you choose what you want to own 
and you ‘direct it’, or do with it, as you wish.  Additionally, ‘being in the lead’ would 
seem to imply that this situation is one of sovereign empowerment. Evidence, however, 
suggests that this is not actually the case. 
  Interestingly in this regard, the paragraph cited above importantly reveals the 
omission of broad based political consultation (consultation is a key but highly limited 
feature of the CDF)  or consideration – the emphasis is on those elements that are 
perceived by the Bank as the most politically significant in attaining and sustaining 
liberal-market reform and function. Indeed, overall, the CDF mechanism exhibits 
corporatist and functionalist tendencies. Rather than offering a radically new approach 
where non-neoliberal frameworks for development are a possibility, as Jonathan Pincus 
has remarked, ‘[t]he arrival of the comprehensive development framework, however, 
suggests that the inclination toward social engineering remains as strong as ever.’
426 In 
order to grasp this, it is worth briefly going through several of the most important 
concepts that are both contained within and associated with the CDF. 
As noted above, the principles contained within the CDF appear positive and 
progressive (in comparison to the previous top-down development of the Washington 
consensus). This is illusory because the principles within CDF entail ‘owning’ and 
‘choosing’ a version of ‘holistic development’ that is prescribed and endorsed by the 
Bank. Within CDF, a country cannot just address social, structural, human, governance, 
environmental, economic and financial factors in any particular way.
427 As we saw in 
the previous chapter on SIN’s new basics, there are very specific interpretations by the 
Bank of how these elements should be conceptualised. Here an intersection takes place 
in a substantive way with the inclusion within SIN of a notion of ‘knowledge’ (which 
largely revolves around the new basics) which, in turn, becomes a new mechanism for 
conditionality. In short, to get the Bank’s endorsement recipient countries must be seen 
                                                 
426 Jonathan Pincus, ‘State Simplification and Institution Building in a World Bank-Financed 
Development Project’, in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds) Reinventing the World Bank 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 78. 
427 As stated above, social, structural, human, governance, environmental, economic and financial factors 
are core emphases within the CDF. World Bank, ‘Comprehensive Development Framework, 
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to own and adopt the ‘right knowledge’. The knowledge that a particular country must 
accrue in order to ‘own’ and develop a ‘holistic, long-term’ approach to development, 
of course, can be found in the Bank literature on good governance, social capital and so 
on. In a similar way, ‘partnership’ and ‘development results’ – the third and fourth 
principles of the CDF – entail homogeneity around the Bank’s way of thinking on the 
part of both donors and recipient. All in all, the CDF is an all-encompassing mechanism 
for the delivery and advocacy of the new basics.  
  The first principle in the CDF is centred around a country having a long-term 
vision, which is to be connected to a strategy.
428 This principle is also attached to a 
notion of ‘holism’.
429 Together the long-term strategy and holism are related to 
delivering SIN because the particular vision that a country develops, from the Bank’s 
perspective, has to draw from all of the other CDF principles (including SIN’s 
prescriptions). This point is important generally in understanding the CDF as a broader 
matrix that promotes consistency and coherence around an application of the Bank 
agenda, rather than a truly country-initiated and owned agenda. The long-term vision 
(10-15 years) that is demanded in the CDF from a country has to demonstrate 
comprehension of that country’s problems and opportunities, taking into consideration 
both constraints and governmental capacity.
430 This vision, is supposed to be 
disseminated as widely as possible – ‘capturing the aspirations of the people’ – and 
while preferably based on ‘concreteness’ and ‘realism’, it should be an accurate 
reflection of country-wide aspirations.
431 Country specificity in the vision is also 
emphasised and the vision supposed to be complimented with a shorter-term ‘strategy’ 
(such as a PRSP or other medium-term development plan, for example) that explains 
how a country is to progress towards the long-term vision.
432   
Two issues come immediately to mind here, that also relate to other elements of 
SIN (as the reader will recall from previous chapters). Firstly, the CDF elements 
covered above still imply that development problems are predominantly national issues 
and that, subsequently, the solutions to these problems are predominantly national ones. 
Here, the adoption of a uniform package of Bank prescriptions at the country-level is 
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429 Ibid. 
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seen as a significant part of a remedy.
433 Yet a truly comprehensive development 
framework would recognise that many of the issues that countries face in developing 
are located above and outside their borders, beyond their control – a fact that receives 
no substantive attention in CDF. This is actually one of the core problems with the CDF 
that also comes up repeatedly in SIN’s prescriptions. For example, the attention to trade 
in connection with the CDF is telling. There is very little recognition of the barriers 
above and beyond the borders of the developing world in the CDF.
434 Secondly, it also 
presumes that a ‘shared vision’ can exist based around the World Bank’s agenda at 
times of relative scarcity where massive conflicting material interests continue to 
operate, and can indeed be furthered by the Bank’s very approach. In this regard, the 
roles that the Bank accords to civil society and government should not come as a 
surprise, as will be explained later. However, the premise that such a shared vision can 
exist and be managed is open to significant question (as is made evident in the case 
study in chapter seven). 
The second principle in the CDF is country ownership of the development agenda. This 
obviously connects with the first principle and is once again linked to the delivery of 
SIN’s prescriptions. Country ownership sounds incredibly progressive at first. 
Ownership typically implies choice for the owner. In the CDF ownership is supposed to 
be generated through government leadership, analysing problems and opportunities and 
implementing solutions.
435 Beyond this, government is posited an explicit role as a 
consensus builder (both externally and internally), ‘drawing on democratic structures as 
appropriate – with other parts of society, including civil society, the private sector and 
the country’s external partners.’
436 
While government, the private sector and civil society are allocated roles in 
generating consensus, and promoting unity and harmonisation there is, of course, the 
                                                 
433 This is epitomised by the following: ‘Country Ownership is paramount, with nations accepting 
responsibility for their own development, and with strategies tailored to country circumstances and 
involving broad based participation’. World Bank ‘Comprehensive Development Framework, 
Frequently Asked Questions’. Somewhat ironically, an article by the Bank on evaluating the CDF 
details that the impetus for the CDF came out of a ‘candid self-assessment’ about aid allocation and its 
management that was undertaken in response to poor development results – especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Rather than looking at the policies, and the paradigm underpinning them, as a potential source 
of problems the issue that the CDF is most focused upon is one of implementation of the ‘correct 
approach’.  See World Bank, ‘Toward Country-Led Development: A Multi-Partner Evaluation of the 
CDF’, Précis no. 233 (Summer 2003), 1. 
434 Trade is an element in the CDF. However, the Bank shies away from some of the big trade issues that 
should be part of a development-focused framework. See World Bank ‘Comprehensive Development 
Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’. 
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rather major issue of politics to be considered here. This is a problem that goes to the 
heart of SIN – its anti-politics tendencies. Even in comparatively well-resourced 
western democracies government doesn’t perform a consensus building role – both 
agendas and decisions are politically contested by many of the groupings listed above in 
a sea of political divergence. For governments in the Third World the possibility of 
building consensus with the multilateral organisations, civil society, and the private 
sector for example – ‘drawing on democratic structures as appropriate’ – seems 
implausible. Here, however, the problems go beyond consensus building – they 
challenge the very validity of using the term ‘ownership’ in the way that the CDF uses 
it. Indeed, that the ‘vision’ to be ‘owned’ involves a consensus between multilateral and 
domestic ‘partners’, in an environment of high-leverage (naturally inherent in the 
lender-borrower relationship), challenges uncritical notions of both consensus and 
ownership. 
  The third and fourth principles of the CDF, ‘country-led partnership’ and 
‘development results’, only serve to complete the new matrix that attempts to enforce  
homogenisation around SIN. By partnership, the CDF continues with the themes 
associated with the first two principles perfectly. Indeed, the consensus demanded by 
CDF of specific interests (such as developing governments, civil society, the private 
sector, the multilateral financial organisations (MFOs), the regional banks and national 
donor agencies) attempts to force an alignment around the policies of the MFOs, 
because in many cases the Bank and the Fund are important sources of finance. In this 
respect the MFOs harbour significant political power in that they hold the final card – 
access to money.
437  
The emphasis on ‘partnership’ in CDF is upon reducing the inefficiencies of 
multiple approaches of donor agencies and there is a call for donor alignment and 
common practices and procedures.
438 This aspect is reasonable enough from a purely 
procedural point of view. As Bretton Woods Project (BWP) has noted, recipient 
                                                 
437 In an article on harmonisation and coherence in relation to the multilateral financial organisations, the 
Bretton Woods Project (BWP) has noted that ‘[t]he key process through which the Bank hopes to 
‘harmonise’ development is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). From the outset, country 
ownership has been a central tenet of PRS formulation. However, as long as the PRSPs have to pass the 
Boards of the Bank and Fund to obtain funding, governments produce remarkably similar outputs. 
Jubilee South (cited in the BWP document) reports that “in some cases, the rush was such that the IFIs 
simply took over the task of writing the PRSPs in a way that would meet the approval of the Boards in 
Washington.”’ Bretton Woods Project, ‘At Issue: Harmonisation and coherence: White knights or 
Trojan horses?’, available online:  
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/knowledgebank/coherence .pdf , accessed May 31, 2004. 
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countries have been ‘…drowning in donor bureaucracy for decades.’
439  But as BWP 
makes clear, the problem with the Bank’s work stems not from the harmonisation of 
procedures but from the ‘…standardization of donor policies’.
440 These two distinct 
features of harmony of procedures and standardisation of donor policies seem to be 
conflated in the CDF approach as one and the same. This coerced homogeneity places 
the CDF in a stark political context that belies its language of ownership, partnership 
and holism.  
The connection that makes the CDF homogeneity-generating matrix complete is 
the final principle of ‘development results’. Part of this focus undoubtedly stems from 
key studies about aid effectiveness and the sorts of pressures placed upon the Bank and 
other MFOs (see chapter two) that culminated in critical attention from NGOs, 
academics and others.
441 Notably, reports such as Assessing Aid and the well-known 
work by Burnside and Dollar, argued that aid effectiveness was best allocated to areas 
that demonstrated good governance.
442 One significant result of this question mark over 
aid performance has been an increased emphasis upon development results. However, 
which development results are looked out for and the ways in which development 
results are assessed matters. Once again, the focus is of course national rather than 
multilateral – what matters is whether a particular government has put in place 
monitoring systems to measure results and whether information is widely available to 
stakeholders. Crucially, the Bank sees the PRSPs and their associated ‘annual progress’ 
reports which detail policy goal progress and other ‘monitorable indicators’ as 
important in this process.
443 PRSPs have to pass Bank board approval, thus, turning the 
monitoring of development policy results into an important element in the new 
conditionality mechanism and, as we will see, the content of the PRSPs is very 
specifically ordered (echoing the influence of the CDF) around the Bank’s approach. 
Furthermore, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the Bank, 
which allocates IDA funds on the basis of policy and institutional quality rankings, is 
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another piece of this puzzle (dealt with below in the section on the Country Assistance 
Strategies – CASs). 
In a review of the CDF, the Bank has highlighted the problems associated with 
the area of ‘development results’.
444 Consequently, the focus that the Bank sees as 
desirable, at least at a country level, returns in a substantive way to the MDGs (perhaps 
the most overt elements of the recent development result push). However, what is 
crucial here is that the Bank sees the quickest way to achieve the MDGs as relating to 
the complete ensemble of policies that are embodied within the CDF. Thus, the results-
based focus in the CDF, when analysed with the other principles, attempts to prompt 
recipient countries into arrangements where their progression towards SIN homogeneity 
can be monitored.  
For an umbrella concept that alludes to something progressive and empowering 
the CDF is really merely one important element in the restructuring of conditionality. 
This time around, though, a veneer of ‘choice’ is more apparent than under the 
Washington consensus. However, the sincerity of this choice is still conditioned in no 
small part by the reality that one cannot ‘bite the hand that feeds’ – at least not too hard 
anyway. CDF attempts to ensure that if countries need funds from the Bank, then their 
promoted approach (which may be thwarted by interests when it comes to 
implementation) will most likely include a very specific version of ‘holism’, in which 
they will ‘own what they have to own’ (in terms of prescriptions) in order to satisfy the 
lender/donor first and foremost. 
 
Delivering the prescriptions of SIN at lower levels: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,  
Country Assistance Strategies and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
The link between the CDF, the PRSPs, CASs (and the IMF’s PRGF) has already been 
noted above. However, it is important to briefly look at these delivery devices 
                                                 
444 The report on the CDF noted some of the complicated issues related to development results: ‘Of the 
four main principles of the CDF, the focus on and accountability for development results is the area 
where least progress has been made. There are a number of reasons for this. There is still much to learn 
about how the linkages between policy actions and development results are operationalized. In part, 
limited progress can also be explained by the lack of monitoring capacity, a frequent lack of baseline 
data, weak capacity to select appropriate goals, and a lack of country ownership of monitoring systems 
which are often seen as externally imposed. Fewer than half the 46 countries have adequate 
development coordination information systems, and in only a quarter are governments putting in place 
a mechanism to track development results. Achieving accountability for results remains a challenging 
task, but the factors already cited cannot, on their own, account for the overall lack of progress. For 
example, only a small proportion of countries are making development information accessible in a 
transparent manner to all stakeholders.’  World Bank, ‘Comprehensive Development Framework, 
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individually, as they each play an important role in the attempted delivery of SIN. It is 
perhaps useful to begin with the PRSPs, which the Bank describes as ‘…the most 
tangible outcomes of the new approach to development’ that has been shaped by the 
CDF.
445 The PRSPs came out of the agreement by the Bank and the Fund, made at their 
annual meetings in September 1999, for nationally owned poverty reduction 
strategies.
446 By August 2004, 49 interim PRSPs (I-PRSP) and 40 PRSPs had been 
presented to the Bank Board.
447 PRSPs are essentially documents produced by the 
world’s poorest countries in order to gain access to both concessional lending from the 
Bank (via the International Development Agency – IDA – the World Bank’s 
concessional lending body) and the Fund and in order to secure debt relief through the 
Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC).
448 An I-PRSP is prepared where a 
particular country isn’t in a position to prepare a full PRSP. This allows a borrower to 
gain concessional lending or debt relief while providing a plan for the development of a 
full PRSP.
449  
Annual progress reports are also built into the PRSP process. Either a PRSP, I-
PRSP or annual progress report that receives – and this is very important in terms of the 
maintenance of conditionality – the approval of Fund and Bank Boards stands as a 
prerequisite for HIPC countries reaching a decision or completion point, approval of the 
Fund’s PRGF (which replaces the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility - ESAF) 
and or IDA lending. Directly connected to the various PRS documents, Joint Staff 
Assessments Notes (JSANs) – previously Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs) – are 
presented to the Boards of Executive Directors of the Bank and the Fund and provide 
perspective on progress. While the earlier JSAs were expected to advise whether a 
                                                 
445 World Bank, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’; James Wolfensohn and Stanley Fischer, ‘The 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)’, a 
‘joint note’ (April 5, 2000) available online: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/pdf/cdfprsp.pdf , 
accessed May 31, 2004.  
446 World Bank, ‘Annual Report 2000’ available online: 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/annrep2000/poverty.htm , accessed January 9, 2007. 
447 World Bank, ‘Board Presentations of PRSP Documents As at August 31, 2004’, available online: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/strategies/boardlist.pdf , accessed September 1, 2004. The 
regional breakdown of I-PRSPs produced is as follows: sub-Saharan Africa: 26; East Asia and the 
Pacific: 4; Europe and Central Asia: 10; Latin America and the Caribbean: 5; Middle East and North 
Africa: 2; South Asia: 2. For PRSPs sub-Saharan Africa has produced 20; East Asia and the Pacific: 3; 
Europe and Central Asia: 8; Latin America and the Caribbean: 4; Middle East and North Africa: 2; 
South Asia: 3. 
448 International Monetary Fund, ‘Debt Relief Under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative’, (September 2006) available online: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm , 
accessed January 29, 2007. 
449 World Bank, ‘Questions and Answers’, available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,menuPK:3842
09~pagePK:162100~piPK:159310~theSitePK:384201,00.html , accessed January 9, 2007. EMBEDDING THE NEW BASICS 
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PRSP constituted grounds for providing for concessional assistance, JSANs have 
dropped this explicit connection, with responsibility in this regard shifting to the 
CAS.
450 However, notwithstanding this, Van Waeyenberge notes that the boards of the 
Fund and the Bank endorse the various PRS instruments (including the annual reports) 
based on JSANs.
451 
    According to the Bank, PRSPs have allowed countries to ‘…address their 
investment climate and prescribe measures to foster private sector development, and to 
chart plans to improve governance and reduce corruption.’
452 The Bank role in the 
PRSP process is seen as providing ‘technical and financial assistance to support 
designing and implementing national poverty-reduction strategies’.
453 Here, the focus 
has been upon ‘strengthening governance and legal and judicial institutions’ and 
assisting countries with monitoring and accountability processes, using annual 
programmatic loans known as Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs), which 
come with important benchmarks for assessment.
454  
The potential depth of influence indicated here is substantive and the ongoing 
relationship is clearly attached to a new level of structural adjustment. The IMF’s PRGF 
is closely associated with the PRSP process, only with the PRGF there is an explicitly 
limited focus upon the Fund’s core concerns of macroeconomics and governance.
455 
Importantly, the Bank’s material on PRSPs illustrates that the CDF’s influence is 
starkly evident. The five principles that the PRSPs are centred around echo the CDF 
with the language of country-driven, results focused, comprehensive approaches that 
emphasise ‘partnership’ and long-term perspectives, drumming home the CDF’s core 
facets almost verbatim.
456    
                                                 
450 World Bank and International Monetary Fund, ‘Guidelines for World Bank and IMF Staffs for Joint 
Staff Advisory Notes (JSAN) for Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’, available online: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/PDFs/jsan_prsp_guidelines.pdf , accessed 
January 9, 2007.  
451 Elisa Van Waeyenberge, ‘The Missing Piece: Country Policy and Institutional Assessments at the 
Bank’,  paper presented at Workshop on the World Bank, Singapore September 18, 2006, available 
online: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/workshops/2006ws/world_bank/papers/van_wa
eyenberge.pdf , accessed January 5, 2006, 18. 
452 World Bank, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Ibid. 
455 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – Operational 
Issues’, available online: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm , accessed September 
8, 2004. 
456 World Bank, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’, 1. See also, Celine Tan, ‘The Poverty of Amnesia 
in Structural Adjustment’, in Diane Stone and Christopher Wright (eds), The World Bank and 
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  A point should be made here about ‘harmonisation’, which is an important part 
of the PRSP process. This echoes the legacy of the Washington consensus in an eerie 
way – dispelling any myth that the fractures between the Bank and the Fund, that were 
at a high point during the Stiglitz fiasco, have had a major impact upon Bank-Fund 
relationship. If anything, significant effort has been made to emphasise that the present 
requires tighter harmony between the two organisations, with the PRSP process 
presupposing an even tighter working relationship between the Bank and the Fund.
457 
Overall, what is striking about PRSPs as delivery devices is the degree to which 
they are designed to generate the output of what the Bank and Fund want to hear. Here 
again, the inherent leverage between donor and recipient is critical. Indeed, put simply, 
because PRSPs function as prerequisites for access to IDA money and HIPC status, 
requiring the approval of both the boards of the Bank and the Fund ensures such 
homogeneity.
458 In this effort, they move well beyond the attempt to alter policy in a 
strategically targeted manner (as with structural adjustment), actually attempting to 
influence ‘the process of formulating national economic plans.’
459 As Tan states, in 
contrast to structural adjustment: 
 
The CDF-PRSP approach instead seeks to reinstate the regulative capacity of 
the state through the reconfiguration of key domestic processes and 
institutions and by linking the disbursement of financing to such reforms. 
This process of restructuring the state apparatuses takes place on two 
fronts: (1) through the imposition of a standardized mechanism for policy 
discussion and formulation – the PRS process – and a universal blueprint for 
developing national development plans – the PRSP document; and (2) 
through efforts to centre key policy-making processes on the PRSP and to 
standardize bureaucratic practice along the principles established by the 
PRSP approach… .
460 
 
Van Waeyenberge has noted the volume of literature that is critical of the ‘insufficient 
depth and breadth’ of participatory involvement in the process feeding into PRSPs and 
                                                 
457 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – Operational 
Issues’. 
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the impact that this has upon ownership.
461 She also points to the recognition of 
homogeneity in the PRSPs, with a ‘striking recurrence of such policy initiatives as trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, investment deregulation and fiscal stringency.’
462 In short, 
the PRSP is a critical device in attempting to guarantee SIN homogeneity through an 
altered form of conditionality that gives the appearance that countries are ‘owning’ their 
development approach (as demanded by the CDF). However, the production of a PRSP 
is done in a highly political environment that, in no small way, provides incentives to 
encourage adherence to Bank orthodoxy on the part of PRSP-producing countries. 
Another critical delivery device for the Bank is the Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS). CASs are prepared by the Bank for all current borrowers from the International 
development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD).
463 While the CAS was developed in the early 1990s, increasingly 
it has become further enmeshed with SIN’s other mechanisms and technologies, 
drawing in the use of consultation processes (see chapter seven) and connecting up with 
development plans (including PRSPs).
464An important function of a CAS is to present 
an appraisal of reform progress and detail the risks the Bank sees in a particular country. 
It also typically provides an assessment of domestic political and economic shifts and 
the evolving Bank involvement in the country. This means that unlike PRSPs, every 
country that receives Bank funds has a CAS. Vitally, while CASs are now often 
developed after consultative participatory processes (a form of political technology 
covered below), they are not negotiated documents and are produced by the Bank 
country offices and those staff attached to them in Washington. The Strategies are 
designed to provide a ‘diagnosis’ of a country’s ‘development challenges’ and seek to 
reveal the core areas where the Bank can be most effective in its work with that 
country.
465 This diagnosis includes an assessment of the Bank’s portfolio performance 
in a given country, the country’s creditworthiness, the potential for reform 
implementation and the levels of institutional integrity evident in a member country.
466  
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Finally, and crucially in terms of conditionality, the Strategies are becoming 
‘increasingly results focused’.
467 
That a CAS’s assessment of a country’s position is directly connected to what is 
possible or not (in terms of the Bank’s portfolio with a member state) makes the CAS 
an extremely important document. In essence, as a document that is approved by the 
Bank’s Board, it is the core instrument that determines the extent to which a Bank can 
work with a particular country. Importantly, like the PRSP, the CAS links SIN’s 
prescriptive content up with a framework for monitoring performance. It is important to 
understand this relationship, because it details the very point of leverage that the Bank 
has through the CAS. Drawing upon the influence of the CDF, a CAS is supposed to 
start out from ‘the country’s own vision of its development goals’,
468 which can take the 
form of a PRSP or other strategy. Here, once again, it is obviously in the interests of a 
country (if it wants access to Bank support) to prepare a plan that satisfies the Bank. 
The CAS then details how the Bank views a country’s situation, providing signals to 
both the Bank’s Board and recipient countries as to where the organisation sees 
weaknesses and how these relate to the Bank’s allocation of resources.  
For example, the 2006-08 Philippines CAS, (which is looked at in the case study 
in chapter seven), presents an assessment of that country’s situation – focusing upon 
certain institutional predicaments (such as capture by interests) – and a forceful 
articulation of the manner in which this impacts upon investor confidence, growth and 
poverty reduction.
469 In turn the CAS presents an overview of the Bank’s ‘engagement 
strategy’ and the way in which its program is to be delivered.
470 It is connected to the 
Philippine Government’s Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (which looks 
very similar in content and form to a PRSP). Importantly, also the Philippine CAS 
presents an analysis of the problems for reform under the previous CAS period (2003-
05) – noting that this constrained the Bank’s capacity to meet certain lending thresholds, 
which required reform progress to be made for the Bank to increase its portfolio.
471  
A note should be made about the delivery device of the CAS and its relationship 
with the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which in itself can be 
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available online: 
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considered part of yet another delivery mechanism of SIN. In the case of IDA 
borrowing countries a further mechanism of leverage is rendered via a system that 
makes annual assessments of a countries policy and institutional situation, largely via 
the CPIA.
472 It includes criteria based around the areas of economic management, 
structural policies, social inclusion and equity and public sector management and 
institutions.
473 The analysis of these criteria is combined with an annual portfolio 
assessment that is concerned with implementation progress, with a governance factor is 
considered also.
474 From these three elements, a performance rating is generated that 
means that higher performers get a higher proportion of IDA funds.
475 This ‘allocation 
norm’ stipulates the funding available to countries for a period of three years, setting the 
‘resource envelope that each country could expect to receive if its performance stays the 
same and assuming a pipeline of quality projects’.
476 The connection between the 
performance rating and CAS is highly important in that when a new CAS is drafted the 
allocation norm sets the base-case financing level in a given country, as well as 
informing the triggers for portfolio possibilities (expansion or reduction etc.).
477  
In sum, the CAS is a delivery device of SIN (in tandem with an individual 
country’s own development plan to which it is connected) that uses the inherent 
leverage within a donor/recipient relationship in a manner that attempts to alter state 
form, in return for access to funds. In IDA recipient countries, this mechanism is tied to 
the mechanism of the PRSP and a further performance allocation mechanism (which 
includes the CPIA) to form an important matrix of checks and balances tied to financial 
incentives (access to funding) that attempts to deliver SIN.  
Political technologies of SIN: participation and partnership 
While delivery devices such as PRSPs and CASs are an essential component within 
SIN, critically, they now work in concert with a set of political technologies that are 
related to assisting in the implementation of SIN’s prescriptive content. Most apparent 
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here are participatory processes and partnership arrangements (the language of SIN, 
noted above and covered further below, can also be considered a political technology). 
It is worthwhile looking at the way in which these political technologies are woven into 
SIN in an attempt to embed its policies. Indeed, the inclusion of these technologies is a 
major point of departure from the previous consensus, where the Bank has attempted to 
move somewhat beyond traditional methods of conditionality by using particular 
techniques to build consensus and marginalise and contain those elements not congenial 
to the SIN project. 
Importantly, the logic associated with political technologies such as participation 
and partnership connects strongly with a narrow reading of civil society, empowerment 
and decentralisation. These, in turn, link up with a concern for the implementation of 
the new basics (covered in the last chapter). It is important to understand the way in 
which these concepts intersect at the thematic and policy levels. John Harris has 
described the link well:  
 
In the contemporary discourse on development articulated in international 
agencies, notably the World Bank, there is a good deal of emphasis upon 
the virtues of ‘participation’ – sometimes also taken as implying 
‘empowerment’ – and upon ‘decentralization’, which is seen either as the 
key means of realizing participation or sometimes as being more or less 
equivalent to it. These three buzz-words are used in close alliance with the 
two others, ‘social capital’ and ‘civil society’… 
478 
 
Here, participation and partnership in SIN are very much about mobilising to secure the 
neoliberal market. In this way, the function they serve in tandem with civil society and 
(for some) social capital is an important part of an attempt to construct and maintain 
hegemony in the classical Gramscian sense, where ‘civil society’ ‘is the ensemble of 
organisms commonly called private’ – separate to ‘political society’,
479 or the state, and 
which becomes important to develop and maintain a historical bloc. Thus, ‘civil society’ 
in SIN incorporates those NGOs and actors that are perceived by the Bank as supportive 
of and/or necessary to the project at hand.
480 
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Essentially, the primary task of what the Bank attempts to do with political 
technologies such as participation and partnership is to nurture and manage within civil 
society those combinations of actors that can assist with facilitating the implementation 
of the market-led development agenda. This approach to participation and partnership 
fits perfectly with Jayasuriya’s notion of governance that sees it as seeking ‘to create 
New Liberal subjects and institutions whose purpose and ends are shaped by economic 
imperatives that are seen to be inimical to pluralist politics of interest.’
481 Crucially, 
rather than expanding the space and opportunity for participation, the Bank’s approach 
necessarily attempts to contain it within specific boundaries. This is because the 
functions that participation and partnership are accorded by the Bank are not actually 
tied to increasing pluralist representation and broad political participation but are 
actually mustered for the express requirement of building consensus around ‘market 
citizenship’.
482 As the case study in chapter seven makes clear, these boundaries are 
often perceived by certain political actors (especially class-based actors such as labour 
groups and activist organisations concerned with the poor) as highly incompatible with 
their interests. Importantly, where the boundaries are seen by NGOs or the Bank as 
insurmountable, participation and partnership, in any meaningful sense, is actually 
impossible. 
  The Bank’s recognition of a role for participation goes back some way, 
beginning significantly in the mid-to-late1980s when the Bank altered the way that it 
engaged with NGOs, setting up a Bank-wide learning group on participatory 
development.
483 James Adams and Jennifer Rietbergen-McCracken (both working the 
Bank) noted that the learning group was ‘charged with examining the issue of 
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participation and the challenges to the bank it entailed.’
484 Here, participation was 
defined as ‘a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them.’
485 Stakeholders in 
this sense were seen as ‘those people – as individuals or institutions – who either affect 
or are affected by the Bank’s policies and actions.’
486 Critical here was the Bank’s 
perennial concern for reform implementation. Indeed, Adams and Rietbergen-
McCracken contended that development efforts had a better chance of success if 
important stakeholders felt that they had a ‘genuine stake in the outcome.’
487 The key to 
understanding the demand for participatory initiatives, from a Bank point of view, is 
particularly revealing in the assessment of ‘costs’ that the authors apportion to not 
adopting participatory measures:  
 
These costs include: a lack of support that can impede the use of services, 
reduce the sustainability of the intended benefits, and limit cost-recovery of 
projects; a sense of indifference and dependency on the state by citizens who 
see they have little or no say in development; and the harbouring of resentment 
and wilful obstruction when projects or policies are imposed.
488  
 
The Bank’s present emphasis upon participation is an ubiquitous element in both its 
public profile and work. It currently maintains its own ‘Participatory and Civic 
Engagement’ webpage, associated with the Participation and Civic Engagement group, 
which is a thematic grouping within the aforementioned Social Development 
Department of the Bank, which has been at the forefront of much of the Bank’s basic 
work upon participation.
489 The Participatory and Civic Engagement web pages, which 
also date the beginnings of the Bank’s work on participation back to the learning group 
that was formed in late 1990, are even more clear about the need for participation and 
the links between it and those organisations that are increasingly referred to as ‘civil 
society’, which is seen as an ‘agent of development alongside the market and the state’: 
                                                 
484 James Adams and Jennifer Rietbergen-McCracken, ‘Participatory Development: Getting the Key 
Players Involved’, Finance and Development (September 1994), 36. 
485 Adams and Rietbergen-McCracken, ‘Participatory Development’, 36.  
486 Ibid.  
487 Ibid. 
488 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
489 See World Bank (the Participation and Civic Engagement Group),‘About Us: Background’, available 
online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTPCEN
G/0,,contentMDK:20507620~menuPK:1278290~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00
.html , accessed January 9, 2007.  EMBEDDING THE NEW BASICS 
  137
 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) are important actors in building necessary 
consensus for economic reforms and long term development, in promoting 
effective governance by fostering transparency and accountability of public 
institutions, and in efforts to fight inequality and exclusion. CSOs also have an 
increasingly critical role in the direct delivery of social and economic services, 
and in improving natural resource management and environmental protection 
through collective action.
490 
  
This description of CSOs distils in a functional sense just what the Bank means when it 
talks about civil society. It is also evident that many of SIN’s fundamentals are 
highlighted and connected with these apparently highly-capable CSOs. Their roles in 
service delivery, providing transparency, ‘building consensus’ and ‘fighting inequality 
and exclusion’ are all clearly emphasised. Of course, having CSOs ‘participate’ in the 
Bank’s work and building ‘partnerships’ with them would seem rational from a purely 
pragmatic perspective on the part of the organisation. However, what is important to 
note is that the sections of civil society that are engaged by the Bank and the way that 
engagement takes place within the Bank’s work do not approximate a pluralist political 
project with a broad based political support demonstrating a plausible notion of 
legitimacy – although the veil of legitimacy present no doubt performs a function within 
the SIN project. What is encouraged – as chapter seven makes apparent – is the 
calculated participation of stakeholders within an already identified rigid policy matrix 
couched around the new basics and delivered via PRSPs and CASs. The concern for the 
Bank here is undoubtedly implementation – such a key focus of SIN. This is not just for 
the sake of pushing an ideologically charged policy set. Indeed, it is also to facilitate 
further lending opportunities which are tied to reform success.  
 
‘Knowledge’, the language of SIN and the new conditionality 
 
‘Holistic visions’, ‘country ownership’, ‘partnership’ and ‘development results’ – now-
ubiquitous entries within the Bank’s lexicon – entwine with the all important conception 
of ‘knowledge’. The ‘Knowledge Bank’ and notions of ‘knowledge sharing’ both 
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feature strongly in the CDF and the devices and technologies discussed above, 
assuming an important place in the SIN.
491 Knowledge, as used by the Bank, is an 
important theme in an organisation trying to move beyond basic structural adjustment 
conditionality to an approach of ‘…defining and propagating a model of development 
best practice’.
492 However, conditionality has not disappeared – it has been altered. We 
should conclude this chapter by making explicit the connection between the delivery 
devices and political technologies of SIN, and the new basics – which accord in no 
small part with the Bank’s meaning of ‘knowledge’ – and the manner in which 
altogether these form the new conditionality mechanism. 
Within SIN, knowledge is now seen by the Bank as a replacement of sorts for 
the  conditionality that was associated with SAPs. In a critical introduction to their 
book, Pincus and Winters encapsulate the way the Bank intended to integrate 
knowledge and conditionality succinctly: 
 
The knowledge bank would no longer enforce policy change through 
conditionality but would instead would teach poor countries how to 
transform themselves, encourage participation in the process of change 
through partnerships, and encourage commitment and “ownership” 
through the vehicle of the CDF.
493 
 
Pender, however, emphasises that rather than replacing conditionality, the CDF and its 
intersection with knowledge are actually formed around yet another form of 
conditionality.
494 Essentially, this new form of conditionality, dressed up in the CDF 
and involving the PRSPS and CASs, can be significantly attributed to the way the Bank 
connects knowledge and ownership. Crucially, ownership is achieved once the country 
                                                 
491 In this regard, the 1998/99 World Development Report, Knowledge for Development is particularly 
emblematic. World Bank, 1998/99 World Development Report, Knowledge for Development, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
492Paul Collier, quoted in John Pender, ‘From “Structural Adjustment” to “Comprehensive Development 
Framework’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 22 no. 3 (2001), 409; Pender notes that it was actually Robert 
McNamara who first proposed conditionality as a tool to encourage growth by connecting financial 
assistance to the adoption of policy sets recommended by the Bank. Pender, ‘From “Structural 
Adjustment” to “Comprehensive Development Framework’, 395. 
493 Jonathan Pincus and Jeffery Winters, ‘Reinventing the World Bank’, in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey 
Winters (eds) Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 12. 
494 Pender, ‘From “Structural Adjustment” to “Comprehensive Development Framework’, 409. Pender 
also makes it clear that while the Bank still uses a form of conditionality it is substantially different, 
being based on a different view of development that doesn’t just focus upon economic growth but 
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has been shown to understand and commit to the new basics. Quoting the World Bank 
report, Assessing Aid, Pender states that knowledge’s ‘… role is therefore envisaged to 
include “financing the overseas education of policymakers”, and nurturing a “strong 
domestic movement for change” in countries where the government is not committed to 
creating a good policy environment.’
495 In short, the strategy, which includes the 
delivery devices and technologies highlighted above, is a political one of ‘constituency 
building’ through strategic education and the construction of institutions.  
Conclusion 
 
What we see in SIN is a massive, interwoven ensemble of delivery devices and political 
technologies that are designed with the express intent of implementing the new basics. 
The PRSPs and the CASs are important delivery devices for attempting to generate the 
sorts of outcomes that the CDF aspires to. Together SIN’s delivery mechanisms and 
political technologies combine with the new basics to form an embedding matrix to 
encourage normative lock-in. What is to be ‘owned’ and ‘partnered’ by developing 
countries is the ‘knowledge’ sold by the Bank (and other organisations such as the 
IMF). Here the perennial concern of implementation is key. In this arrangement, 
partnership matters because the support of certain constituencies is necessary to the 
liberal-market reform project. 
In the following three case study chapters it will be made clear how all of this 
plays out on the ground. Crucially, we look in significant detail at the way in which the 
new basics are woven deep into various types of delivery devices and are combined 
with SIN’s political technologies in order to attempt reform delivery. What is 
interesting here is that SIN’s final form of delivery, and indeed its success or failure at 
circumventing reform impediments, on the ground is highly sensitive to political factors 
that stem from within the Bank and the individual country environments in which it 
operates as well as the global political economy more generally. 
                                                 
495 Ibid.  
  
 
Chapter 6 
Attempting Market Extension through SIN: the Privatisation of 
Manila’s Water Services 
 
A significant theme that comes out of the foregoing analysis is that while SIN 
proponents downplay politics (both consciously and unconsciously), SIN is intensely 
political. Its depoliticising, technocratic language actually obfuscates a massive political 
project that is cast around theoretical influences with very specific political lineages. 
Crucially, the SIN project promotes the importance of institutions in relation to liberal 
markets. It also includes an awareness of the difficulties of implementing the earlier 
Washington consensus agenda and specifies numerous new methods and mechanisms to 
eliminate impediments to reform. Drawing upon the grounding of the first five chapters, 
the following case study-based chapters ask what SIN means for states and societies in 
practice. They also address the issue of what states and societies mean for SIN in 
practice. This is because, as we will see below, SIN is shaped and contested by a variety 
of factors on the ground.  
This chapter asks what a particular case study (based around a part-privatisation 
of metropolitan Manila’s water services) tells us about the process of SIN-style market 
extension, its assumptions and what this might imply for state and society. The example 
covered in this chapter involves the delivery device of a ‘technical assistance’ (TA) 
contract between the Bank Group, through its International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
and the Philippine Government. This is an interesting example of a SIN delivery device 
– demonstrating the Bank’s influence beyond simple country lending-based 
arrangements. As we will see below, the IFC not only played the role of lead adviser on 
the project – it actively sought to sustain and embed the part-privatisation process 
through further investment and credit. In this way, it is the knowledge disseminating 
role played by the IFC and its active facilitation work within this scenario that is 
perhaps most interesting in terms of looking at an example of SIN in action. Importantly 
also though, the new basics – especially the reconfiguration of the state in line with 
promoting competition and regulating infrastructure – play an important role in this 
story too. In contrast to the Washington consensus, we see how the Bank, at the request 
of certain elite actors, assists in attempting to alter state form in a manner that puts into 
practice some of the regulatory institutional assumptions of NIE.  ATTEMPTING MARKET EXTENSION THROUGH SIN 
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Crucially, the case study below makes the point that the state’s role in all of this 
is an evolving one. Here the state is being pushed away from traditional forms of 
service provision to become a ‘regulatory state’.
496 Indeed, the regulatory tasks to be 
performed by the state correspond precisely with a NIE (and new basics) notion of the 
state as a supplier of regulatory and other institutions (see chapters three and four), 
rather than a service provider. Yet, interestingly, in addition to this regulatory push, the 
example below demonstrates how in practice the state under SIN patterns of 
transformation is also expected to shoulder financial risk for foreign and domestic 
capital, while remaining the active interface with and party responsible to multilateral 
organisations like the Bank, to facilitate market extension. In such ways it is also the 
‘guarantor state’, not just a custodian for its constituents but, asymmetrically, for 
domestic and foreign capital also. Crucially, though, while the state is often turning to 
the ‘Knowledge Bank’ and its monopoly on development ‘best practice’ when 
attempting to address infrastructure and service issues, capital (which often pushes for 
pro-market reforms in the first place) has the muscle to affect and demand certain 
institutional arrangements that are often beyond what the Bank or state might be content 
with. Indeed, what is particularly evident below are the problems associated with the 
technocratic assumptions of NIE and the new basics and the relationship between power 
and institutions. 
 
Market extension and SIN 
 
The Washington consensus attempted to play a catalytic role in the process of market 
extension – with its key tenets often focused upon crude commodification, through 
policies such as privatisation. From a simple neoliberal perspective (typical of the 
Washington consensus), the market is the most efficient resource allocation mechanism. 
Thus, converting everything into a commodity that can be traded in the market seems 
logical because the ‘real’ (undistorted) cost of everything must be realised. This 
approach informed a dramatic project, where privatisation and liberalisation had 
significant roles in a commodification process, where increasingly the discipline of the 
market was to dominate. However, as was made evident in chapter two, the attempts at 
first generation reforms, like privatisation, were plagued with problems, perhaps most 
famously in Russia. 
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SIN, as heir to orthodox neoliberalism’s throne, critically alters the market 
extension process in influential ways. In short, it places crucial emphasis upon new 
methods of implementation (such as part-privatisation and public-private partnerships) 
and specifies a precise regulatory institutional mix for a liberal market society. For SIN, 
like the previous consensus, the market remains the central institution. Importantly, 
however, drawing upon NIE, socio-institutional neoliberals demand the presence of the 
right regulatory structure to correct information asymmetries and reduce other 
transaction costs associated with market failure. Property rights over commodities must 
also be specified and enforced for both capturing the efficiency benefits of private 
ownership and the reduction of transaction cost respectively. 
Market extension as it relates to SIN is expressly understood here as the process 
of extending the realm of private property, and the associated institutional adjustments 
that this entails, to those areas where it was previously limited or entirely 
circumscribed, in order to reap the theorised benefits accorded to private property and 
its protection. The process of market extension is obviously most explicit in the 
privatisation of a state-owned utility, such as water or electricity services. Further to 
this, market extension is inextricably linked to the process of commodification.
497 
Predictably, SIN-based market-led development has sought to further institutionalise 
commodification and market extension through altering the state’s structures, seeking a 
new and more deeply embedded approach to restraining government provision of 
services and other traditional public goods. This process has not been frictionless or 
passive. Importantly, it has been driven, resisted and assisted by particular interests 
(local, national and international) within particular constellations of power – where 
domestic and international capital have been dominant players. 
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Market extension and water privatisation in Manila 
 
The case of utility privatisation, increasingly common around the globe, is perhaps the 
most obvious form of market extension undertaken as part the Bank’s work. Here, there 
is some continuity with the past for the organisation. But it would be misleading to 
write off this as just being an example of continuity with the past. As has been made 
clear, SIN is concerned with attempted deep-embedding of market supporting structures 
which, in turn, requires a shift in the very function and form of the state. Crucially, this 
process is not pursued in the same way as structural adjustment of the eighties and early 
nineties, via basic policy sets tied to conditionality. Indeed, the current attempts at 
extension of the market through privatisation are a case in point. The outcomes of 
privatisation processes, which are now often actually part-privatisation initiatives, are 
explicitly seen as being dependent upon sound regulatory structures and a managed 
nexus between public and private actors. Furthermore, in some circumstances (such as 
the one below) governments actually turn to the Bank to advise them on how best to set 
up such arrangements.  
There is more to this situation than the state becoming a regulatory state – 
although this is certainly a big part of the state transformation process promoted by the 
Bank. Critically, in practice, it also involves the state acting, at times, as a ‘guarantor 
state’ – facilitating foreign and domestic capital activity both by encouraging private 
sector involvement and then by attempting to guarantee stability, income, risk 
mitigation and investment in the interests of capital, and in particular transnational 
capital.
498 This is interesting in terms of the combination of ideology and interests at 
play. It implies a consideration for consumers rather than citizens and is premised upon 
the assumption of the inherent efficiency of the private sector. However, together, the 
regulatory and guarantor requirements of SIN, in relation to market extension, 
demonstrate that the state is subjected to significant pressure (in various forms) to 
deliver a particular set of structural arrangements. These arrangements are often 
designed to accommodate first and foremost the interests of capital with the idea being 
that such an approach, plus regulation, generates the best results for a society. Crucially 
though, ideology and reality often part ways when interests are at play. This can prove 
problematic for the state (and the work of the Bank), as the case study below illustrates. 
This is because the transformation process associated with privatisation not only 
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requires the state to regulate. It also requires it to make significant concessions to 
capital, partly because of the interests that make up government and which have 
influence upon the state and partly because, tied to a particular ideology, the state has a 
circumscribed choice-set. Such concessions are often not popular with sectoral NGOs 
and indeed populations more generally. The case of water privatisation (as a form of 
market extension) in the Philippines is enlightening in regard to the process of 
attempting SIN market extension and the role of, and effect upon, the state. Critically, 
the case study below also challenges the technocratic assumptions that underpin much 
of the Bank’s advice to underdeveloped countries. 
  
The context of reform 
 
The push towards privatisation in the Philippines was substantively set in train by 
Corazon Aquino in 1986 (with the Philippine Privatization Program), and then further 
pursued by the subsequent presidency of Fidel Ramos, although the World Bank had 
earlier linked conditionality to a reduction of government corporations in the 
economy.
499 Both Aquino and Ramos were basically forced to ‘embrace’ a different 
path to that of Marcos – which had led to economic failure – and thus embraced 
neoliberal ideology, though departed from the ideals in response to particular 
interests.
500 Interestingly, many of the capitalists that were marginalised under the 
Marcos regime were to become significant promoters and beneficiaries of market 
reform under Aquino and Ramos.
501  
Several important events that occurred during Aquino’s administration were 
important in facilitating post-Marcos market extension. Firstly, Aquino had established 
the Committee on Privatization (COP) which was designed to privatise hundreds of 
government companies and assets. Also, during her administration an important Build-
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Operate-Transfer (BOT) law was enacted.
502 The Ramos administration continued the 
trend of facilitating market extension and, after ending a power crisis of devastating 
proportions with a policy of privatisation, it was hoped that the looming water crisis in 
metropolitan Manila could be resolved in a similar way.
503 Previously, the state had run 
water provision in Manila under the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Service 
(MWSS), a state body that was renowned for poor service and that was both a debt-
laden drain on the government (with large debts to multilateral organisations) and 
grossly inefficient.
504 Many of the twelve million people that were covered by the 
MWSS remained disconnected and loss of water through leaks and theft was 
substantial.
505  
Mark Dumol, a key official in the privatisation process of the MWSS, was quite 
certain as to the source of Service’s problems: ‘In summary, we felt that many of the 
problems of the MWSS were inherent to the company, by virtue of it being owned and 
operated by the government.’
506 President Ramos himself was known to be particularly 
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excited about the prospects of the MWSS being privatised and, as Dumol has noted in 
his frank diary of the process of privatising water provision in Manila, he was critical in 
bringing the water crisis to the attention of people and developing a consensus that 
major issues existed.
507  
Between 1994 and 1995, domestic and foreign capital (British and Malaysian) 
made clear their interest in the MWSS.
508 However, these approaches were turned down 
in preference for a bidding process for the privatisation. Indeed, the lead-up to the 
privatisation of the MWSS was particularly interesting in the way that foreign 
governments (especially the French and the British) and foreign capital (once again 
French and British based) were keen to display to the Philippine government the merits 
of water privatisation through anecdotes and trips to view privatisation projects in 
water.
509 At an early stage in the development of the privatisation process the 
Commercial Counselor of French embassy even secured a US$1 million grant from the 
French government for (French) advisers to assist with the process.
510 The mustering of 
those western governments that were home to the world’s largest water company 
interests – and that of the companies themselves – was impressive. 
                                                                                                                                               
construction companies in the Philippines today’. They also have interests in water and sewerage. See 
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The need for advice and investor confidence: enter the IFC 
 
The Philippine government personnel responsible for the water privatisation were 
adamant about the need for advice for the prospective water privatisation project. 
According to Dumol’s account, the World Bank’s IFC
511 was drawn to the water 
privatisation process by the invitation of a Philippine government official, who declared 
that they were the only financial advisor he knew.
512 Subsequently, an IFC team arrived 
in Manila in 1995 and Dumol was positive about their prospective involvement, 
especially in terms of the legitimacy that he thought the organisation would generate for 
the privatisation process:  
 
Though I had previously heard about IFC, I was really not familiar with the 
organization.  
  I was surprised to learn that even though it was a multilateral body, it acted 
according to private sector rules. Together with the IFC’s vast experience in 
privatization transactions, the fact of their being a multilateral organization made 
them the ideal entity to hire as advisers. They would provide the transparency we 
needed for the bidding process because they were not identified with any particular 
country. Also we could negotiate with them directly (since they were a multilateral 
group).
513  
 
Here the IFC’s advice was obviously critical to the privatisation process. Indeed, 
indicative of just how central Dumol and others saw (in retrospect) the World Bank’s 
(and the Asian Development Bank’s) role in relation to the provision of technical 
assistance is the following  statement: 
 
Water utilities need some technical assistance to help them evaluate their 
problems, decide on their best course of privatization, and help them procure 
advisers. The utilities need the draft terms of reference and a budget. Without 
help, the utility is unable to progress. Our experience is that the easiest way to get 
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this technical assistance is through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank.
514  
 
Perez-Coral, from a very different political perspective to that of Dumol, has 
summarised the IFC’s activities more generally (and ironically in a similar way to 
Dumol) when she suggests that it ‘acts as a catalyst for private investment because its 
participation provides “comfort”, enhances investor confidence and attracts financiers to 
a deal.’
515 Importantly, though, as we will see below, the IFC’s interaction with the 
Manila water privatisation arrangement did not stop with assisting in the development 
of the process as lead adviser.
516 Later it would go on to provide support loans to one of 
the companies – Manila Water Company Incorporated (MWCI) – and actually become 
a shareholder in the company itself. However, its initial role was to provide technical 
advice on the privatisation process and develop a contract for the program.
517 It also 
provided ‘prospective bidders with the assurances and information they needed if they 
wanted to bid, …collecting data that would be the basis of profit forecasts, [and] 
identifying the eligible bids and…the winning bidders.’
518 For this the IFC received a 
consultancy fee of US $6.2 million, which was to be recovered by the government at the 
awarding of the concessions.
519  
  It is important to note here that the Bank’s involvement in the Manila water 
privatisation, through the IFC, is another element in a much bigger global pattern of 
World Bank-assisted market extension initiatives in relation to water. For example, the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) produced research in 2003 
that indicated that out of 276 loans that the Bank made between 1990 and 2002 classed 
as ‘water supply’, one third required some privatisation component before funds were 
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517 Cristina David, ‘MWSS Privatization: Implications on the Price of Water, the Poor, and the 
Environment’, Philippine  Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper no. 2000-14 (April 
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received.
520  The number that required privatisation as a condition tripled between 1996 
and 2002.
521 The Bank’s market-extension approach to water is based around a 
thoroughly neoliberal analysis of the global water problem that sees it as resulting from 
a lack of pricing and the imprudent use of government subsidies.
522 Indeed, the Bank 
sees market efficiency and the reconception of water, and services related to it, as 
commodities (that is, ‘private goods’) as integral in solving issues of an economic and 
environmental nature.
523 In this project, the Bank as a ‘Knowledge Bank’ has an 
important role to play in promoting approaches to water that intersect with the interests 
of global water companies.
524  
Although the Philippine government contracted the IFC, the arrangement 
designed by the parties was entirely compatible with the Bank’s preference for 
understanding water services in a commodified form, while also emphasising a 
significant role for government as a regulator. The arrangement designed saw MWSS 
retain ownership of assets, with the operation and maintenance of Manila’s water 
services divided between two privately run concessions. Revealingly in this regard, 
according to Dumol there was a perception that full privatisation was politically 
untenable.
525 The form of privatisation chosen was a hybrid form of market extension. 
Not a full privatisation per se, the outcome was thought to be the largest public-private 
partnership (PPP) of its type, and the world’s largest water privatisation, when it was 
implemented in 1997.
526 Under this arrangement MWSS would move away from its 
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tremendous stockpile of data, information, and theory (with neoliberal perspectives predominating) 
regarding developing countries. Even in a political climate of declining institutional credibility, World 
Bank research and publications continue to hold tremendous influence over a range of institutions 
including G-7 government development agencies, the United Nations, private voluntary agencies and 
academia. It is hardly surprising that the World Bank would play a lead role in developing supply-side 
theories and applying market-based solutions to the field of water resource management.’ Grusky also 
notes the critical role of the IFC (and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) in the relationship 
between the Bank and global water conglomerates. Sara Grusky, ‘The IMF, the World Bank and the 
Global Water Companies: A Shared Agenda’, available online: 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/sharedagenda.pdf , accessed January 31, 2007, 2. 
525 Dumol, 14. Dumol’s concerns are amplified in his numerous references to the highly political nature 
of potable water and water as a ‘commodity’ that is essential to life. Dumol, 9, 56. 
526 Finger, 291; Dumol, i. Finger has identified five types of PPP arrangements (which he specifies in 
relation to the ‘new water paradigm’). They are as follows; a concession contract (as with the 
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role as a utility provider to, principally, become a regulator – overseeing the operations 
of the winning concessionaires.
527 In working out the details of the PPP there was some 
debate between the IFC and the Philippine officials as to the responsibility of the 
MWSS’s ongoing projects. The IFC’s position was that MWSS should retain all 
ongoing projects because the bidders had not been involved in the respective project 
conceptions. This position also minimised the risk to the bidders associated with 
ongoing projects. The Philippine negotiating party for the PPP was almost diametrically 
opposed to this position, insisting that the privatisation be as ‘total as possible’.
528 One 
particular sticking point in this regard was the Umiray-Angat Transbasin Project 
(UATP), where all bidders indicated that they would not accept responsibility for the 
project.
529 The project was however critical to the prospective private concessionaires 
meeting their water supply requirements, and breaking the supply shortfall.
530 However, 
the UATP involved a large amount of tunnelling, with its high degree of risk and all the 
bidders demonstrated their timidity towards risk in managing the important project.
531 
The responsibility for the critical UATP project, with both its risk and important yields, 
was to remain with the MWSS. All other projects, contrary to the IFC’s position, would 
be handed over to the bidders. 
The PPP model decided upon saw Manila drawn up into ‘east’ and ‘west’ 
sectors with a concessionaire to be chosen for each – the so-called ‘Paris model’. The 
successful bidders for the respective concessions were announced in early 1997.
532 The 
winning bids were submitted by two groups of companies – both powerful 
combinations of domestic and international capital. In both instances Filipino 
companies maintained majority shares in the concessions.
533 The east zone of Manila 
                                                                                                                                               
assets and add new ones (which it finances), while delivering the service to customers; a build, operate, 
transfer contract (BOT) where a contractor finances, builds and operates facilities and sells its service 
to the government rather than the user; a lease or affermage contract where a private operator manages 
and maintains utility facilities for a period of time (ten to twenty years) and finances the maintenance of 
existing facilities but is not expected to finance new infrastructure; operation and maintenance 
contracts where a private operator is completely responsible for the operation of facilities and the state 
(which owns the infrastructure) pays the private operator for the service; and, finally, a management 
support contract where a private contractor is given specific tasks and objectives in terms of improving 
service delivery. See Finger, 286. 
527 The MWSS Regulatory Office (MWSS-RO) was formed for this purpose. Metropolitan Waterworks 
and Sewerage System, ‘Ten Most-Asked Questions About the Privatization of MWSS’, available 
online: ‘www.mwss.gov.ph/faq.asp , accessed June 10, 2005.  
528 Dumol, 58. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid. 
531 Ibid. 
532 Esguerra, 10. 
533 Foreign ownership rules embedded in the Philippine constitution limit foreign ownership of utilities to 
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was awarded to Manila Water, a joint venture that presently comprises of the Filipino 
Ayala Corporation, UK-listed private utilities firm United Utilities, Bank of the 
Philippines Islands Capital Corporation, Mitsubishi Corporation and the IFC itself.
534 
At the time of the concession being awarded Manila Water’s ownership was a similarly 
impressive fusion of foreign and domestic capital,
535 although at that stage the IFC did 
not own stock in the company. 
The concession for the western zone went to another formidable coupling of 
domestic and international capital named Maynilad. Maynilad was composed of 
Benpres Holdings (as a majority shareholder
536 and owned by the famous Filipino 
Lopez family) and the huge French water company Lyonnaise des Eaux (now Ondeo, a 
division of Suez-Environment whose parent company is Suez).
537 The respective 
reaches of the companies in Maynilad are vast. Suez/Ondeo is one of the two biggest 
water related companies globally.
538 The Lopezes, in part through Benpres, have major 
interests in broadcasting, telecommunications, the new economy, infrastructure and 
power generation and supply.
 539 
                                                 
534 World Bank (International Finance Corporation), ‘Summary of Project Information’, project: MWC II 
(2004), available online:  
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/2bc34f011b50ff6e85256a550073ff1c/e887f06d8637e6b4852
56e67007f0017?OpenDocument , accessed June 10, 2005. Ayala Corporation has stakes in ‘…real 
estate, electronics, utilities, the automotive sector, banking, insurance, telecommunications, 
transportation and food.’ See International Finance Corporation, ‘Summary of Project Information’. Its 
2004 revenue was 43.7 billion pesos (around US $782 million – June 2005 currency rate). When 
Manila Water won the concession in 1997, its composition included International Water, which, at the 
time, was wholly owned by the massive American corporation, Bechtel. In 1999, the Italian utility giant 
Edison SpA bought a 50% stake in International Water. In December 2003 Manila Water bought out 
International Water’s 16.6% share in the joint venture. However, International Water still has an 
affiliation with the Manila Water because United Utilities, which is now a partner in Manila Water, has 
a ‘well-established strategic alliance’ with International Water. See Bechtel, ‘Bechtel and Edison Reach 
Agreement on Edison´s acquisition of a 50% Stake in International Water Limited’, news release (11, 
September 1999), available online: 
http://www.bechtel.com/newsarticles/162.asp , accessed June 19, 2005; Manila Water,  ‘Partners’, 
website, available online: 
 http://www.manilawater.com/au_partners.cfm , accessed June 21, 2005;  Manila Water, Manila Water 
2004 Annual Report, available online:  
http://www.manilawater.com/downloads/annual_report_2004.pdf , accessed January 30, 2007, 21.  
535 See previous footnote. 
536 Finger, 290. 
537 Suez-Environment’s 2003-2004 Facts and Figures Report states some revealing statistics about 
Ondeo’s work in water worldwide. For example, it notes that it operates subsidiaries in 25 countries 
and had consolidated revenues for 2003 of 5.9 billion euros. It has been called one of the two biggest 
water companies on the planet. See Suez-Environment, Suez-Environment Facts and Figures 2003-
2004,  available online: http://www.suez-env.com/upload/publication/suez_env/pocket2004gb.pdf , 
accessed June 21, 2005, 9. 
538 The other is also a French-based multinational, Veolia (previously Vivendi). 
539 The Lopezes have been an oligarchic force in the Philippines for generations. Alfred McCoy has noted 
that since the early part of the last century the success of the Lopezes depended upon their ability able 
to manipulate the financial and regulatory powers of the state to gain licences that restricted market 
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From the perspective of the MWSS, the proposed benefits with the PPP for 
consumers included the reduction of water tariffs (MWSS proposed savings of seven 
million pesos per day for customers), the expansion of piped water coverage, improved 
water pressure and better sewerage related services.
540 In terms of the privatisation’s 
impact for the government, MWSS highlighted several proposed benefits. Firstly, the 
concessionaires would pay commencement fees of US$10 million each. Secondly, the 
concessionaires would cover the operating costs of the MWSS Regulatory Office’s 
(MWSS-RO) fees and the residual fees of the MWSS (obviating the need for the 
national government to budget for the MWSS). Importantly, the concessionaires would 
pay a fee compatible with the annual debt servicing requirements of the MWSS, while 
being obligated to further invest in infrastructure (that would remain the property of the 
government at the conclusion of the twenty-five year concessions). Finally, it was 
estimated that the concessionaires would pay income taxes estimated at US $3 billion 
dollars over the life of the contracts.
541 
The sorts of assumptions that underpinned the logic of how the proposed 
benefits (in addition to the income the government would receive) would be realised 
under the concession arrangement exhibited strong NIE (and SIN) overtones. In short, 
the market, when adequately regulated, is perceived to be the most efficient allocation 
mechanism and should be given preference. Applying the logic to water supply in 
Metropolitan Manila is simple. The water infrastructure, while remaining the property 
of the state, would be tendered out to two concessionaires for them to operate – the 
winners being Maynilad and Manila Water. Both concessionaires, subject to the 
efficiency-creating discipline of the market and a drive to maximise profit by extending 
their respective markets, while being regulated under contract by the newly formed 
MWSS-RO (funded by the concessionaires), would, the theory goes, provide better and 
                                                                                                                                               
media and electricity interests were expropriated by the dictator (and divvied up to his cronies) when 
the then Lopez owned Manila Chronicle turned against him. However, Marcos had earlier sought 
support from the Lopez family in his presidential bids for 1965 and 1969. After the dictator’s fall, 
under the presidency of Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), the family got many of its operations back and 
has regained its place as ‘one of the country’s wealthiest business clans.’    
In 1999, there was substantive interest over the looming wedding between the daughter of then 
President Joseph Estrada and one of the Lopez clan because as one writer put it ‘the sweep of major 
Lopez enterprises’ were ‘all dependent on state franchises.’ Antonio Lopez, ‘Family Affair’, in 
Asiaweek, available online:  
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0423/biz5.html , accessed June 23, 2005; Paul Hutchcroft, 
‘Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: the Politics of Patrimonial Plunder’, in World Politics 
43 (April 1991), 435, 443; Alfred McCoy, ‘Rent Seeking Families and the Philippine State: A History 
of the Lopez Family’, in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, Alfred McCoy 
(ed), (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1993), 429-536. 
540 MWSS, ‘The Ten Most-Asked Questions’.  
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cheaper services than the previous state-run organisation. Thus, it should be no surprise 
that a hybrid privatisation arrangement that involved the state as a regulator (later on it 
also became a guarantor), and the private sector was the outcome decided upon 
(especially given the involvement of IFC consultants and an administration in the 
Philippines that was keen to embrace neoliberal ideology). 
Before we look at a brief assessment of how the privatisations (and the SIN 
assumptions) have fared, it is worth quickly summarising and clarifying the main 
interests involved in the privatisation process and placing them in a historic context. 
Firstly, as we have seen, the Ramos administration had been keen to implement the 
privatisation of MWSS as a ‘fix it’ to an ailing utility – having had some early success 
with privatisation in the electricity sector. The government clearly had an interest in 
improving the operation of the water provision in Manila for its constituents, with the 
MWSS seen as grossly inefficient and service provision limited and poor. Importantly 
also, as Pinches has emphasised, the Ramos administration (like the Aquino 
administration before it) was ‘compelled’ to take a very different path to development 
than that of Marcos – which had failed to generate development in the face of regional 
success.
542 Here, both the Aquino and Ramos administrations articulated a neoliberal 
ideology, which saw the ‘principal role of the state [as] that of economic facilitator’.
543 
Further to this, neoliberal reform was supported by many of the capitalists that lost out 
under Marcos.
544 In short, there was an alignment of interests and ideology that 
combined to generate the environment that produced the PPP.  
In turn, this moment was grasped by foreign and domestic capital. Once the 
proposal was decided upon, with little resistance within the Philippine Congress,
545 
capital began jostling for the two (east and west) Manila concessions. The big players of 
the Philippine elite, along with the big corporate players of international water, were 
                                                 
542 Pinches, 111. 
543 Ibid.  
544 Ibid. 
545  Esguerra, 10. This said, activist organisations, long-opposed to privatisation have tackled the 
increasing commodification of water supply in Metropolitan Manila for some time. NGOs, such as 
Freedom from Debt Coalition, Institute for Popular Democracy and Focus on the Global South 
(Philippines), who form part of Bantay Tubig – a coalition of NGOs working on the impacts of 
privatisation of Metropolitan Manila’s water – have directed plenty of attention towards both the 
concessionaires, the government and the multilateral banks. The role of these groups and their conflict 
with the other interests is covered below.  
    In regard to the Philippine Congress at the time, Michael Pinches noted, ‘Ramos has been highly 
successful at building alliances and winning support for his liberal economic reforms in congress, 
despite the latter’s strong support in the past for economic protectionism. …there seems to have 
emerged in Congress a remarkable political consensus over the quest for capitalist development 
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obviously determined to secure entry into the process. Indeed, at least one commentator 
suspects that ‘dive bids’ were probably used by bidders, while all the time being aware 
that substantive increases in water provision rates would be required for the operations 
to be financially feasible.
546 The perceived importance by investors of listed companies 
gaining either of the concessions was particularly evident by the impact upon the share 
prices of the respective bidders, which depended upon the market’s perception of their 
chances at winning a concession.
547  
The winning concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, stunning fusions of 
domestic and foreign capital, had obvious profit-making interests in a captured market 
associated with an essential ‘commodity’, over a twenty-five year period. For a clan like 
the Lopezes, whose oligarchic position (restored after the fall of Marcos) had been 
significantly built upon their ability to secure opportunities (through exclusive licences 
and so forth) from the state that restricted market access, such an opportunity must have 
been irresistible.
548 Ayala Corporation was also ‘desperate’ to attain the concession it 
ended up winning – having significant real estate interests in that zone.
549 Additionally, 
risk was at least partially minimised for the winning bidders in that the massive UATP 
project was to remain the responsibility of the MWSS, even though it would assist the 
concessionaires in meeting their service targets.
550 
However, this is only part of the tale. A brief assessment of how the PPP 
arrangements have fared so far, and the manner in which certain interests have defended 
their positions, illustrates how the technocratic institutional assumptions of SIN and 
NIE are so problematic. It also demonstrates the way that the ideology that supports 
SIN forms of market extension is infused into a defence of the PPP. Interestingly and 
importantly, both the state and the IFC have had significant roles to play in sustaining 
the PPP and thus promoting market extension.  
 
The travails of the concessions and the roles of the state and the IFC 
 
Within three years of the concessions being awarded there were problems with the PPP, 
with Maynilad in financial trouble and Manila Water challenging the terms of the 
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concession contract itself.
551 The contract that the concessionaires agreed to stipulated 
that price changes were only permissible for three reasons: inflation, unexpected events 
and rate re-basing (reviewed at the start of each five year period).
552 Other than these 
reasons, it was expected that profits could only be increased by increasing operating 
efficiency (for example, by reducing the amount of wasted and stolen water and 
extending coverage).
  553 Contractually, the concession arrangement looked sound. As 
Esguerra notes, ‘There is a valid basis to say the Concession Agreement was a fair deal 
that allows all stakeholders – government, the companies, and the consumer – to reap 
benefits, and to change arrangements in an open and negotiated way in response to 
unforeseen circumstances.’
554 Additionally, a bond was in place (with the funds 
provided by the concessionaires) to allow the government to draw from if there were to 
be any problems with either Maynilad or Manila Water meeting their obligations under 
the agreement. 
    By 2000, Maynilad was claiming that it was the victim of ‘unforeseen 
circumstances’ and that this had placed it in the precarious financial position that it 
found itself in. Maynilad’s western concession had assumed the vast majority of 
MWSS’s debt (90 percent). When the Asian crisis dramatically devalued the peso this 
created large foreign exchange losses, which in turn reduced revenues and thus, its 
credit worthiness.
555 Maynilad claimed that the crisis and its effects constituted a force 
majeure – an unforeseen circumstance that justified a change in the arrangement 
(including a mechanism to accelerate the passing on to consumers of the costs of 
unanticipated foreign exchange losses).
556  
  As Finger has noted, the terms of the concession agreement allowed for 
‘ordinary currency fluctuations’ (in the order of 2-3 percent) which would be passed on 
to the consumer in tariff increases.
557 However, a devaluation of the magnitude 
associated with the Asian crisis meant the MWSS-RO had to ‘balance Maynilad’s 
financial requirements with consumers’ affordability’ in considering larger tariff 
increases.
558 But this was not the only problem for Maynilad and some say that the 
Asian crisis and the associated peso devaluation were excuses made by the company for 
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the results of their own business practices. Esguerra is particularly critical in this regard, 
stating that Maynilad pursued irresponsible corporate practices, including lavish 
expenditure. Maynilad’s inability to achieve operating efficiencies also added to the fact 
that by 2001 its ‘operating expenses were a third higher than the company had projected 
in its bid’.
559 
  Despite the MWSS allowing an Extra-ordinary Price Adjustment from October 
2001 to December 2002, Maynilad filed in December 2002 for an early termination to 
the twenty five year concession agreement.
560 It blamed the MWSS for not meeting its 
obligations under the concession agreement.
561 An arbitration panel held hearings and 
received submissions from MWSS and Maynilad and, in November 2003, found that 
there was no basis for an early termination of the agreement. It also instructed Maynilad 
to pay more than US$6.7 billion in unpaid concession fees (equivalent to 32 months of 
fees), plus interest.
562 Finally, while it was insufficient to cover the Maynilad’s arrears, 
MWSS was told by the panel that it could draw on a US $120 million bond (put up by 
Ondeo) if Maynilad failed to pay.
563  
  Despite the panel’s decision being final, in November 2003 Maynilad filed to be 
placed under corporate rehabilitation, which, due to the terms of the concession 
arrangement, would grant them the termination of the concession arrangement that they 
sought. By early 2004 the MWSS had still not collected the fees from Maynilad and, 
according to Bantay Tubig, an NGO concerned with water in Manila, there appeared to 
be a political will on the part of the Arroyo administration to save Maynilad and the 
Lopezes from financial disaster.
564 Rather than collect the money owed to MWSS for 
the concession fees, a debt for equity swap was promoted, amidst significant criticism, 
where the government would waive the concessionaire’s debts in exchange for 
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, accessed June 13, 2005. ; Bantay Tubig, ‘Executive Summary: the GMA-Lopez Deal re Maynilad’, 
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, accessed June 14, 2005. 
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equity.
565 Additionally, one former senator asserted that ‘the government turned its back 
to protect public interest when it ordered the MWSS to back down on its threat to seize 
the performance bond issued by Ondeo’.
566 The issues over the concession are still 
continuing. In January 2005, The Manila Times reported that the Arroyo administration 
would use part of the US$120 million performance bond to buy 39 percent of the 
concession. Ondeo (having earlier reduced its stake) would retain 19 percent of the 
concession and a mixture of banks and the MWSS would hold the majority of rest (36 
percent) ‘through coupon-generating preferred shares.’
567 The state, in the form of the 
MWSS, would have to accept responsibility for the concession once again, because of a 
deal brokered in the interests of capital by the administration.  
  While the other concession, Manila Water, has not had anywhere near the 
problems of Maynilad, it has asked for amendments to the original contract and invoked 
increases in rates.
568 Important to Manila Water’s story here though is the way that the 
IFC has assisted it substantively, extending the reach of the market, by both buying 
equity in it and lending to it to help it meet its targets as set out in the concession 
agreement. Additionally, this has occurred while Ayala (the major shareholder of 
Manila Water) has been keen to buy out its foreign partner and buy into water supply 
projects elsewhere in the world.
569 In early 2005, in partnership with the ING Group, it 
also expressed an interest in the ailing Maynilad.
570  
                                                 
565 Plunder charges were filed against President Arroyo, the Lopezes and several justice officials by a 
senatorial candidate. See Patricia Esteves, ‘Lawyer Files Plunder Case Against Arroyo, Lopezes’, The 
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Manila Water was publicly listed in March 2004 and, crucially, this was a 
condition of the IFC buying equity in the company.
571 In May 2004, some seven years 
after awarding of the concessions, the IFC entered into a subscription arrangement with 
Manila Water and purchased 176,400,000 shares at 4.75 pesos each (roughly US$15 
million – calculated at June 2005 exchange rates).
572 In addition to the share 
subscription, the IFC also extended a US$60 million loan package to Manila Water.
573 
Succinctly put, the IFC advised the government of the Philippines on the PPP, supplied 
support loans to Manila Water for a variety of tasks, and bought into the company, 
stipulating a condition that its investment required  putting up Manila Water, within 42 
months, for an initial public offering (IPO). The IFC’s involvement in the Manila water 
privatisation thus becomes an example of market extension upon market extension.  
  The stock investment and loans that the IFC has made in and to (respectively) 
Manila Water have been significant. These have clearly been associated with supporting 
an example of what the organisation perceives as an important privatisation success 
story (which is clearly in the IFC’s interests) in part by assisting Manila Water to meet 
its targets. IFC project summary documents are particularly revealing in this respect:  
  
The project will assist MWCI to attain the targets set out under its concession 
agreement, including provision of water and sewerage and sanitation services to the 
general population in its concession area. … 
MWCI stands out as one of a limited number of successful privatizations in the 
water and sanitation sector in emerging markets The company has made good 
inroads into the poorer areas of its concession area. IFC’s assistance to MWCI 
builds upon the earlier privatization advisory work by supporting a concessionaire 
who has demonstrated the efficiencies and client responsiveness that a private 
sector provider can introduce to the provision of public services.
574 
 
Crucially, according to IFC documents for the first Manila Water Company IFC project, 
the project sponsors (Ayala Corporation, United Utilities, Bechtel and Mitsubishi) were 
also keen to have the IFC involved in order to, once again, provide potential investors 
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with confidence for lending and the planned IPO. This accorded with the interest on the 
part of the Philippine government to have the IFC on board in the PPP in the first place: 
 
One of the reasons MWCI has approached IFC is because local banks are not 
offering financing of the appropriate maturity. The sponsors further believe that 
completing a financing with IFC would be a signal of quality that would help it in 
later rounds of financing, including a planned IPO. In addition to these practical 
points, Ayala Corporation perceives that the presence of a prestigious institution 
such as IFC in MWCI would be good for the Philippines by demonstrating that 
privatization can work despite the challenges posed by poverty in the Philippines, 
and that a well-run company can attract financing in an emerging market context.
575  
 
What is particularly evident in the above reading of the privatisation of Metro 
Manila’s water supply is the problematic nature of market extension in underdeveloped 
countries, where ailing critical services need to be reformed within the logic of the 
hegemonic paradigm which itself meets politics. In this story coalitions of interests 
pursued a particular path of market extension bound by a commitment to neoliberal 
ideology (the government and the IFC) and explicit self interest (foreign and domestic 
capital, the IFC and foreign governments). Importantly, the World Bank played a 
decisive role both through the IFC’s advisory (technical assistance) work, loans and 
investment in both generating and sustaining the arrangement, demonstrating a 
proclivity to undertake an arrangement that is now increasingly common.  
The privatisation was possible initially because the Ramos administration was 
ideologically convinced of the merits of private sector involvement in utility provision. 
It also potentially stood to gain from someone taking the ailing MWSS off its hands and 
the income that a privatised MWSS would generate. Foreign and domestic capital had 
obvious profit-making interests in pursuing market-extension. The IFC gained by 
receiving a large consultancy fee and gaining lending and investment opportunities 
while at the same time playing a significant role in shaping the process and sustaining it. 
The IFC also had a great deal at stake, in terms of its legitimacy, in sustaining the 
market extension process. Furthermore, when things went bad with Maynilad, the state 
was to make the compromises that would impact upon the public purse. In this tale, the 
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state was a facilitator, a regulator and a guarantor – exhibiting at times clear conflicts of 
interest in an attempt to placate capital and ensure a necessary public utility.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The privatisation of Manila’s water services presents a revealing example of SIN forms 
of market extension and its newly-associated emphasis upon the role of institutions in 
attempting to make market-based approaches work. It demonstrates the way in which 
the Bank still, in a formative manner, supports the process of market extension in a way 
that does not need to rely upon Washington consensus-style conditionality. Here, 
instead, new approaches to reform delivery are used that relate to the Bank’s provision 
of technical assistance. By virtue of the Bank’s supposed monopoly on ‘knowledge’ and 
its apparent legitimacy providing capacity, governments, like that of the Philippines, 
have turned to the organisation for advice relating to reform. Further to this, in the case 
of Metropolitan Manila’s water, the Bank’s IFC followed-up on this advisory role by 
investing in one of the concessionaires on the condition that the company would be 
publicly listed. 
  What is also particularly evident is that the state sought advice from above (from 
the Bank) in an environment which leaves little room for input from constituents more 
generally. In the case of Manila’s water privatisation, the process was almost 
exclusively driven at an elite level by a combination of domestic and foreign capital, the 
World Bank and administrations from Ramos on. But for the state, market extension 
was a double-edged sword that would actually cost it, and the Filipino public, 
significantly. Captured by ideology early on, sections of it would be both compromised 
and would have to make ongoing concessions for the PPP. In this process of market 
extension, the state became the ultimate guarantor, shouldering financial risk for 
domestic and foreign capital and remaining the ultimate body held accountable in 
relation to utility provision. Furthermore, the case study above demonstrates that when 
the intersections between capital and the state are strong, and when political realities 
(such as the importance of providing utilities) generate the need for action, this 
guarantor function extends well beyond the SIN-specified conceptions of the state as a 
regulatory state. Here, what is evident is the manner in which ideologically and 
materially driven interests, that substantively drive the market extension process, 
comprise a formidable current that has significant repercussions for many of those states 
and societies that can least afford it.  
 
  
 
Chapter 7 
Participating in the Embedding of SIN: the World Bank’s Country 
Assistance Strategy for the Philippines 
 
Following on from the theme of market extension and the increasingly common SIN 
delivery device of technical assistance, this chapter analyses, via another case study of 
another of SIN’s delivery devices (a Country Assistance Strategy – or CAS), the two 
core political technologies within SIN associated with embedding its policy set – 
participation and partnership. Both words are now found ubiquitously within Bank 
documents and language (described in chapter five). These political technologies, and 
the programs and projects to which they’re attached, have important roles within the 
Bank’s work and the broader legitimacy-building project associated with embedding 
SIN as a hegemonic paradigm.
576  
What partnership and participation mean within SIN varies, to some degree, on 
context. However, crucially, this variance never deviates from a definition that is 
associated with an instrumental concern for reform implementation and maintenance. 
Encouraging NGOs, government line agencies, and other immediate ‘stakeholders’ 
affected by Bank work, and or vital to its implementation, to be more substantively 
involved in the processes of institutional change and implementing lower-level projects 
is of course politically pragmatic for the organisation. But creating a perception of 
knowing what needs to be done and controlling the way that different groups ‘engage’ 
with this project is also an important element for aiding Bank objectives.  
To this end, as the following case study from the Philippines illustrates, there is 
an attempt through SIN to incorporate specific organisations and people into a particular 
framework (where they are congenial to its objectives), in no small part via the political 
technologies of participation and partnership processes. While the words ‘partnership’ 
and ‘participation’ evoke progressive sentiments, the lines between the Bank and groups 
within society are often so divergent as to be irreconcilable. Indeed, where organisations 
(such as particular NGOs or trade unions) are not congenial to the SIN project the limits 
of participation and partnership are starkly evident. Activist organisations, for example, 
well organised against many of the sorts of programmes that the Bank promotes and the 
Bank itself, often rally for policies inimical to that of the Bank, or indeed for the 
                                                 
576 A search of the Bank’s website in August 2005, returned 812 hits for participation and 866 hits for 
partnership respectively.  PARTICIPATING IN THE EMBEDDING OF SIN 
  164 
abolition of the organisation itself. These groups clearly lie outside the bounds of SIN-
style partnership and participation. The separation that exists is, of course, in significant 
part ideological and in many ways represents insurmountable differences in world 
views. As will become clear, the possibilities for partnership and participation between 
the Bank and NGOs with a critical bent around issues such as debt cancellation and 
privatisation are inherently limited. 
Yet this isn’t the whole story. What becomes evident from the following case 
study is that particular groups and interests are keen to participate with the Bank when 
they think that they can potentially tap into the Bank’s funding sources or have their 
concerns addressed by the Bank within its in-country work. These people are often the 
most positive about the Bank’s attempts to involve and consult NGOs and government 
at different levels. Nevertheless, the Bank’s approach to participation and partnership is 
even criticised by those who are involved with the organisation’s attempts at partnership 
and participation. For example, criticisms relate to the terms of reference of consultation 
processes, the sincerity of the Bank’s work in consultation, the lack of consulting the 
poor directly and the organisation’s assessment of particular problems. 
As we will see, rather than the pursuit of partnership and participation of a broad 
and more genuine manner, the Bank’s interest is in gaining the assistance of 
government and NGOs that will get behind the organisation’s approach. Here, we see 
the way in which partnership and participation are mobilised as the political 
technologies of SIN. Of critical importance is what this implies for notions of political 
representation. One of the key contentions of this chapter is that in an attempt to alter 
the existing and often flawed institutional structures attached to Philippine politics, the 
limited notions of participation and partnership that are associated with the Bank’s 
approach actually imply another form of elitist politics (based around SIN) and the 
circumscription of broad political representation.  
The following is specially intended to provide a demonstration of the way in 
which participation and partnership are mobilised by the Bank as political technologies 
to embed SIN’s broader framework. Their utility, for both the Bank and particular 
interests, is focused upon controlling and marginalising political and ideological 
conflict – especially that between neoliberalism and a range of more progressive 
agendas. Here, the Bank attempts to use participation and partnership as containment 
methods that exhibit an anti-politics quality. The chapter is specifically interested in the 
ways in which particular groups within society, networks and government are brought PARTICIPATING IN THE EMBEDDING OF SIN 
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in, left out, and, promote, adopt or resist the SIN agenda. In short, the chapter details 
why SIN proponents are so interested in participation and partnership, the manner in 
which both of these are incorporated in the Bank’s work, and what the limits to both 
these methods are, especially in terms of political representation and the containment of 
non-neoliberal approaches. 
 
Participation, Partnership and the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy in the 
Philippines 
 
The all-important delivery device of a CAS makes a good case study for assessing the 
incorporation of political technologies such as participation and partnership in the 
Bank’s work, especially in a country like the Philippines, known for a high level of 
political participation (both good and bad) and a highly vibrant and active political 
society.
577 In the following analysis of the Philippines’ CAS (2006-2008), participation 
is looked at in two discreet ways – participation within the process of developing the 
CAS and participation within the CAS itself. As will be made evident, the two are 
analytically separable, yet stem from the same genus of concern: implementation. 
Indeed, the same can be said for concerns over ‘partnership’ as the following makes 
clear. 
The Philippines’ most recent CAS was submitted to the board of the Bank  in 
April of 2005 and covers financial years 2006 – 2008. The decision for the CAS to 
cover a three-year period instead of the more common four-year term was undertaken to 
fit into the six-year election cycle in the Philippines and six-year Medium Term 
Philippine Development Program (MTPDP).
578 Subsequently, the CAS is connected to 
the MTPDP, as the country’s own vision for development,
579 which in other countries 
could take the form of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  Once a country has a 
development plan, like the MTPDP, it opens up the potential for a CAS to be 
developed.
580 Typically, this involves the Bank beginning with an analysis of the 
particular government’s strategy. The Bank has to make an assessment of whether there 
is an alignment between the government strategy and what the Bank can, and wants, to 
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do. This is done to isolate the areas where the Bank Group can have an impact.
581 As 
one senior Bank country office staffer explained, what is important is that the 
government has the will to fix the problems that exist.
582 
As was noted in chapter five, the CAS (for any country) was previously 
considered explicitly as ‘an internal bank document’.
583 However, according to a 
document previously available on the Bank’s Participation website, client governments 
were brought into the CAS formulation process in 1994. Other stakeholders, ‘NGOs, 
women’s groups, trade unions, youth groups, farmers’ associations, and the private 
sector’ were also included in the development of CASs in 1996.
584 The purpose of 
participation in developing a CAS is explained as being important in order 
 
…to obtain information from diverse sources and to consider a wide range of 
perspectives from various sectors of civil society, or stakeholders, in the 
formulation of the CAS. Since 1996, a great deal of effort has gone into giving 
ownership of the CAS to both the government and the people of the client 
country.
585 
 
Participation in the context of developing the Philippine CAS is perhaps best analysed 
through the lens of consultation,  a word that is often traced back to the Bank’s 
conducting of environmental assessments on its projects in the early ‘90s.
586  
In developing the Philippine CAS, a consultation process was undertaken, 
building upon processes associated with previous CASs in 1999 and 2002.
587 As a key 
part of the process (the one which gets the majority of coverage relating to consultation 
in the two key documents associated with it) a series of five workshops were held 
across the country. It was decided that the main consultation meetings would be multi-
sector, involving government (including local government), a broad range of NGOs and 
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582 Ibid. This, of course, implies an acceptance by government of a neoliberal analysis of and prescription 
for the problems. 
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religious organisations, and development partners – many of whom had worked on 
Bank projects.
588 Formal and informal meetings ‘with key opinion leaders from various 
sectors and with government officials from oversight and implementing agencies’ were 
also a part of the process.
589 Additionally, several feedback mechanisms were 
incorporated (a client survey, CAS completion report and a feedback report to 
participants), and feedback was received from a government group that was put together 
to ‘coordinate with the Bank Group on the CAS and its substance.’
590 The involvement 
of youth, a focus that the Bank has been recently promoting at an organisational level, 
was also included via conferences and workshops around the country that the Bank 
organised in collaboration with the private sector, NGOs and the government.
591 In 
addition to these meetings and feedback mechanisms ‘development partners’ (bilateral 
and multilateral agencies) were met with.
592 
  The Bank summed up this process thus:  
 
Through small and large meetings, the Bank Group heard the views of its 
various stakeholders on the development needs of the country over the next 
three years and views on how the Bank Group can assist the government and 
other development partners in addressing these needs.
593 
 
The five ‘multi-stakeholder consultation workshops’ mentioned above involved nearly 
three hundred people and are perhaps the most interesting part of this process of 
consultation for the purpose of analysing participation within the CAS’s 
development.
594 Two were held in Manila, with single meetings being held in 
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Tuguegarao (on Luzon), Cebu and Davao (on Mindanao) in the latter half of 2004.
595 
The majority of participants came from government (38 percent), with 28 percent being 
made up of representatives of ‘civil society and labor’, local government units (LGUs) 
made up 16 percent and members of academia 12 percent.
596 
Looking beyond the simple percentage measures, it is interesting to see what 
some of the people who attended the consultation meetings had to say about the process 
and the Bank generally. It is also revealing to look at the reasons given by various 
people for choosing to attend or not to attend the CAS (and other) consultation 
processes that the Bank runs in the Philippines. As will be taken up in the section on 
‘partnership’ and ‘participation’ within the CAS below, the Bank (through the CAS) has 
a very clear idea of what it wants to achieve in the Philippines and this involves 
requisite alterations to structures that will potentially impact, one way or another, many 
Filipinos. Thus, the issue of who is involved and how matters a great deal. Interestingly, 
in relation to representation, it should be noted that the general public was not invited. 
As one staffer put it:  
 
While the process was transparent, we did not invite [just] anyone who is 
interested. We did post the events on the website but only to inform the public, 
not invite them. We also thought that to publicize the event may not help as 
people might feel constrained to freely discuss their ideas.
597 
 
In inviting participants, the Bank consulted its ‘current list of stakeholders’, asked the 
advice of their sectoral operations staff, asked government, ‘civil society’ contacts and 
the Bank’s Knowledge for Development Centres (KDCs), ‘where many of the 
consultations took place.’
598  
The government people involved in the CAS consultative processes came from 
national ‘oversight and implementing agencies’ and LGUs, with ‘many mayors and 
governors’ attending meetings.
599 Additionally, the workshops were done ‘in 
partnership with the Government’s central planning agency, the National Economic 
Development Authority’, with the Bank stating that the CAS consultations presented an 
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opportune time for the government to circulate the draft of its medium-term plan – 
which was being finalised at the time of the CAS consultation process.
600 From ‘civil 
society’ a broad list of groups were invited, including NGOs with a critical voice.
601  
The meetings were described by the Bank as lively. From the point of view of 
one Bank staffer they also helped to dispel issues with and criticisms of the Bank and 
erase the perception of the Bank as ‘shrouded in mystery’.
602 This hints at why, as 
communication and constituency building exercises, consultative and participatory 
processes are perceived as value-adding for the Bank. Getting people ‘on-board’, giving 
people a sense that they are inputting into the process dissolves the perception that the 
Bank is a monolith, unresponsive to domestic concerns and meddling in domestic 
politics. 
Speaking to people outside the Bank that participated within the CAS 
consultations, a range of views is evident, with some distinct themes becoming 
apparent. For example, groups that saw a potential opportunity for working with the 
Bank or who work with the Bank already were generally more positive about the 
Bank’s attempt at consultation and the Bank itself. However, in several cases these 
groups actually had ideological sympathies or concerns about political representation 
that lay outside or that were contradictory to what the Bank is working towards – that is 
the embedding of SIN. Others still, were keenly aware of the limitations to the 
consultation process and frustrated by them. Finally, some groups that participate in 
Bank activity (including consultations) point out that many of their organisational peers 
are hostile or unhappy with this, indicating the seemingly irreconcilable political 
divisions within society.  
Attorney Zoilo V. Dela Cruz, the National President of the National Congress of 
Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (part of the Trade Union Congress of 
the Philippines, or TUCP), stated that he thought the CAS consultation processes went 
very well and that the TUCP was interested in the work that the Bank does, especially 
in regards to infrastructure.
603 He also stated that he thought the CAS itself was ‘very 
good’, although he had some concerns about its ability to be implemented. He thought 
                                                 
600 World Bank (Philippines), ‘World Bank Country Assistance Strategy Feedback Report’ , available 
online:  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/Feedback_Report.pdf  , 
accessed August, 2005, 2. 
601 A list of people associated with the Cebu CAS consultations was provided to me that confirms that a 
wide array of groups and individuals were invited to the meeting, including groups critical of the Bank.  
602 Interview with two Senior Bank Country Staffers. 
603 Interview with Attorney Zoilo V. Dela Cruz, National President of the National Congress of Unions in 
the Sugar Industry of the Philippines, Manila, November 23, 2005.  PARTICIPATING IN THE EMBEDDING OF SIN 
  170 
that the work of the World Bank was important but it must involve the private sector, 
which for him included TUCP, to help monitor and help implement reforms to tackle 
corruption and increase wages.
604 Dela Cruz saw more money from the World Bank as 
being required, saying that the conditions the Bank sets are fine: ‘if you don’t like the 
conditions you don’t borrow’.
605 Yet many of his personal beliefs and concerns 
pertaining to organised labour were actually antithetical to the Bank’s work, 
unsurprisingly receiving no attention in the CAS. For example, he felt that when 
markets were opened, tariffs and quotas were important tools to be used on some goods. 
This seemed particularly important to him in relation to the ascendancy of China and a 
workforce that was willing to work for less. Perhaps most interesting were Dela Cruz’s 
positions on wage increases and industrialisation and the role that he thought the 
international financial institutions could play. One of his contentions was that the World 
Bank (and the IMF) should help factories update and create wage increases to stimulate 
domestic demand.
606 A major focus for the union official was to increase membership 
and representation of the workforce in the Philippines, which he offered faced massive 
dilemmas of representation that plagued its chances at achieving gains in income. For 
him, boosting wages to improve collective purchasing power made sense, not just for 
labour but for capital also, although he remained wary of the profit motive: ‘Unless we 
organise workers we can’t increase the collective purchasing power to increase the 
business income. But business always wants more profit.’
607 Many of the ideas Dela 
Cruz mentions in relation to the World Bank are obviously problematic for any shade of 
neoliberalism and reside more comfortably alongside variants of Keynesianism and 
social democracy. The CAS makes no mention of the importance of organising labour 
or working with unions (other than involving them in the consultation meetings), nor 
does it entertain quotas and tariffs. It certainly does not talk about raising wages or 
lending to reinvigorate factories.  
Interestingly, Dela Cruz also mentioned that some of the more leftist unions 
were unhappy with TUCP’s participation in Bank activity. He mentioned that the more 
radical KMU, or Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement), while having a large 
membership, would not participate in the CAS consultations.
608 Indeed, the theme of 
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groups being critical of peer groups for working with the Bank appeared several times 
in interviews, with people from non-participating NGOs who were either frustrated with 
the Bank’s attempts at consultation (not just with the CAS) or saw it as completely 
disingenuous. Clearly, the decision of whether or not to participate in Bank activity for 
some groups is a decision where pragmatism and ideology play a role.
609 This may go 
some way towards explaining the fairly low absolute numbers of ‘civil society’ 
participants in the consultation process (as mentioned above, this grouping – including 
labour – made up only 28 percent of the total) for a country that has an incredibly 
vibrant NGO culture and established labour groups.
610   
The disconnect that exists between some NGOs – many that are knowledgeable 
on development issues – and the Bank is at times massive. It is also mutually felt, by 
both the Bank and the NGOs themselves, with neither side often seeing any potential 
reconciliation of ideas or positions. Indeed, one senior Bank staffer located in the 
Philippines country office could not have made the relationship and function of NGOs 
and this disconnection any more explicit. For this person, there existed three types of 
NGOs. First, there were those that were ‘implementing partners’. Second, there were 
organisations that were solution finders and providers. Finally, there’s a group that 
effectively operate as an opposition to the Bank’s operations. It was made clear that 
while this final group needed to be listened to, it should only be listened to so far.
611 
This compartmentalisation of civil society is, of course, not mentioned in the CAS or 
the consultation documents. However, the following quote from the ‘Feedback Report 
to Participants of Multi-Stakeholder Meetings’ (associated with the CAS) perceives part 
of the problem of involving ‘civil society’ organisations as an issue on the part of NGOs 
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that relates to both comprehension and ‘knowing their role’ as it apparently relates to 
implementation, advocacy and monitoring: 
 
In line with participatory governance, the consultations affirmed the importance 
of greater involvement of civil society organizations not only in monitoring 
public sector performance but also in planning and implementation of projects 
and programs. Increasing involvement by civil society organisations, however, 
would entail not only their participation in meetings and conferences but also 
increasing their capacity to understand, analyze, advocate and monitor policies 
as well as programs and projects.
612 
 
Such a statement further demonstrates the functional limits of participation within SIN. 
Yet beyond these limits, the boundaries in relation to the Bank’s efforts at participation 
are in distinct ways political ones, drawn by those in opposition to one another. This 
chasm was reiterated by personnel from several development-focused activist 
organisations, confirming the barrier to even a limited form of participation or 
engagement – such as that which exists between opposing political parties in 
parliamentary democracies, for example. It is somewhat ironic then that the Bank has 
emphasised the importance of ‘buy-in from all participants’ (in relation to participation 
and the CAS document generally) as being important to prevent groups from ignoring 
‘the process of development’: 
  
Without buy-in, the process of development becomes a top-down process 
which organizations at the local level might resent, or worse ignore. It is a 
central component of sustainability, which is built upon fundamental 
understanding and cooperation among partners and stakeholders in the 
process.
613  
 
While the people spoken to within critical development-focused NGOs certainly were 
not ignoring the ‘process of development’, many conveyed, to varying degrees, 
antipathy and anger to the process of development pursued by the Bank and were often 
quite removed from the Bank’s participatory consultations (such as those associated 
with the CAS) and its work more generally. This was often a conscious decision. One 
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person from a well known regional organisation, Focus on the Global South, noted that, 
for various reasons, while their organisation was invited to the CAS consultations (in 
which they did not participate) they had been disappointed by previous attempts by the 
Bank at consultation.
614 Firstly, in their experience with the Bank’s participatory 
processes, people tended to be invited to participate in events with limited notice – often 
only a few days – although for the CAS process the Bank office in Manila stated that it 
allowed two to three weeks.
615 Additionally, it was noted by the same person from 
Focus that while the Bank wanted to convey the appearance of involving a broad range 
of organisations, from civil society, academia and government, ‘in practice, this doesn’t 
happen’.
616 While not entirely ruling out participating in Bank consultation processes, 
there was no illusion as to the level of engagement from this person’s perspective. 
Indeed, they expressed that the only reason that their organisation would be involved 
was to ‘check out the process’ (to see who was invited to be part of it) and to put 
forward their own organisation’s critique and agenda in relation to the ‘…process and 
content of the CAS.’
617 
One theme that emerged specifically in relation to the CAS consultation 
meetings was a criticism that there was insufficient time for questions and the 
processing of information, not to mention a greater representation of the local public. 
Pamela E. Sullano, who is a regional coordinator for the Community-based Resource 
Management Project (funded by the World Bank), noted that while LGUs from around 
the region were able to share their stories, target beneficiaries such as fisherman and 
farmers should have been involved in the consultation process (perhaps even in another 
meeting) because local perspectives are not always congruent with those LGUs or 
government people.
618 Dr. Victoria H. Zosa, Director of the Office of Research at the 
University of San Carlos and a facilitator in the Visayas consultation process was even 
more explicit in regard to this point. For Zosa there were important issues that were not 
discussed at the CAS meeting and people who were not present that should have been:  
 
                                                 
614 A mirror of this story was also told to me by another Focus on the Global South member in Thailand 
(at Focus’ Bangkok offices) in relation to some of the consultation processes and meetings organised in 
that country by the World Bank that she and her colleagues had been invited to. Interview with Chanida 
Bamford, Senior Associate, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok April 4, 2005. 
615 Email from member of Focus on the Global South, Friday, September 9, 2005; Email correspondence, 
World Bank (Philippines), October 2005. 
616 Email from member of Focus on the Global South, Friday, September 9, 2005.  
617 Ibid.  
618 Interview with Pamela Sullano, Regional Coordinator, Community-based Resource Management 
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You need a follow-up. We wanted to know why the World Bank thought there 
was no investment, their answers were insufficient. It’s not just corruption. 
Liberalisation policies are hurting the economy. This was not mentioned at the 
CAS meeting. The type of people at the meeting were mayors and local people 
but the poor can’t speak out in the CAS-type forum.
619  
 
Zosa is also implicitly critical of the NGOs who attended the consultation meetings, and 
makes an interesting point in regard to the sorts of NGOs that generally attend such 
meetings and potentially why:  
 
NGOs have a framework that is conducive to the Bank rather than the poor – 
the Bank is a source of funding for NGOs. The World Bank, in the post-Marcos 
era, relies on NGOs instead of academe but NGOs aren’t trained.  
NGOs were vocal at the CAS meeting and they present a position that they 
know what’s going on. But they have an interest. NGOs don’t want to break 
down the problem. There is a problem with funding agencies relying on 
NGOs.
620 
 
When asked whether she had read the final CAS Zosa illustrated a frustration with the 
consultation process that several people from more critical NGOs had conveyed in 
relation to Bank processes more generally. She stated: ‘I have no reason to read it – it’s 
over, like all the consultations in the Philippines. It’s always a consultation, it’s not 
genuine, it’s a done deal. It’s top down.’
621 A similar point was also made to me by 
Father Margarito Alingasa, a former President of the University of San Carlos and the 
Executive Director of Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water Foundation, who attended 
the CAS consultation meeting in Cebu. While Alingasa says that the Bank tried to listen 
and ‘feel the pulse’, ‘It was a very cursory consultation. The perspectives were already 
there on the part of the World Bank.’
622  
                                                 
619 Interview with Dr. Victoria Zosa, Director of the Office of Research, University of San Carlos, Cebu, 
December 1, 2005. Zosa also stated that there was no time for questions and that ideas ‘need time to 
gel’. The point about the lack of time for questions at the Visayas consultation meeting was also made 
to me by Barangay Captain Adonis Bacalso. Meeting with Barangay Captain Adonis Bacalso, Cebu, 
November 30, 2005. 
620 Ibid. 
621 Ibid. Zosa also mentioned that there should be a follow-up to discuss the final CAS.  
622 Interview with Father Margarito Alingasa, Executive Director of Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water 
Foundation, December 2, 2005. Father Alingasa  also had concerns that the CAS consultation process 
didn’t see ‘the reality on the ground. People working in air-conditioned offices don’t have contact with 
the poor.’ Interestingly, Alingasa also noted that his NGO would not get money from the World Bank 
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There is of course a distinct interest on the part of some NGOs and local 
government people attending meetings such as the CAS consultation meeting. The 
League of Corporate Foundations (LCF), an NGO whose motto is ‘business solutions to 
social problems’ and which is interested in corporate social responsibility has no current 
formal relationship with the Bank but is presently interested in working with them.
623 
Indeed, people from LCF were keen to point out that the World Bank saw a match 
between the CAS and LCF’s strategies.
624 The eagerness demonstrated on the part of 
some NGOs to work with the Bank was also clearly present at the meeting in Cebu, 
where Ferdinand S. Boncayao, Chairman of the Political Science Department at the 
University of San Carlos, noted that there was enthusiasm on the part of participants in 
the CAS consultation meetings, who were interested in how they could avail the 
services of the World Bank.
625 Indeed, the Bank was clearly keen to link up with 
organisations that it saw as having a fit with its agenda. At the meeting for the Visayas 
in Cebu, the World Bank’s Country Director for the Philippines, Joachim von Amsberg, 
promoted the opportunity for organisations to tap help from the Bank and talked about 
assisting LGUs.
626 
Nevertheless, some NGOs choose not to attend World Bank consultation 
meetings associated with the CAS (and other processes), and it is important to 
understand why. This reveals important information about the Bank’s approach to 
participation and partnership and the way in which the approach frustrates some groups 
to the point of not participating in future events. Various interviewees mentioned that 
when they conveyed dissenting views at consultation meetings run by both the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) their views were not reflected in the 
final published proceedings.
627 In fact, this was closely related to another problem – the 
inclusion of the names of participants in final documents detailing consultation 
processes, despite the omission of their, often, highly critical views. Numerous people 
that were interviewed conveyed a range of emotions ranging from resignation and 
frustration to outright anger at the use of their names in this manner, without being 
placed in context, in an exercise that they saw as an attempt by the Bank to demonstrate 
                                                 
623 Interview with members of the League of Corporate Foundations, Manila, November 24, 2005. 
624 Interview with members of the League of Corporate Foundations. 
625 Interview with Ferdinand Boncayao, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of 
San Carlos, Cebu, November 30, 2005. 
626 Interview with Barangay Captain Adonis Bacalso, Cebu, November 30, 2005. 
627 This particular criticism was also noted of the ADB by one particular interviewee. Interview with 
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legitimacy and endorsement for their proposals.
628 A further criticism aired by an 
individual from the development NGO community, stated that the Bank engaged with 
NGOs for reasons of implementation and monitoring. For this person, the Bank would 
‘dangle money at NGOs’, however, they really did not want to engage and were not 
interested in NGOs having an input into policy formation in particular.
629 On policy in 
general, this person found the Bank to be very defensive of its position. On the CAS 
specifically, this respondent stipulated that while the Bank involved participatory 
elements it already had ‘the matrix’, detailing precisely what it would comprise.
630 
Indeed, a comparison of a series of discussion briefs that were distributed 
around the time of the CAS consultations as ‘informal contributions to development 
policy debate’
631 with the CAS’s final form, demonstrates the continuity between what 
the Bank was wanting to focus on (in the briefs) and the way in which it should be 
focused upon (in the CAS). Crucially, despite the consultation processes there is no 
substantive thematic difference between the briefs and the CAS.
632 Further to this, given 
the timing of the briefs, the discussion briefs represent real agenda-setting documents 
for the CAS process – signalling the Bank’s intentions (although they are stated not to 
necessarily represent the institutional views of the organisation).
633     
                                                 
628 There are no dissenting views highlighted in the consultation documents for the CAS. In fact, rarely do 
you see such views in Bank documents. 
629 Interview at Institute for Popular Democracy in Quezon City, Manila on Friday, April 15, 2005. This 
person also explained that the fickle nature of the finances of some NGOs means that sometimes they 
need such resources, although there were organisations that refused Bank funding. This raises an 
important point about why some NGOs might partner with the Bank at certain times. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Joachim von Amsberg, Letter to ‘Development Partners’ from Philippine Country Director Joachim 
von Amsberg, August 30, 2004. Available online: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/DB_covernote.tif , accessed 
September 29, 2005. 
632 Take, for example, the SIN synergies between some of the titles and thematic classifications of the 
briefing papers (‘Strengthening the Investment Climate’; ‘Restoring Fiscal Sustainability’; 
‘Governance and Institutional Strengthening’; ‘Making Decentralization Work Better’) and the focus 
areas for ‘analytical and advisory activities’ (AAA) highlighted in the CAS (Growth and the investment 
climate; fiscal reforms; governance, political economy of reform and anti-corruption; and LGUs, 
municipal finance). See World Bank (Philippines), Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines, 
2006-2008, 34-35, and World Bank (Philippines), ‘Discussion Briefs’, available online:                                                                        
http://www.worldbank.org.ph/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/PHILI
PPINESEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20250461~menuPK:332988~pagePK:141137~piPK:217854~theSiteP
K:332982,00.html , accessed September 29, 2005. Interestingly, the World Bank’s Indonesia site has a 
very similar set of briefing papers: See World Bank (Indonesia), ‘Indonesia Policy Brief: Ideas for the 
Future’, available online:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20414389~menuPK:224605~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:226
309,00.html , accessed October 3, 2005. 
633 von Amsberg, ‘Letter to Development Partners’. This said, the discussion briefs are highly compatible, 
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  Talking to the Washington-based Program Coordinator responsible for drafting 
the CAS about the production of the document provides further explanation as to why 
the potential for outside entities to influence the document is limited. Indeed, 
understanding the manner in which a CAS is produced may go some way towards 
explaining why they often end up looking so similar. A CAS is produced in a step-by-
step process, where there are guidelines to work off and numerous committees (within 
the Bank) of review.
634 Once consultation meetings (like those covered above) have 
taken place, the document is then drafted. Crucially, this process includes looking at 
other CASs. It is then submitted for internal processes of review that take place with the 
intent of representing all sectors within the organisation. Interestingly, in describing this 
process, the Program Coordinator also points out that where their office is in the Bank’s 
Washington headquarters there are actually six people sitting in one corridor that all talk 
to each other about one another’s CASs, in an environment where ‘there’s lots of 
knowledge sharing’.
635 There is a formal standardisation step in the overall process, 
with the Operations Policy and Country Services section of the Bank responsible for 
‘standardising the CAS’.
636 A process of discussion and consultation takes place with 
and to the Bank’s board, though this does not relate to an issue of approval.
637 
Comments come in from the board (there were 14 comments for the Philippines CAS) 
and it is the Program Coordinator’s job to reflect the way in which these concerns are or 
will be addressed back to them.
638 In the case of the Philippines the Bank’s board was 
essentially concerned with economic risk. Indeed, the lack of progress on the fiscal side 
and the fact that in the last CAS the Bank never reached its high lending case, which 
required certain levels of reform to be evident prior to further extending lending, were 
the key concerns.
639 This said, the Bank’s Executive Directors viewed the CAS as the 
best they had seen in months and the CAS was recognised as an example of Bank ‘best 
practice’, with positive feedback gained from other country offices.
640  
  This internal perspective on the CAS’s development gives us an inkling of the 
bureaucratic production of the document, post-consultation, and the organisational 
elements that it must pass through, all of which must have a homogenising influence, 
                                                 
634 Interview with Washington-based World Bank officer, Manila, November 2005. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Ibid. This person also noted that, in the case of the Philippines CAS, the draft of the document was 
also shared with the Philippine Government with the result of no major changes being made. 
637 Ibid. Interestingly, the staffer notes that they have never heard of items (including CASs) being 
rejected by the Bank’s board. 
638 Ibid.  
639 This is reflected in the current CAS as the next section of this chapter states.  
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which limits the capacity for outside influence. Indeed, despite the highly-limited 
potential for the input of consultation participants and critical voices in the CAS’s 
production, perhaps the most important constituencies that affect the document’s end 
form are those within the Bank. For example, as one Bank staffer noted to me, every 
executive director has their pet concerns. The inference here was that these had to be 
managed. Such interests coupled with more mundane, yet paradigmatically important, 
bureaucratic interests reveal the potential pressures that may well be faced in forging a 
document like a CAS. Indeed, satisfying such interests is more obviously in the 
immediate interest of those producing the CAS than any other external concern. 
 
Participation and partnership within the content of the CAS 
 
Having looked at the boundaries of participation and partnership in the production of 
the CAS, the focus now turns to charting the manner in which participation and 
partnership are woven deep into the form of the CAS itself. This follows the SIN 
concern for implementation and monitoring perfectly – although at another level. As we 
will see, when one analyses the annex in the CAS which contains the completion report 
of the previous CAS (FY 2003-05), it is clear that frustrations with the pace of reforms 
and the direction of the government throughout the CAS (2003-05) period have 
generated areas of key concern to the Bank country office.
641 In dealing with this, 
‘participation’ and ‘partnership’ are substantively mustered into action as political 
technologies within the new CAS.  
Unsurprisingly, given the limitations on the participatory process associated 
with developing the CAS, the terms, assumptions and the foci within it adhere, without 
exception, to a classic SIN ensemble. When the core program outlined in the CAS is 
linked on a performance basis to the portfolio – determining the amounts of money the 
Bank will lend – there is little for participants to do in relation to the Bank’s activities 
other than assist the Group in achieving its objectives. All that remains to be partnered 
and to participate in is, of course, the country program that the Bank has developed and 
articulated in the form of the CAS. The following elucidates the manner in which 
notions of partnership and participation are incorporated in the CAS to deliver a typical 
SIN policy set.
642 Importantly, it will be made clear that there exist real tensions 
                                                 
641 This was clearly a concern of the Bank’s Board also, as was noted in the previous section. 
642 By a ‘typical SIN policy set’, I am not saying that the mix of policies pushed in different settings are 
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between the Bank calling for a ‘strong state’, to rally around and deliver its preferred 
institutional forms, and an expanded notion of participation and partnership that could 
be associated with forms of civic engagement where actors have the potential to 
influence politics and institutional form. Such a situation heavily circumscribes the 
nature and function of participation and partnership in a way that expressly serves the 
Bank Group’s self interest. 
  The lack of divergence from the SIN mould perhaps best illustrates the output of 
limited forms of participation in the development of a document like a CAS. In the 
current CAS, there is a thematic focus upon issues of governance and the influence that 
levels of governance are seen to have upon the investment environment, which is, in 
turn, automatically linked to the generation of ‘the common good’.
643 Consequently, 
issues of corruption, and institutional issues more generally, receive plenty of attention 
as the source of the Philippines’ development problems, pointing to what the Bank sees 
as ‘a frail social contract between the government and its citizens.’
644 
Somewhat ironically, however, the purpose of the CAS is about securing the 
elite grounds upon which change in the Bank’s immediate interest can be secured – 
although the language of capture by special interests is not of course used here. Indeed, 
the CAS seems to harbour grave reservations for democratic processes and democratic 
reforms as a way of rectifying this ‘frail social contract’.
645 For example, the document 
states that despite democratic processes, ‘governance indicators’ show that ‘rule of law, 
political stability and control of corruption are lower in the Philippines than in than in 
other East Asian comparator economies.’
646 ‘The answer’ to such a situation (contained 
within the CAS) is to encourage and support ‘islands of good governance’, and, 
crucially, to promote the concession of authority by the public:  
 
If citizens begin to see that public institutions are improving their governance 
and delivery of services, they are more likely to vest authority and provide 
                                                                                                                                               
although SIN is a broad paradigm and particular political factors within the Bank and outside it impact 
what form SIN takes place in different settings, there are indisputably many paradigmatically-common 
themes evident across the Bank’s work. See chapter four on the new basics. 
643 World Bank (Philippines), Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines, 2006-2008, 1, 8, 13.  
644Ibid. 
645 Paul Hutchcroft, one of the most eminent scholars on contemporary politics in the Philippines and a 
reference source for the Bank, has actually offered an alternative solution to deal with the Philippines’ 
woes. In a public lecture given in Perth, Western Australia in August 2005, he was more than clear in 
stipulating his desire for strengthening political parties (as representative institutions) as a vital way for 
the Philippines to move forward. Paul Hutchcroft, ‘Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: Addressing 
the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines’, lecture given as part of the Asia Research Centre’s 2005 
public seminar series, Conflict, Security and Political Regimes in Asia (August 19, 2005). 
646 World Bank (Philippines), Country Assistance Strategy, 2006-2008, 12. PARTICIPATING IN THE EMBEDDING OF SIN 
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resources to the state. A stronger state will be able to increase social inclusion 
and cohesiveness.
647  
 
Given this assessment, it is unsurprising that other states within the region are called 
upon as examples of the merits of such governance provided by ‘strong states’: ‘As the 
experience of many of its East Asian neighbours illustrate, a stronger state is a 
precondition for robust private-sector-driven growth and greater social inclusion.’
648 
Yet a strong state is only desirable from this perspective when it favours a suitable set 
of interests. While it is set up as a rational-ideal type (as it often is in Weberian 
conceptions), it is just another specification of institutions and institutional function 
compatible with specific interests, in a hegemonic sense, with a preference for liberal 
capitalism. The endorsement of a particular notion of a strong state by the Bank is 
evident in the inclusion of the following quote from the CAS by one of President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo’s advisors, Rigoberto Tiglao:  
 
There are two essential attributes of a strong state. First, it is autonomous of 
dominant classes and sectors, so that it represents people’s interest, both 
minority and powerful groups. Second, it has the capacity, represented mainly 
through a strong bureaucracy, to implement its policies.
649 
 
The representation of people’s interests, especially in a situation of chronic inequity and 
corruption, is of course vital. However, this conception of a strong state has a distinct 
political purpose, which is obfuscated by conflating it with the representation of the 
‘people’s interest’. Crucially, ‘representing the people’s interest’ and a ‘strong state’ in 
the SIN mould, do not necessarily sit together easily and a potentially inverse 
relationship can be made between the two. Ironically, the use of ‘participation’ within 
the CAS in such a functional and political manner, concerned with delivering and 
sustaining its preferred ‘matrix’, is one such example of an inverse correlation between 
a strong bureaucratic drive and broad based pluralist representation. ‘Strong’ here 
means that the state is as ideal as possible for guaranteeing SIN implementation and 
regulation prerogatives. Crucially, participation in no way means ‘representing the 
people’s interest’ in a pluralist, or non-neoliberal sense. 
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The bulk of the CAS’s thematic foci are situated around generating a SIN, 
drawing heavily upon the new basics, response to the problems in the Philippines as the 
Bank sees them: 
 
The economic and social aspects of the reform agenda supported by this CAS 
are inseparable. The Philippines poverty reduction strategy, in fact, is integrally 
embodied in the development strategy of this CAS with its two objectives 
(economic growth and social inclusion) and two levers (fiscal stability and 
improved governance). Higher and sustained growth  would need to be the 
major driver of poverty reduction through jobs and income creation (despite the 
lesser effect of growth on poverty reduction under high income inequality). 
With more social inclusion the poor would be empowered and enabled to 
participate in the opportunities afforded by economic growth, supported by 
public spending targeted to the poor as well as institutional reforms for market 
access and participation in decision processes. Fiscal reforms, in turn, are 
essential for growth, for the prevention of crises that inevitably would hurt the 
poor severely, and for building-up effective social spending that reaches the 
poor. Finally, governance improvements would focus on institutional changes 
that let the state deliver its core services to all citizens, especially the poor who 
are often excluded.
650  
 
The two ‘objectives’ of the CAS, economic growth and social inclusion, in addition to 
the two ‘levers’, fiscal stability and improved governance, are essential goals and means 
of achieving those goals respectively, of a classic SIN blueprint. Even here, in a limited 
way the concepts of inclusion and participation are reined into the mix – specifically, in 
relation to social inclusion. But participation is drawn into the CAS in a more 
functionally substantive manner when it comes to issues of reform implementation. 
Demonstrative of this is an entire section in the CAS that is dedicated to looking at the 
Bank Group’s ‘Philippines partnership’ – a phrase that has been used by the Bank 
Group elsewhere to define, in a collegial-sounding sense, the relationship between a 
particular member country and the organisation.
651  
                                                 
650 World Bank (Philippines), Emphasis in the original, Country Assistance Strategy, 2006-2008, 9. 
651 Take for example the ‘Thailand – World Bank Group, Partnership for Development’ document which 
is actually a renamed Country Assistance Strategy. See World Bank (Thailand), ‘Thailand – World 
Bank Group, Partnership for Development’, available online: 
http://www.worldbank.or.th/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/THAILA
NDEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20169454~menuPK:434845~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:33
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It was pointed out earlier that the CAS, despite consultations and public access 
to its final form, is very much the product of an internal dialogue within the Bank. To 
this end, certain paragraphs in particular look targeted at convincing board members in 
Washington of the possibility for maintaining and indeed expanding a successful Bank 
programme in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the manner in which implementation, 
partnership and participation are correlated, conveniently attempting to obscure a 
political project and curtail the range of participation through the centrality of the 
CAS’s matrix is palpable. This reveals, once again, the defence and promotion of the 
Bank’s interest in securing its reform agenda and extending increased lending, which is 
tied within the CAS to performance benchmarks in areas of reform. 
It is not too difficult to understand where the Bank’s country office’s concern 
for implementation comes from. The completion report for the previous CAS (FY 2003-
05), included in the first annex of the latest CAS, reveals much of the frustration that the 
Bank has experienced in this respect, and the key lessons that it distils focus plenty of 
attention upon the agencies and other elements critical for reversing the implementation 
problems. The completion report’s purpose is an evaluative one that seeks to draw ‘key 
lessons for preparation of [the] new assistance strategy’.
652 The annex is fairly 
comprehensive and frank. The report looks at several areas in making its evaluation, 
and its production included interviewing Bank staff and managers from Washington and 
Manila, reviewing the Philippine portfolio performance, assessing the Bank’s 
performance in meeting the previous CAS’s objectives and developing ‘lessons for 
future Bank assistance.’
653 The overall picture that is drawn by the completion report is 
mixed. However, areas of major concern that are focused upon, especially macro-
economic objectives, are revealing, especially when reasons for poor reform progress 
are addressed. Take for example the following excerpt from the report: 
 
However, the Bank was not able to meet it [sic] macro-economic objectives. 
The public sector deficit and high levels of public debt will continue to limit the 
government’s ability to provide infrastructure, facilities and services. The 
Philippines is seen as lagging behind Indonesia, Thailand, and other Asian 
countries in key economic areas, such as provision of infrastructure and the 
ability to attract private investment. Many key constraints were political and 
outside the Bank’s immediate sphere of influence. While progress is being 
                                                 
652 World Bank (Philippines) ‘Philippines Country Assistance Strategy FY 03-05 Completion Report’, in 
Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines, 2006-2008, cited previously, 56.  
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made, strengthening the government’s ability to deliver services (especially at 
the local government level) remains a key challenge.
654 
 
The effect that such a situation has on constraining the Bank’s ability to lend is made 
clear in the section following the above assessment that provides an assessment of the 
lending performance of the Bank. Lending is characterised as being ‘lower than 
planned’ for the period 2000-04 (FY).
655 The report elucidates a fundamental cause of 
the lower-than-planned lending: 
 
Lack of adjustment lending was a key factor: the FY03-05 CAS included US 
$750 million in three adjustment loans in the base case scenario. The Bank did 
not go ahead with adjustment lending because the government did not meet the 
fiscal triggers (fiscal deficit reduction and revenue enhancement). The FY03-05 
CAS had anticipated political opposition to reforms as a country risk.
656 
 
The completion report sums up by characterising the Bank’s performance in the 
Philippines as ‘satisfactory’. However, its key recommendations illustrate the obvious 
link between a thematic concern for participation and partnership and the pursuit of the 
Bank’s interests.
657 Take the following three excerpts (of four in total) from the section 
in the completion report on ‘key lessons’ to guide what the Bank should do:  
 
•  Build on its strong relationship with the client and continue to strengthen 
ownership of the program. The Bank will need to: (i) collaborate closely with 
its clients in operations and fully incorporate their needs and priorities; and (ii) 
ensure that clients continue to see the Bank’s inputs as relative, responsive, and 
innovative. 
 
•  Continue its outreach to political leaders, opinion leaders (i.e., the media), and 
civil society to build awareness of and promote consensus on the challenges 
facing the Philippines and the Bank’s position on these issues. … Many of the 
solutions are political, requiring action by the legislature. The bank will need to 
                                                 
654 Ibid, 61. 
655 Ibid, 62. Further to this, the Bank’s ‘discouragement’, resulting from the slow reform process is 
restated in the body of the CAS as the reason for scaling back its programme over the years. See World 
Bank (Philippines), Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines, 2006-2008, 30.  
656 World Bank (Philippines) ‘Philippines Country Assistance Strategy FY 03-05 Completion Report’, 62. 
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continue its ‘honest broker role,’ but should be realistic about what can be 
accomplished in the near term. 
 
•  Further coherence among Bank projects involving local governments. In the 
past, local governments were often seen as critical implementers of various 
sectoral strategies, rather than units of government in themselves. Going 
forward, local government programs should: (i) strengthen local ownership by 
addressing their priorities; and (ii) take a systematic approach to key cross-
cutting areas such as capacity building and revenue enhancement.
658 
 
 
As an exercise for drawing lessons for the preparation of the current CAS,
659 it is clear 
just how the content from the completion report for the earlier CAS has influenced the 
thematic focus upon participation and partnership in the newest Strategy. Several 
examples of the way that this manifests in the CAS as a defence by the Bank of its 
interests are useful here in order to forcefully make the point. Once again, the emphasis 
upon the relationship between particular ‘stakeholders’, notably government at both a 
national and local level, and the success or failure of the Bank’s objectives is 
particularly stark. Indeed, the CAS states quite frankly that its ‘effectiveness’ depends 
in large part on the ‘political appetite for reform and the pace of change’.
660 This 
‘appetite’ for reform is linked in a scaled way to the potential for expanding the Bank’s 
portfolio during the timeframe covered by the CAS.
661 Subsequently, the importance of 
partnering with stakeholders – such as the government (at several levels), civil society, 
the private sector and other development partners – receives specific attention. 
  Unsurprisingly, the importance of partnering with government, local and 
national, is particularly emphasised. The Philippines government is after all a Bank 
member (and part owner), borrower and client, not to mention heavily associated with 
an important bundle of institutions at the centre of the Bank’s agenda, both as targets of 
reform and ‘containers’ of elements crucial to promoting and facilitating reform. It will 
be recalled from the first section of this paper that government was a significant 
participant overall in the consultation processes associated with developing the CAS. 
Here, the alignment with and ‘partnering’ of the government’s development plan are 
                                                 
658 Ibid, 65. Note that not all of the excerpts are quoted here in full. 
659 Ibid, 56. 
660 World Bank (Philippines), Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines, 2006-2008,  10. 
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salient reminders of the importance placed upon this relationship. Indeed, the CAS and 
the Philippine government’s medium-term plan, the MTPDP (mentioned earlier), are 
linked in several ways. First, remember that it is a prerequisite for the Bank in 
developing a CAS that the country in question has a development plan, like the MTPDP 
in place (in the Philippines’ case the MTPDP sits in place of the PRSP). Additionally, 
the CAS’s consultation workshops were organised simultaneously with the 
government’s canvassing of its own plan (the MTPDP). The Bank makes the 
relationship between the CAS and the MTPDP particularly apparent, stating that the 
strategy ‘applies key lessons’ from past ‘engagement’ and feedback from stakeholder 
consultations, building ‘upon the government’s Medium-Term Philippines 
Development Plan’.
662 The Bank has ‘reconciled’ the MTPDP and CAS themes in a 
way that conveys compatibility between the two, on the surface lending legitimacy to 
the CAS (which is seen as being compatible with the ‘country plan’) and implying 
‘ownership’.
663 Of course it should be remembered that the relationship between the 
CAS and the MTPDP development plan is potentially a political one also, with the 
MTPDP being a prerequisite for a CAS (which is, in turn, essential for the Bank’s 
country program to continue). 
However, beyond the connection with government through the MTPDP there is 
an effort to partner government line agencies and local government units (LGUs) to 
achieve reform ‘lock-in’. This is hardly surprising given the fact that the CAS stipulates 
that potential areas for Bank Group support could address ‘government priorities’ such 
as fiscal reforms, budget and expenditure reforms, civil service reforms, the 
streamlining of agency staffing, procurement reform and anti-corruption measures.
664 In 
deciding upon the ‘thrust’ of support, ‘Bank Group assistance would be tied to the 
quality and implementation of reforms, as well as for groups that show the most 
promise of becoming islands of good governance.’
665 Such an approach is clearly 
evident in the evolving relationship between the Bank Group and the LGUs. Indeed, 
within the current CAS, LGUs receive particular attention as a ‘direct client’.
666 As the 
CAS notes, the Local Government Code of 1991 shifted responsibility for many 
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services to the LGUs.
667 Subsequently, the Bank has strongly recognised the importance 
of the LGUs in relation to its operations. It operates the LGU Assistance Portal on the 
internet, and states in the current CAS that with their substantive responsibilities for 
service delivery LGUs are placed ‘at the forefront of development and poverty 
alleviation.’
668 Given the increased focus at the local level, this makes LGUs important 
or potentially important ‘partners’ and ‘participants’ in the Bank’s work. In particular, 
the Bank is clearly interested in promoting what it sees as well functioning LGUs as 
‘islands of good governance’, for replication elsewhere, proposing a performance and 
capacity framework in part for ‘strengthening LGU accountability, thereby reinforcing 
the decentralization process’ through benchmarking.
669 
Rather than partnership (and ownership) in a more traditional sense, what is 
actually requested in the CAS is the assistance of various government bodies to rally 
around and/or fall into line with the Bank’s strategy. While this is perhaps to be 
expected, we should ask what this implies for political representation. While it is 
accepted that the Philippines, despite democracy, has failures evident in its political 
processes, the manner in which an alternative institutional arrangement is advocated in 
the CAS actually depends upon yet another form of elitist politics (the paradigm that is 
seen as solely ‘legitimate’ is elite driven) – albeit one that is distinctly different in 
delivery, intent and content. What is subverted by the Bank’s self-interested approach, 
is pluralist or non-neoliberal political participation and influence. While ‘good 
governance’ requires what is encapsulated by the Bank’s versions of partnership and 
participation, political representation could require quite the opposite. Within SIN, 
partnership and participation attempt to prohibit political plurality, its representation 
and its potential to influence institutional form. 
  Interestingly, for all the attention that the Bank Group (especially out of 
Washington) has given civil society, the actual role it is allocated is rather minor in the 
Philippines CAS. This is perhaps because relationships with LGUs replace the 
functional need of civil society. Yet similar trends to those above reveal themselves in 
the way that civil society and the poor are incorporated into the CAS. For example, the 
Bank describes its ‘outreach efforts to civil society and beneficiaries in project 
preparation and implementation’ as ‘especially successful’.
670 In addition to ‘civil 
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society’, there is a demand for participation of the poor in decision making – despite 
their lack of participation in the CAS consultation meetings (mentioned above). Once 
again this is linked back to implementation – where social exclusion is coupled to the 
difficulties associated with reform:  
 
While public decision-making is formally open to all members of society, the 
effective participation of the poor and other marginalized groups is often 
limited. Their diminished social inclusion and sense of disenfranchisement 
make policy making, especially the implementation of hard reforms, all the 
more difficult because many groups of the population may not expect to share 
the benefits of public services and reforms.
671 
 
Finally, rounding off the continuity in the concern for implementation, the importance 
of the participation and partnership with other development organisations and 
multilateral agencies, especially the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 
and the ADB is emphasised in the CAS. This is, in part, surprising as they are actually 
competitors in lending circles. Ideologically, however the ADB and the Bank Group are 
perhaps closer than ever and efforts are emphasised within the CAS towards 
‘harmonisation’ between their respective programmes.
672 
 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing review of participation and partnership in the context of the Philippines 
CAS is illuminating in regard to the use of both political technologies and delivery 
devices within SIN. The limits to the respective definitions of the key concepts of 
participation and partnership are obvious to the point that they bear little resemblance to 
their more traditional definitions. The concern for the Bank here is, yet again, 
implementation, not just for the sake of pushing an ideologically charged policy set but 
also to facilitate further lending opportunities which are tied to reform success. Both the 
language and processes attached to participation and partnership is specifically 
connected to program and project delivery and this connection is stark.  
However, the functional approach to participation and partnership reveal 
substantive tensions that relate to political representation, where important groups are 
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not adequately represented and where irreconcilable divisions exist. The divisions that 
get in the way of a more pluralist partnership and participation within SIN are of course 
political. The disconnection between some of the key development-focused NGOs in 
the Philippines and the Bank Group could not be greater. Indeed, the Bank sticks with 
its own in an arrangement where it includes those compatible with its project and 
alienates those who are not. While not deliberately excluding critical groups from its 
consultation exercises, the circumscribed nature of the Bank’s processes and ideology 
mean that groups often exclude themselves – with concerns over the process being 
construed or used as a legitimising campaign or as a formulaic exercise required for 
bureaucratic validation.  
  In terms of the roles of participation and partnership within the CAS, the 
concern for implementation is again central. It is particularly evident in the attention 
that government (both line agencies and the LGUs) get in the overall strategy. 
Interestingly, the limited specified role for ‘civil society’ in the strategy reveals some 
disconnection with the more participatory pronouncements that come from the Bank’s 
participation website, potentially pointing towards an organisational preference for 
working with local government than certain NGOs. Indeed, given the difficulties often 
associated with political society for SIN and the Bank’s interest in decentralisation, this 
may well become a trend, with local governments becoming the crucial implementers, 
monitors and ‘clients’ of the next generation of development initiatives (increasingly 
replacing national governments and NGOs). It is, of course, unsurprising that 
government at various levels features so robustly in the CAS – at the national level 
government is after all the Bank’s ‘main client’). Yet, what is interesting is that for all 
the talk of participation and partnership, the potential for the meaningful involvement of 
some of the Philippines’ diverse political groups is so dramatically circumscribed. This 
derives from SIN’s functionalist concern for securing political and ideological 
objectives. Here, partnership and participation within SIN should be recognised for the 
political technologies that they are, merely deployed to complement delivery devices 
(like the CAS) for SIN’s prescriptive set. Whether as political technologies they are 
successful in ameliorating the tensions concomitant with market relationships is, of 
course, very much another matter. Given the irreconcilable nature evident between 
SIN’s prescriptions and the interests of many groups, we should be sceptical of its 
potential in this regard.  
 
Chapter 8 
A ‘SINful’ Approach to Poverty Reduction? The Kecamatan 
Development Program in Indonesia 
 
This final chapter details the relationship between ‘poverty reduction’, politics and SIN, 
largely via an analysis of a large-scale delivery device (a social development program in 
Indonesia), which takes a radical approach to embedding SIN forms of governance. 
Like the themes covered in the previous two case studies (market extension, 
participation and partnership), ‘poverty reduction’ is now found ubiquitously in Bank 
documents and statements. Furthermore, it intersects in an almost seamless fashion with 
those aforementioned themes, which are related by the Bank to methods and 
prescriptions by which to realise poverty reduction. Indeed, the language of poverty 
reduction permeates through project documents and programs as both an end-goal of, 
and justification for, particular delivery devices, which, in turn, attempt to apply the 
new basics with the assistance of SIN’s political technologies.
673 Indeed, given the way 
the Bank uses the term, everything that the organisation does appears, in one way or 
another, to be related to poverty reduction. However, the link between what the Bank 
does (promoting market-led development with various delivery devices and political 
technologies) and substantive poverty reduction is a point of significant contention.
674 It 
is therefore appropriate that this final case study chapter takes a critical look at the 
concept, being as it is both ‘all-enveloping’ and controversial. 
The chapter begins by briefly looking at the Bank’s reorientation around the 
theme of poverty reduction and, subsequently, Paul Cammack’s new materialist critique 
of it, cautiously adopting his analytical position with some qualifications. The 
substantive portion of the chapter is then taken up with a case study that looks at the 
World Bank’s Kecamatan (pronounced ketchamatan) Development Program (KDP), 
which presents an excellent example of SIN’s institutional emphases upon social capital 
and governance put into practice in the name of poverty reduction. Essentially, the KDP 
is a social development project that seeks to change patterns of behaviour at various 
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levels of society – attempting to normalise transparency and accountability, and assist 
the decentralisation process, for example – by using the provision of funds at the local 
level as an incentive. More than this, though, the KDP is an example of a World Bank 
project run by people who take SIN to perhaps its most extreme, aided and abetted by a 
particular political and historical context. This is important as it indicates that specific 
political contexts, both within the Bank and within a member country can facilitate 
and/or impede the potential for certain types of SIN reform to be both conceived and 
implemented. Indeed, as will be made evident, the KDP, like SIN, owes its existence 
and precise form to crises (the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and the broader crisis of 
neoliberal legitimacy that partly ensued from this) and the pressures and opportunities 
that these crises provided to different actors. In the Indonesian context, where the 
Bank’s portfolio was massively impacted by the crisis and the organisation’s reputation 
was heavily tarnished by, among other things, its close relationship with the Suharto 
regime, the KDP presented an alternative approach (driven by the Bank’s social 
development unit – SDU – in Indonesia) to both the Bank and the Indonesian 
Government (who had few options during such a desperate period). Furthermore, the 
program was undoubtedly assisted by the fact that it was representative of the focus 
upon social development that had ascended in the Bank previous to the crisis and that 
was strongly supported by Wolfensohn as important in reframing the Bank’s activities.   
Certainly, the Bank’s SDU in Indonesia, which is so heavily associated with 
KDP, has demonstrated that the SIN ‘envelope’ can be pushed to generate different 
types of projects to those typical of the Bank’s portfolio, providing that the political 
contexts within and outside the Bank are conducive. However, it is critical to 
understand what is actually different about a project like the KDP. This is taken up at 
length in this chapter with a demonstration of how the KDP works and what is 
attempted through it. The conclusion is that what really is different about KDP – and 
what makes it apparently ‘radical’ (as with the SIN of the PWC more generally) – has to 
do with its approach to delivering reform. 
  The picture that emerges from the analysis is that there is a spectrum within the 
Bank’s poverty reduction work and that political context matters in determining on 
which part of the SIN continuum particular projects and programmes reside. Politics 
also matters with respect to implementation – as we will see. However, despite there 
being more orthodox and more ‘progressive’ variants within the Bank’s poverty 
reduction work, at no time is the SIN paradigm abandoned. If anything, one could see A SINFUL APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION? 
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the paradigm as strengthened by the very implementation approaches that a program 
like KDP adopts. If that paradigm is seen as exacerbating and entrenching asymmetries 
of power – as this thesis asserts is the case with SIN-based market-led approaches to 
development – then KDP’s potential to realise long-lasting and significant reductions in 
poverty should be treated with considerable scepticism. While the KDP may have the 
potential to reduce poverty in the short-term (although even key people associated with 
the project have their doubts, as we will see below), Cammack’s concerns about 
‘proletarianisation’ resulting from the Bank’s project should be taken very seriously.
675 
This potential outcome (the proletarianisation of the poor) places the Bank’s ‘poverty 
reduction’ work in context. Alternatively, substantive questions emerge in relation to 
the longevity of KDP’s influence upon norm creation and attempts at ‘institution 
building’ – elements which are key to achieving proletarianisation.  Importantly and 
fundamentally, this also raises the question of whether an expensive debt-funded 
program like KDP should be considered an efficient method of poverty reduction. 
  
The Bank’s ‘refocus’ upon poverty reduction 
 
The Bank’s work on the theme of poverty reduction is strongly correlated with the 
Wolfensohn presidency and the challenges faced by the Bank leading up to and during 
this era. Several excerpts from a Bank-published book on Wolfensohn’s incumbency, 
serve as reminders of the pressures faced by the Bank (covered in detail in chapter two) 
which prompted the amplification of the emphasis upon poverty reduction:  
 
Faced with questions about its relevance and effectiveness, the World Bank 
reshaped and refocused its mission, anchoring it on poverty reduction as the 
raison d’être of development. A rebalanced agenda has fundamentally altered 
the traditional relationships between the Bank and its clients and other partners. 
It has also changed the face of international development.
 676  
 
It continues: 
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In 1995 the Bank had to adjust to an emerging development paradigm that put 
poverty at the center of development efforts, recognizing equity as essential for 
prosperity and acknowledging the importance of institutions. This shift called 
for a reexamination of the Bank’s core strategic thrust—against a backdrop of a 
world rapidly moving toward market-based democracies and globalization, 
fueled by the revolution in information and communications technologies.  
In response, the Bank realigned the way it worked. It sharpened its focus on 
poverty reduction. It changed its relationship with the clients putting them in 
the lead. It broadened its reach and leverage by establishing or strengthening 
partnerships. It expanded the scope of its work to focus on binding constraints 
to poverty reduction. And it introduced far-reaching institutional changes that 
made it more responsive and more relevant. There were four elements to the 
change agenda: a new business model, declaring war on poverty, broadening 
the scope of Bank action, and realigning the institution.
677 
 
In the same book, current World Bank Chief Economist François Bourguignon argues 
that the focus on poverty reduction was more of a refocus, rather than something 
entirely new. However, what was new was that poverty reduction was now seen as 
strongly correlated with growth:  
 
First of all, the Bank’s agenda became more focused on the objective of poverty 
reduction. Indeed, the emphasis on poverty was not new. Development has long 
been concerned with improving living standards and reducing poverty. Only in 
the 1990s did poverty reduction become the overarching goal of development 
and development assistance. 
What was new was that the emphasis on poverty reduction was fully 
articulated with growth, no longer antagonistic to it.
678 
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This refocus and ‘reconciliation’ with growth has resulted in a situation where almost 
any facet of the Bank’s work can be related by the organisation, or elements within it, to 
poverty reduction.
679  
The theme of poverty reduction as it is used by the Bank is viewed in this thesis 
with Cammack’s new materialist analysis of it, as a project that facilitates ‘the 
proletarianisation of the world’s poor’, as a key influence and concern.
680 However, 
partly endorsing and extending upon Marcus Taylor’s criticisms of Cammack’s 
argument, it should be made clear that the argument presented here places a stronger 
emphasis upon the critical role of political contestation, history and contradiction within 
both the Bank, and member countries, in determining the nature of and outcomes 
associated with particular poverty reduction projects.
681 Indeed, the relatively variegated 
nature of SIN’s manifestation on the ground is in no small way related to these very 
contestations and contradictions.
682 For example, the case study elaborated below 
illustrates that the Bank’s internal dynamics, right down to the country level, are related 
to the very form that neoliberal poverty reduction initiatives take in different settings. In 
this way, KDP demonstrates how relatively progressive factions within the Bank are 
able to push forward a fairly unique, albeit still neoliberal, project because of the 
congenial alignment of both contradiction within the Bank’s previous work (issues with 
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implementation, program outcome and corruption, for example) and within the global 
political economy also (the Asian crisis, is a key factor in the story below). 
Understanding the shape of the Bank’s approach to poverty reduction as conditioned by 
such factors and relationships assists in addressing Taylor’s criticisms of Cammack’s 
work as structural-functionalist (or monolithic), truly ‘opening up the Bank’, right down 
to the country level.
683 
Nevertheless, Cammack’s concerns should be taken very seriously – especially 
in the case of projects that actually get implemented. For Cammack, poverty reduction 
as interpreted by the Bank is ‘conditional upon, and secondary to’
684 the implementation 
of programs that seek to extend market relations and, ergo, the concomitant 
asymmetries of power inherent in such relations. Thus, to varying degrees, the poverty 
reduction approach associated with SIN is seen as generating ‘proletarianisation and 
capitalist accumulation on a global scale’ as its output.
685 This is not to say that the 
Bank’s focus upon reducing poverty is disingenuous. Neither is it incompatible with a 
detailed analysis of the contradictions and politics inherent in what the Bank does. 
Crucially, here, Cammack’s point that that the Bank’s pursuit of poverty reduction is 
‘real, within limits’ is accepted:
686 
 
My argument is that, while the Bank’s commitment to poverty reduction is real, 
within limits, it is conditional upon, and secondary to, a broader goal. Its 
principal objective is the systematic transformation of social relations and 
institutions in the developing world, in order to generalise and facilitate 
proletarianisation and capitalist accumulation on a global scale, and build 
specifically capitalist hegemony through the promotion of legitimating schemes 
of community participation and country ownership.
687 
 
The point is that poverty reduction’s subordination to and dependence upon SIN tenets 
entails the reproduction of social asymmetries – even if this isn’t the explicit intension 
of particular project architects or the organisation itself. It should become apparent in 
this chapter (as well as in the thesis) that ideology and politics together must be central 
foci in an analysis of the PWC. Thus, what has evolved from the political conflict (over 
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and within neoliberalism) are projects and programmes that do differ from those of 
earlier. However, crucially, none depart from the logic of market extension – although 
this logic now incorporates the new basics and a more diverse array of delivery 
mechanisms and political technologies to attempt to achieve what was previously often 
unachievable – implementation.  
As mentioned above, for the Bank, poverty reduction is in essence what it does. 
It is embodied in the organisation’s motto, ‘working for a world free of poverty’. It is 
the goal of the organisation which is apparently to be realised through the efficient 
operation of markets and growth. This is seen as depending upon the production of 
social and human capital, and the attraction of financial capital through the presence of 
well-functioning neoliberal regulatory institutions (all of which relate to the new 
basics). Therefore, for the Bank, social capital and human capital programmes can be 
considered ‘poverty reduction’ programmes in the same way that restructuring a 
banking sector or government institutions in line with the key tenets of SIN can be.  
That the Bank’s notion of poverty reduction is ‘conditional upon, and secondary 
to’
688 the broad SIN project is a vital point, as this is a guiding constraint on what is 
possible even for those working within the Bank that are critical of its more orthodox 
elements. Indeed, the two (poverty reduction and the SIN fundamentals) actually need 
to be separated because in actuality (i.e. beyond the Bank’s public pronouncements 
about what it does and its conflation with ‘poverty reduction’) the causal relationship 
between the two is highly contested, problematic and far from conclusive. Indeed, on 
this point Cammack’s portent about the World Bank’s broader project facilitating the 
proletarianisation of the poor is crucial, even if political realities mean that 
implementation is often more problematic than his argument might suggest.  
 
How the KDP operates 
 
The KDP is an innovative, large-scale poverty reduction project that attempts to put 
core SIN emphases (in particular, those of social capital and governance) into 
practice.
689 Essentially, it seeks to change patterns of behaviour by providing funds to 
the local level for infrastructure and other purposes as incentives. Crucially, though, the 
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KDP is different to many other neoliberal development projects in its approach to 
delivering reform. Indeed, the specific design of the project is quite radical, illustrating 
the shift in conditionality that is an important feature of SIN. In the program, leverage 
for policy reform operates at a local level, bypassing much of government. In many 
ways, when compared to earlier neoliberal development projects, this appears quite 
progressive and different. Resources are allocated to villages on a competitive basis, for 
projects that villagers actually propose. Also buffering the program’s seemingly 
progressive credentials, is its emphasis upon the participation of women. Furthermore, 
KDP has a defining focus upon creating a type of governance that goes beyond that 
typically associated with the ‘good governance agenda’, in that it is seen, especially by 
significant people associated with its design and implementation, as having the potential 
to increase more broad and active forms of political participation and representation 
(beyond simple market-establishing concerns). In this respect it is highly ambitious, 
seeking nothing less than the reframing of citizenship in post-New Order Indonesia. 
The KDP is associated with the World Bank’s SDU based in Jakarta, and it has 
received attention from academics and popular authors alike.
690 Indonesian government 
agencies describe the project as one that aims to alleviate poverty and improve local-
level governance in rural Indonesia.
691 For the Bank, it is described in a more formal 
manner as a project to ‘support participatory planning, and development management in 
villages, through a broad program of social and economic infrastructure, [which] will 
also strengthen the local formal, and informal institutions, through greater inclusion, 
and accountability of basic development needs.’
692 It is classed as a community 
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 http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/01/18/000094946_0101170531251/Re
ndered/PDF/multi0page.pdf , accessed January 11, 2006, 1-2. A SINFUL APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION? 
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empowerment/social protection project by the Bank and its task leader, Scott 
Guggenheim, is also the lead social development specialist for the Bank in Indonesia.
693 
The KDP has gone through several phases – each one expanding upon the 
previous in size. Its pilot version covered twenty-five villages in 1997, its first major 
phase (KDP 1) reached 15,000 poor villages and, in 2005, it was expected to reach just 
under half (30,000 or so) of all the villages in the country.
694 A version of it was used 
by the Bank in Aceh and North Sumatra to assist in the post-tsunami environment and 
similar projects are being recreated in Afghanistan, East Timor and the Philippines.
695 It 
is the biggest community development project in Southeast Asia
696 and has been a 
major example of what the Bank has called ‘scaling up’ – that is the often rapid increase 
in the size of new programs to reduce poverty. Furthermore, KDP’s role in terms of 
cost-effective infrastructure is impressive. For example, KDP I saw US$133 million in 
rural infrastructure construction, 16,700 roads (19,000 kilometers) built or upgraded, 
3,500 bridges built or reconstructed and its estimated beneficiaries are quoted as 35 
million people, with 25 million workdays generated, and the short-term employment of 
2.8 million villagers. 
697  
                                                 
693 According to one of the Bank’s senior poverty specialists in Indonesia, the Bank’s SDU is probably 
the biggest of any social development unit in the world (perhaps even bigger than that of the 
Washington head office). Interview with Stefan Nachuk. 
694 World Bank, ‘Indonesia – Second Kecamatan Development Program’, 1; Scott Guggenheim, Tatag 
Wiranto, Yogna Prasta and Susan Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program: Large-Scale 
Use of Community Development to Reduce Poverty’, a case study from ‘Reducing Poverty, Sustaining 
Growth – What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why. A Global exchange for Scaling Up Success’, Scaling 
up Poverty reduction: A Global Learning Process and Conference, Shanghai, China (May 25-27, 2004), 
available online: 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/12/03/000090341_20041203153406/R
endered/PDF/307790IND0KDP0cty0devt01see0also0307591.pdf , accessed January 31, 2007, 1; 
World Bank, ‘Kecamatan Development Project 3B’, Project Appraisal Document (March 1, 2005), 
available online: 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/03/09/000090341_20050309091816/R
endered/PDF/31566.pdf , accessed February 7, 2007, 2. 
695 World Bank, ‘Community Recovery Through the KDP’, available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40
941&Projectid=P097535 , accessed January 12, 2006; Li, ‘The Social Development Program of the 
World Bank in Indonesia’, 2. 
696 Scott Guggenheim, ‘Crises and Contradictions: Understanding the Origins of a Community 
Development Project in Indonesia’, (2004), available online: 
 http://www.cultureandpublicaction.org/bijupdf/guggenheim.pdf , accessed October 2005, 2. 
Guggenheim remarks on the scale of the project within the World Bank’s Indonesia portfolio, stating 
that between 2001 – 2003 it ‘accounted for more than half of World Bank lending in Indonesia.’ 
Guggenheim, ‘Crises and Contradictions’, cited previously, 6. 
697 Further to this, 2,800 clean water supply units, 1,300 sanitation units, 5,200 irrigation systems were 
built.  400 public market structures were constructed, (16 were rehabilitated) and 260 rural village 
electrification activities were undertaken. See ‘KDP Achievements’, in Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Indonesia), Community Development Agency, KDP National Secretariat and National Management 
Consultants, Kecamatan Development Program, 1998-2002, Final Report, 23. A SINFUL APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION? 
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It is worthwhile having a look in detail at how the KDP operates. This is 
important in assessing both how different, and similar, KDP is as a Bank project, in 
comparison to other projects operated by the organisation. Indeed, it is seen (in 
particular by people closely associated with it) as being substantively different from 
‘standard development projects’.
698 A brief overview of KDP’s structure illustrates 
where much of this perceived difference stems from. Here, the nature of reform delivery 
is key. KDP basically provides funds (block grants of US$40,000 – US$114,000) to the 
kecamatan or sub-district level.
699 The broad list of what KDP can finance is long and 
wide-ranging:  
 
KDP can finance productive infrastructure, social and economic activities. 
Proposals can include a mixture of various social, economic and infrastructure 
activities if the villagers so choose. Project menus are open to all productive 
investments except those on a negative short list [which includes military or 
paramilitary purposes, civil works for government administration or religious 
purposes, manufacture of environmentally hazardous goods, arms, or illegal 
drugs, or financing of government salaries. There is also a restriction upon land 
acquisition]. Villagers can prepare joint proposals, for example, for multi-
village irrigation, road or water supply systems.
700  
 
Importantly, villagers make decisions on the use of the funds for ‘infrastructure, social 
or economic activities.’
701 The manner in which the funds are distributed down to 
villages is itself very interesting: 
 
The distribution of funds within the subdistrict is through a subdistrict forum to 
a village. The subdistrict forum consists of village heads plus additional, 
broadly represented persons (such as religious and traditional leaders, teachers, 
etc) and three representatives (one man and two women) from each 
participating village. The subdistrict forum also creates a unit called the 
                                                 
698 Guggenheim, ‘Crises and Contradictions’, 4-6. This point was also made to me by several Bank staff 
in the social development unit. 
699 The reason for targeting the kecamatan level is elaborated below. Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and  
Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, cited previously, 7; Mohini Malhorta, 
‘Learning from the Kecamatan Development Program’, available online: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/reducingpoverty/doc/104/file/kdp%20FV%20Facilitator%20Rep
ort.pdf , accessed January 12, 2006.  
700 Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and  Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 8. 
Importantly, KDP funds cannot be used at the district level for infrastructure, which is has its own 
sources of funding. See Ibid.  
701 Ibid. A SINFUL APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION? 
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financial management unit to manage KDP funds and to oversee any large 
procurement.
702  
 
Crucially, this funding arrangement is also associated with particular processes of 
‘socialisation’ (to the ways of KDP), planning, proposals and project selection.
703 These 
processes are seen as critical to the project and illustrate the importance of its simple 
(yet strong) rules and the role of facilitators in the project’s operation.  
The socialisation stage of KDP is seen as a vital elementary stage to ‘… 
[support] the success of the processes and activities implemented in the following 
stages.’
704 The operational manual for KDP states that the intention of this stage is to 
form a uniform understanding of the program by its participants and to encourage 
participation and monitoring. Various forums are important in this process.
705 Initially, 
word about KDP is spread through workshops at the provincial, district and subdistrict 
levels ‘…to disseminate information and popularize the program.’
706 These 
‘…workshops involve community leaders, local government officials, local press, 
universities and NGOs.’
707 Village, sub-village and group meetings are also held to 
further spread information about KDP and ‘…encourage people to propose ideas for 
KDP support.’
708 Planning meetings are then conducted at the sub-village and village 
levels. Here, facilitators are involved, from the village and sub-district level, to spread 
information about KDP procedures and to encourage the submission of ideas for KDP 
funding. At this stage, women also hold their own meetings in order to decide ‘…upon 
women’s proposals’.
709 A subsequent village meeting is then held, where the respective 
ideas of the villagers are discussed and the ideas that are to be put forward to the sub-
district (inter-village) forum are decided upon.
710 All in all, this socialising and planning 
stage takes about 1-2 months. Each village can submit up to three proposals to the inter-
village forum, with one of these proposals coming ‘from village women and a second 
from a women’s savings and loan group.’
711 Proposals are written up specifying 
important information, such as the ‘…proposed location, number of beneficiaries, 
                                                 
702 Ibid. 
703 Ibid. 
704 World Bank, KDP II, Operational Manual, 16. 
705 Ibid. In addition to these forums mass media and religious and other community meetings are used to 
spread the word about KDP. Ibid. 
706 Ibid. 
707Ibid, 7. 
708 Ibid.  
709 Ibid. 
710 Ibid. 
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volume/dimension, and may include a rough cost estimation.’
712 These are then 
discussed at the inter-village level.
713  
A process verifying the fulfilment of the technical requirements of each proposal 
prior to project selection also takes place. For this, a team – usually comprising of 
‘community leaders, the Subdistrict facilitators, and appropriate technical staff 
recommended by the District Engineer’ – is involved.
714 Some of the issues with which 
this verifying team is concerned are the economic and technical feasibility of a given 
project, the amount of people benefited by the project, the planning for maintenance or 
loan repayment – where loans are involved, the level of participation by people in the 
idea proposal process, and the local community contribution.
715 Proposals are then 
discussed at a second inter-village meeting to determine priority rankings.
716 After this, 
one more meeting of the villages occurs, proposals are selected and a grant agreement is 
drafted for the successful proposals.
717 This agreement is ‘…signed by the kecamatan 
manager for KDP, the person-in-charge from the village, the village chief, and the head 
of the Activity Management Unit.’
718  
Competition between individual proposals is also a vital feature of KDP. Where 
a strong consensus cannot be reached, villagers are given criteria in order to prioritise 
particular proposals, often with the assistance of a facilitator.
719 Interestingly, this 
competitive element was highlighted to me in a meeting of villagers in West Java as an 
undesirable facet of the project that should be eliminated.
720 One particular person also 
noted that the prioritisation of projects is difficult, with each village ranking itself 
highest, and with bargaining processes taking place between villages.
721 For 
Guggenheim (the program’s team leader), however, conflict within KDP is not a major 
                                                 
712 Ibid 7-8. 
713 Ibid. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Ibid. Projects that are deemed not feasible are discussed with communities so that they have the 
opportunity to modify the proposal or at least gain an understanding of why the proposal was rejected 
by the facilitators. While the facilitators can recommend rejection, the communities must still make the 
decisions themselves. Ibid. 
717 Ibid, 9. 
718 Ibid. 
719 In an interview with people from the Ministry of Home Affairs, both of whom were very positive 
about KDP, the competitive element was iterated as one of KDP’s key principles (along with 
transparency, decentralisation, being pro-poor and sustainability). They noted that while a facilitator 
was involved to assist where consensus couldn’t be reached, they often don’t need to do anything. 
Interview with Richard Gnagey and Prabowo Ekasusanto, Jakarta, December 13, 2006.  
720 Other people present at the meeting agreed with this sentiment. When I asked them what was good 
about it, people offered that its involvement of the community was good and that given the lack of 
money in the area any assistance from the government or the World Bank was generally to be 
welcomed. Meeting with villagers in West Java, April 21, 2005. 
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factor: ‘…we don’t have conflict within KDP – or very little’.
722 One of Guggenheim’s 
key colleagues in social development is perhaps a little more cautious – especially in 
relation to consensus being met: ‘consensus at the village level is generally met – 
although there are some conflicts.’
723 Nevertheless, facilitators and consultants are vital 
to the management and operation of KDP – a point corroborated by numerous other 
people associated with KDP.
724 Indeed,  a veritable army of private consultants (4,200 
in KDP II) is involved at all levels down to the subdistrict level to ‘…implement the 
technical aspects of the project.’
725 Further to this, two (one male, one female) or three 
facilitators are elected for every village participating in KDP.
726 
  All of this is managed at the national level by the Community Development 
Agency within the country’s Ministry of Home Affairs which is responsible for the 
management of KDP on a day-to-day basis and is, for World Bank purposes, the 
implementing agency.
727 Additionally, a deputy for regional development within 
BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional) – the national 
development agency – heads up the KDP’s National Coordination Team, which 
‘…provides oversight, strategic planning and evaluation’ of the project.
728 Other 
ministries are represented by government coordination teams, which also assist with the 
management of KDP, and there is also a role played by province and district levels.
729 
  The financing structure is also interesting and important, being indicative of 
both similarities and differences of the KDP as a Bank program. At the level of the 
World Bank and the Indonesian government, KDP is a combination of a credit (that is, a 
                                                 
722 Interview with Scott Guggenheim, Jakarta, December 15, 2005. 
723 Interview with Victor Bottini, Community Development Specialist, World Bank, Jakarta, April 19, 
2005. 
724 Interview with Victor Bottini; Interview with Tatag Wiranto; Interview with Richard Gnagey and 
Prabowo Ekasusanto. Almost all of the consultants are Indonesian and the case study on KDP II states 
that ‘[t]otal international TA [technical assistance] comes to less than one percent of the project 
budget.’ World Bank, KDP II Operational Manual. 
725 Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 9. It is 
stated that private consultants (rather than government personnel) are used in order to avoid ‘inflating 
the civil service payroll’ and to provide ‘more flexibility’. Most of these consultants are Indonesian. 
Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 9. For a 
detailed list of key KDP actors see World Bank, KDP II Operational Manual, 11-15. 
726 Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 9. The 
KDP II manual actually specifies that three VFs (or village facilitators) are chosen at the village level 
(from village members), - two ‘empowerment VFs and one ‘as a technical cadre.’ See World Bank, 
KDP II Operational Manual, 7, 12. 
727 Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 9; World 
Bank, ‘Updated Project Information Document (PID) – Report 32942’, (May 2003) available online: 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/07/13/000090341_20050713092136/R
endered/PDF/329420PID1P079156.pdf , accessed January, 2006. 
728 Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 9. 
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non-interest-bearing loan – not a grant) and an interest-bearing loan.
730 This point itself 
is seen as a problem by various people, from a senior bureaucrat who was previously 
involved with KDP in significant ways to NGOs associated with the project.
731 KDP II, 
III (and IIIb) have drawn upon both the interest-bearing International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) funds and non-interest-bearing International 
Development Association (IDA) funds of the Bank, with varying grace periods of five 
to ten years.
732 Nevertheless, the money supplied for KDP from both IDA and IBRD 
constitutes debt in a country that, in 2003, had US$77 billion in public (government) 
debt, of which nearly US$60 billion was bilateral and multilateral debt.
733 However, 
when asked about the financing mix associated with KDP, Guggenheim is adamant that 
                                                 
730 The Bank money, in US dollars from both IBRD and IDA, in the budgets for KDP I, II and III is as 
follows (accurate up to November 2003):  KDP I, $275 million; KDP II, $320.2 million; KDP III, 
$249.8 million. Ibid, annex 3. In the updated project information document for KDP III, the amount 
stated as being financed by both IBRD and IDA is stated as US $246.4 million. World Bank, ‘Updated 
Project Information Document’, cited previously, 17. 
731 Interview with Gunawan Sumodiningrat; Interview with Rahadi Wiratama. 
732 Several important notes should be made with regard to IDA and IBRD lending, especially in the 
context of KDP. Firstly, KDP I was funded by IBRD funding. Secondly, IDA lending is long-term and 
has no interest. Further to this KDP lending from IDA has grace periods of ten years before the 
principal needs to be repaid, and maturity periods of 40 years. This said, lending (or ‘credits’, as the 
Bank refers to IDA lending) amounts do incur a service fee (currently 0.75 percent of funds disbursed). 
Indonesia, is classed as a ‘blend borrower’, which means it can borrow from both IDA and IBRD. To 
be eligible for borrowing from IDA in 2004 countries had to have a per capita income of less than US 
$965. Blend borrowers are those borrowers that have an ‘adequate’ per capita income and a 
creditworthiness sufficient to borrow from IBRD. IBRD funds are mostly raised on the international 
financial markets, whereas IDA funds need to be periodically replenished, mostly from contributions 
from wealthy countries. See World Bank ‘IDA - Background’, (2006), available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:20051270~me
nuPK:83991~pagePK:83988~piPK:84004~theSitePK:73154,00.html , accessed January 18, 2006; 
World Bank, ‘Indonesia: Kecamatan Development Project 3B’, (March 24, 2005) available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20411876~menuPK:287113~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:2263
09,00.html , accessed January 18, 2006; World Bank, ‘Indonesia: Third Kecamatan Development 
Project’, (June 26, 2003), available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20117081~menuPK:287113~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:2263
09,00.html , accessed January 18, 2006; World Bank, ‘Indonesia: Kecamatan Development Project II 
(KDP II)’, (nd), available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20026607~menuPK:287113~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:2263
09,00.html , accessed January 18, 2006; World Bank, ‘Indonesia: Kecamatan Development Project’, 
(nd), available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20026524~menuPK:287113~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:2263
09,00.html , accessed January 18, 2006; World Bank, ‘Indonesia: Kecamatan Development Project – 
Supplemental Credit’, (nd), available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20026814~menuPK:287113~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:2263
09,00.html , accessed January 18, 2006. 
733 Dadan Wijaksana, ‘CGI slammed for being insensitive about RI’s debts’, The Jakarta Post, December 
13, 2003, 1; World Bank, ‘External Debt Outstanding, December 1997-2003’, available online: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Country-
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using loans for a project like KDP is entirely appropriate – especially instead of relying 
on grants: 
 
First of all there are too many grants… . I think that KDP has such high rates of 
return and reaches so many poor people [that] this is exactly what a loan project 
should be doing. Instead, what you do [with grants] is put in a false subsidy – 
that is very helpful operationally, because you can do all sorts of things with 
grants, but it reinforces this idea that unless there is all kinds of concessional 
finance then ‘[damn] the poor people’. Right, and we’re happy to borrow 
money for airports but something that immediately benefits the poor, well, it’s 
beyond the scope.
734  
 
National government contributions to KDP are essentially zero, although local 
government contributions and community contributions are counted as Government of 
Indonesia (GOI) contributions.
735 Furthermore, other funds also come from mid-level 
government which Guggenheim would like to see as a broader trend followed by other 
levels of government: 
 
Because [KDP] was essentially developed through the crisis, we structured it in 
a way to, I wouldn’t say falsify, exaggerate local government contributions. So 
BAPPENAS…doesn’t actually contribute anything. When you look at the 
financing structure we count community contributions as Indonesian 
contributions, so at the national level there are essentially no contributions. The 
downside of that is that they see it as [a] one hundred percent World Bank 
project. Interestingly, at the other level, where the opposition [to KDP] was, at 
the mid-level government, we now get a tremendous amount of money. … [I] 
would like to be able to regularise the financing structure in a way that sort of 
commits to different levels of government that ‘you want it, you pay for it’.
736 
 
Under the existing structure, Bank money for KDP is transferred to the Bank of 
Indonesia (the Indonesian central bank) into a special account, then through the State 
Treasury Office as block grants down to collective accounts for the villages within each 
kecamatan. Instalments are then paid out of that account to villages in three tranches 
(40 percent, 40 percent and then a final amount of 20 percent), with the final amount 
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only released once a process of certification has occurred.
737 Additionally, after each 
tranche has been utilised, villages have to report to their community to explain how the 
funds were used – illustrating some of the transparency/monitoring aspects that play 
such a significant role in KDP – which are taken up in more detail below. Community 
contributions to KDP are also high.
738 
Even somebody with only a cursory knowledge of World Bank projects should 
be surprised by the KDP’s uniqueness – in particular its structure that allows villages to 
choose, albeit in a competitive environment, what they want to spend money on. 
Furthermore, it actually circumvents a lot of government, which is unusual for a World 
Bank project (national governments being the clients and members of the Bank). As we 
will see below, all of these facets are essentially related to reform delivery. While there 
are several other features that distinguish KDP as different for a World Bank project 
(covered below), what is crucial about KDP is the way in which it actually fits very 
comfortably within the reproduction of neoliberalism. Indeed, in many ways KDP can 
be seen as a somewhat rare example of a large-scale neoliberal institution building 
project that actually gets implemented in the way it was intended. This generates the 
related concerns regarding reform longevity and impacts upon poverty. These issues are 
covered in the following section on what the KDP sets out to do as part of the 
reproduction of neoliberalism and the manner in which it attempts poverty reduction. 
 
 
The purpose of the KDP 
 
We have seen above how the KDP operates – which emphasises much of what is 
different about program in comparison to other World Bank projects and programs. It is 
also important to emphasise what exactly the purpose of the KDP is. This is especially 
important in demonstrating how the KDP falls within SIN and, in turn, how it comes to 
be defined as a poverty reduction project.
739 On one level the KDP appears to be largely 
about cost-effective infrastructure provision (and more) for villages – a fact 
Guggenheim, and various departments within the Indonesian government, point out.
740 
                                                 
737 Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and  Wong, ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program’, 9. 
738 Ibid, 12. 
739 Guggenheim is comfortable to note KDP’s relationship to neoliberalism noting that he sees the project 
as an example of being able to pursue progressive aims within the neoliberal paradigm.  Interview with 
Scott Guggenheim. 
740 With regard to this, Guggenheim noted to me ‘Everyone agrees, I think, – even in finance – that you 
build infrastructure more cheaply this way than any other way. I couldn’t make that argument in 1998 
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Yet it is vastly more ambitious and political than that. In essence, the KDP is a project 
that attempts to deliver its reform set (a mixture of good governance, social capital and 
decentralisation) via the incentive/leverage of the provision of infrastructure and other 
goods at the local level. The problem here is that the KDP, using debt-funded methods 
tolerable to the SIN paradigm, attempts to create patterns of neoliberal governance 
while ignoring many of the broader structural politico-economic impediments to 
development that countries like Indonesia face. Furthermore, and related, its links with 
the reduction of poverty are far from clear – even to its task leader.
741  
The KDP is both political and ambitious, in that it is designed to create certain 
institutional structures in the post-New Order environment.
742  In this regard, the 
program is associated with reworking notions of citizenship, in part by creating demand 
for behavioural change (i.e. attempting to instil norms of transparency and 
accountability), using incentives to drive the process. In short, improving governance is 
the KDP’s primary output. Tania Li, writing on the Bank’s SDU in Indonesia (which is 
so closely associated with the KDP),  has noted this fetish for governance over other 
issues: 
  
Although the Bank’s social development team did not suggest that inadequate 
planning and failures of governance were the only source of poverty, they 
were the only sources taken up as the basis for the team’s very large and 
expensive anti-poverty program. The exclusion of refractory relations – 
unequal relations of production and appropriation foremost among them – 
was intrinsic to the construction of communities as sites of intervention.
743 
                                                 
741 Even Guggenheim himself has questioned the link between projects like KDP and poverty reduction. 
At the World Bank supported ‘Scaling Up’ conference in Shanghai, 2004, Guggenheim provided a 
summary analysis of several case studies of community driven development (CDD), including KDP. A 
person who seems more than willing to highlight the problems of a particular project as well as its 
benefits, he frankly stated ‘The three cases [programs in Brazil, Yemen and the KDP] give us a good 
way out of the divide between economic justice and economic growth.’ However, he then went on to 
qualify that the relationship between these projects and the reduction of poverty just wasn’t known and 
that while CDD could lower the cost of projects and that this potentially meant that the Government of 
Indonesia, for example, had more money to spend on poverty reduction, there was no proof that such 
projects lower poverty. See Scott Guggenheim, B-Span video presentation, (Shanghai, 2004), available 
online: 
 http://info.worldbank.org/etools/reducingpoverty/casestudy.asp?type=case , accessed January 12, 
2006. This is despite the fact that the paper for the case study presented at this same conference (which 
Guggenheim co-authored) is entitled ‘Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program: A Large-Scale 
Use of Community Development to Reduce Poverty’ (emphasis added); World Bank, ‘Indonesia – 
Second Kecamatan Development Program’, 1; Guggenheim, Wiranto, Prasta and Wong, ‘Indonesia’s 
Kecamatan Development Program: Large-Scale Use of Community Development to Reduce Poverty’, 
cited previously, 1 
742 The ‘New Order’ is the term given to former Indonesian President Suharto’s three decades of rule.  
743 Li, ‘Neo-liberal  Strategies of Government through Community’, 9. A SINFUL APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION? 
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Importantly, in relation to this governance fetish, the KDP works around much of 
government. As one Bank staffer noted to me, while the program is ‘sold’ to the 
government as a poverty reduction initiative (which the government is happy with), it 
actually circumvents government.
744 Somewhat telling here, is the manner in which the 
project’s design uses the kecamatans to by-pass existing political institutions to create 
or rebuild absent social and political institutions. Revealingly, a quote from 
Guggenheim explains just why the kecamatan level was chosen as a focus for the 
project:  
 
Kecamatans seemed advantageous for some additional reasons above and 
beyond their accessibility to villagers. Because they were not a fully 
autonomous unit of government, they had no budget and contracting powers of 
their own, This meant that the collection of commercial and political interests 
that had a stronghold over government in the districts was much weaker in the 
subdistricts. Kecamatans also had a requirement to ‘coordinate’ village 
development through a kecamatan council that included all of the village heads, 
but because the kecamatan had no budget of its own to invest, most of these 
councils only met once or twice a year. And last, having villagers compete for 
KDP funds in kecamatan meetings would, we hoped, encourage the kinds of 
direct negotiations and cooperation that would provide a basis for rebuilding 
the supra-village horizontal institutions destroyed or neglected by the New 
Order.
745 
 
The updated project information document (PID) for the KDP III is especially telling in 
the program’s focus upon governance and where it stems from. What is particularly 
glaring here is the influence of neoliberal notions of social capital. ‘Community 
Empowerment and Local Governance’ is the first key section covered in the document, 
which refers back to a series of studies (the Local Level Institution – LLI – studies) that 
the Bank, BAPPENAS and the Ministry of Home Affairs carried out prior to KDP I. 
Crucially, these studies obviously had an indelible impact upon the KDP’s form.
746 
According to the PID, the LLI studies ‘identified a gap in local governance that exists in 
                                                 
744 Interview with World Bank Staffer, Jakarta, April, 2005.  
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the large majority of Indonesian rural villages.’
747 The way that the concerns derived 
from this analysis are worked into the project information document draw upon a 
neoliberal version social capital-type analysis in that a lack of trust and dialogue is 
unproblematically connected to the present development situation and impediments to 
economic efficiency. Also evident is a concern for implementation, a pervasive theme 
in SIN:  
 
This gap usually translates into a lack of trust, apathy and a low-quality 
dialogue about development. Externally induced development models that do 
not recognize the core problem of the local governance divide limit their own 
likelihood of success. Evidence of this root problem can be seen in the 
universally reported problem of poor public infrastructure construction 
standards and poorer maintenance in Indonesian villages, clear signs of little 
local ownership. As a result, social and economic resources are not as well used 
as they could be, particularly with respect to rural poverty reduction.
748 
 
Here it is implied that poor governance leads to a lack of social capital (in this case a 
lack of trust) which is, in turn, seen as the reason for poor infrastructure. This might 
seem a rather selective analysis to some, especially for a country with a stated (by the 
Bank) per capita income in 2003 of US $810.
749 However, the lack of trust and 
problems of corruption in the post-New Order environment (which are dramatically 
real) are used to justify an expensive ‘corrective programme’ of governance, as if it 
were a root cause of Indonesia’s situation.
750 Governance is seen in the KDP beyond a 
merely functional relationship with the market, in contrast to the more normative notion 
of governance endemic within the Bank.
751 However, the market element remains 
strong, and notably, in project documents the emphasis is upon the lack of governance 
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and its impact upon market functionality rather than the more political notion 
‘citizenship’.
752 
Notably, in relation to the link between social capital and the KDP, the LLI 
studies that identified the ‘governance gap’ and which were an influential forerunner to 
the KDP (noted above), were part of a broader multi-country study on social capital and 
the ideas of Robert Putnam.
753 The LLI study had other specific findings that 
emphasised the potential within communities, the results of which can be seen as 
influencing the KDP and which effuse a certain fondness for Putnam’s incarnation of 
social capital (see chapter four). For example, one finding demonstrated that 
community-owned projects performed better than government or NGO projects, had 
greater levels of participation of the poor and women, in addition to more significant 
input from villagers.
754 Another finding demonstrated the multi-purpose focus of long-
lasting community organisations in comparison to temporary development project 
organisations. A further finding pointed to disconnection between community 
organising capacities and government and yet another illustrated the benefit to 
communities of ‘…strong leadership and somebody who could play a facilitating role to 
share information, invoke dispute resolution procedures, and help villagers find external 
assistance when that was needed.’
755 Given the demonstration of how the KDP works 
(above) it is not too difficult to see how resonance between such findings and the KDP. 
What is of concern here is the diagnosis of a particular problem via the LLI studies, 
with a particular technical cure, in the form of the KDP, that omits a larger political 
economy analysis of poverty. 
  It is important, however, to be careful not to illustrate the presence of social 
capital in the KDP as just another functional extension of ‘the Bank’s work’ – this 
would be much too convenient an analysis. Indeed, the relationship between social 
capital, the KDP and the Bank needs to be characterised in a more nuanced fashion, 
which reveals much about the Bank’s internal politics. For Guggenheim, social capital 
(the term and concept) was particularly useful for people working in social development 
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of a three-country study to see if the ideas on social capital published in Robert Putnam’s book on 
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within the Bank to talk to the Bank’s power group – the economists – despite his own 
personal scepticism vis-à-vis the concept.
756 Here, in an environment dominated by a 
particular power group within the Bank, a particular language served the social 
development unit personnel to realise certain goals. Interestingly, this use of social 
capital marries up with John Harriss’ discussion of it as a ‘Trojan horse’, where it is 
seen by some as a tool to change the development agenda from ‘the inside’.
757 However, 
in a further interrogation of the KDP below, the very issue of what has been changed, in 
part by using this ‘Trojan Horse’ approach, is addressed further. What is clear is that the 
KDP sits quite comfortably within SIN, with the project actually  demonstrating a 
unique, and temporarily successful, way to deliver it.  
 
Radically unorthodox or radically SIN? 
 
Talking to several people within the SDU of the Bank in Indonesia, one definitely gets 
the impression that there is a push to create change within. But what we must ask 
ourselves here is what really is so different about the KDP in relation to the 
reproduction of neoliberalism? In essence, the answer here relates to policy delivery, 
which brings us back to SIN’s systemic concern for implementation. While the 
governance element within the KDP exhibits a broader focus (mostly outside of official 
documents) upon citizenship than typical World Bank usage, Harriss points out that 
such a conception remains compatible with the World Bank’s broader project, 
especially within the discourse of social capital and its attendant language of 
community development, empowerment and participation. It is worth quoting Harriss’ 
summation of this relationship at length because it really does pertain to the question of 
how the KDP is different as a governance project:
  
 
The point, for the purposes of the present discussion, is that current 
thinking about development is greatly concerned with ‘good government’, 
which is held to mean government that is transparent and accountable, 
working within a clear and consistent legal framework, such as will provide 
the conditions for effective and efficient markets. It is in this context that 
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the ideas about ‘civil society’, ‘decentralization’, ‘participation’ and latterly 
– in some senses the queen of them all, because it embraces them all – 
‘social capital’, have acquired such currency. The basic idea is that through 
‘participation’ in ‘voluntary local associations’ (which may be confused 
with ‘non-governmental organisations’) people are ‘empowered’ in ‘civil 
society’ (defined as the sphere of voluntary rather than ascriptive 
association, that lies outside the state and the family and kinship). A vibrant 
civil society, which implies the presence of a strong sense of civic and 
community responsibility among people, acts both as a vital check upon the 
activities and the agencies of the state, and as a kind of conduit between the 
people and the government. A strong civil society should contain the 
expansion of the state … and will make for ‘good government’ (that is, 
‘democratic’, meaning responsive, accountable and transparent 
government). It is expected, too, that in the context of such a strong civil 
society people will be broadly supportive of the market-led orientation of 
economic policy (which respects their rights to make ‘choices’). …The 
whole set of ideas is pitched specifically against the old ‘top-down’ 
development, which is seen as having failed. It is an extension to the old 
‘Washington consensus’ rather than a radical rethinking of it (‘post’ 
Washington consensus, perhaps, but not ‘past’).
 758 
 
 If we adopt the ‘expanded’ governance framework (that is, even with the expanded 
focus upon citizenship) as a comfortable fit within neoliberalism, the KDP looks more 
like a poster child at the vanguard of SIN – rather than some radical anomaly within it.  
This sentiment is further countenanced when looking at the foci upon 
supervision and monitoring built within the project, which seem an important element 
for generating a local-level form of transparent market discipline. There are both 
internal and external monitoring aspects to the KDP. The internal monitoring is based 
around a Management Information System, which is maintained by a national oversight 
team which compiles information on the KDP and reports on its progress.
759 Externally, 
the Indonesian association of independent journalists, Aliansi Jurnalis Independen 
(AJI), and independent provincial NGOs are contracted to monitor the KDP, with AJI 
the contract allowing journalists to visit KDP sites in order for them to write articles in 
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regional and national newspapers on the project.
760 In this arrangement the journalists 
are seen as a conduit for airing the monitoring activities of NGOs and other civil society 
groups.
761 Additionally, the many village meetings and the scrutiny of procurement of 
materials is also important in this regard.  
This emphasis upon transparency and monitoring, and indeed the KDP’s 
governance focus more broadly, is clearly related to dealing with corruption. Corruption 
is of course a massive problem in Indonesia, both for the Bank and more generally.
762 
However, the question here is whether indeed it is possible to make sustainable changes 
to this fact with a mechanism like KDP, from the bottom-up, where massive economic 
and political asymmetries abound, to alter governance at such levels anyway. At another 
level, the approach mirrors the perspective that extends from the Bank’s analysis of 
problems being country specific, when indeed there are clearly significant issues at very 
different levels to that of ‘the local’. What seems to be facilitated by the KDP is market 
participation with a system of surveillance and monitoring to instil a technically 
‘idyllic’ market where – returning to the language of NIE – transaction costs are low 
and information flows freely.
763 However, the poverty reduction potential of this 
approach is more than open to doubt, as is its capacity to engender lasting change. 
Nevertheless, the way in which KDP deals with corruption within the actual 
program itself is something Guggenheim is clearly keen to point out, especially in 
relation to how it measures up against other development projects previously run by the 
Bank.
764 Elsewhere, he has been more abrupt, emphasising that design principles for 
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CDD (like KDP) projects need to be simple and enforcement needs to be strict. In this 
regard, Guggenheim states: ‘Tough love is the only way to stop a few small mistakes 
becoming pervasive damage to a large-scale development project.’
765 This isn’t just 
tough talk. Guggenheim offers the example of corruption in North Sumatra, where 
rather than ‘doing better next time’, the district was dropped altogether from the 
project.
766 Neoliberal conditionality, then, has moved down from the national level to 
the local.
767 However, despite the monitoring and surveillance aspects of KDP, from the 
point of view of some villagers, corruption was undoubtedly still a problem in KDP and 
in particular facilitators were highlighted as potential perpetrators at the village level.
768 
However, compared to other projects it seems to have a much better reputation in terms 
of levels of corruption.
769  
  Beyond corruption, yet still related to it in several ways, what is sought through 
KDP is support for governance in relation to decentralisation, which the World Bank 
has championed for some time now.
770 Hadiz, like Harriss (above), has noted the 
relationship between decentralisation and the sort of ‘social development’ associated 
with KDP: 
 
Significantly, ‘decentralisation’ has become, along with ‘civil society’, ‘social 
capital’ and ‘good governance’, an integral part of the contemporary neo-
institutionalist  lexicon, especially for those aspects which are intended to draw 
greater attention to ‘social’ development.
771  
 
KDP’s citizenship focus is important here and is part of a project that attempts to instil 
particular behavioural norms and demands to assist in filling the institutional vacuum 
left by the departure of the centralised New Order. When asked about KDP’s potential 
to influence citizenship and the subsequent possibilities for political change at higher 
levels, Guggenheim is keen to reveal that this is the project’s defining intent: 
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Well that’s the sort of guiding idea behind it right [influencing types of 
citizenship and facilitating political change]. It’s not that it can do it by itself, 
but in a big agricultural country, the standard model of political reform is very 
top-down: you get a constitution, then you get a parliament, then they start to 
roll out a series of regulations, eventually they get to the provinces and then 
somewhere down the line they hit the villages. …In…East Timor, Indonesia 
and Afghanistan, I think there’s absolutely no question that the bottom-up 
model is already influencing national politics.
772 
 
In this respect, one of KDP’s key roles (the reader will recall from earlier) is to 
strengthen local government and community institutions, in post-New Order Indonesia.  
Here, participation and empowerment – two important features of both KDP and 
SIN – are intended to play central roles. Participation here means more than it does in 
many Bank projects – with local-level participation being obviously high. Yet the 
following paragraphs on the KDP emphasise that, while the manner in which 
participation is used is different in the program, participation is still related back to 
embedding essentially SIN notions of governance: 
 
In terms of program benefits, villagers report greater access to markets, schools, 
health facilities, clear supply and sanitation, and other economic opportunities.  
There is also increasing evidence of improved local governance and 
community empowerment practices in many KDP areas. KDP has had a 
multiplier effect on approaches to community-level development. For example, 
villages are holding local government more accountable and demanding greater 
transparency within other government-sponsored programs. Villagers are 
transferring KDP procedures and financial management skills to other 
development projects. All these changes signal incremental progress in 
empowering communities and improving the interest and role of local 
government in responding to community needs.
773  
 
Of course, corruption is bad and improved schooling, health facilities and sanitation are 
all highly desirable, as is cheaper infrastructure of a decent quality. But as a 
governance/decentralisation project, the KDP is an expensive (in terms of Indonesian 
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debt) micro-focussed project (with macro objectives) that has everybody watching 
everybody within the dubious poverty alleviation mechanism of the neoliberal market.  
Importantly, questions also remain over the KDP’s sustainability and impact – 
surely a key concern for a program that seeks to reduce poverty through building 
particular institutions. Hadiz, for example, has portrayed a fairly bleak picture of 
Indonesian decentralisation that draws into question the capacities of a program like the 
KDP and SIN, more generally: 
 
Decentralization and democratization in Indonesia have been characterized by 
the emergence of new patterns of highly diffuse and decentralized corruption, 
rule by predatory local officials, the rise of money politics and the 
consolidation of political gangsterism. In the Indonesian context, the main 
question to ask, therefore, is who has benefited most from this decentralization 
and this type of democratic system? 
It is not difficult to identify the beneficiaries. By and large, they are 
individuals and groups who had earlier functioned as the local operators and 
apparatchik of the previous New Order – small to medium-size, but politically 
well-connected business people with big ambitions, as well as an array of the 
regime’s former henchmen and enforcers.
774 
 
Thus, while the KDP has big ambitions in the area of governance it faces formidable 
obstacles, variations of which face any institution building reform project. While the 
KDP’s governance focus goes beyond the version of governance typically associated 
with the Bank, especially its notion of citizenship, the important point is that the 
program never breeches the confines of SIN. In short, the KDP is a large-scale project 
that attempts to reduce poverty by instilling market-compatible norms and institutional 
structures by by-passing government, in environments of often chronic inequality, 
without addressing many of the important economic asymmetries that contribute to 
Indonesia’s situation. 
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The politics of KDP’s development and form 
 
Not surprisingly, a project like KDP has a significant amount of politics associated with 
it both within the Bank (internal) and outside of it (external). Detailing the politics of 
KDP is important here for several reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the limiting and 
facilitating factors that make a project like KDP possible within the Bank. The politics 
within the Bank are important and it is precisely this sort of detail that often goes 
missing in analyses of the organisation’s work – detail which reveals exactly why 
particular projects come about. Here, there are both elements that constrain and 
facilitate the respective agendas and ideas of individuals and groups within the Bank. 
The Bank’s SDU in Indonesia (and elsewhere) has pushed much of what is in KDP, in a 
highly political process where the outcome has been a compromise that concludes in a 
radical approach to delivering SIN.  
Secondly, with a project as large as KDP, with such massive ambitions and 
potential implications attached to it, there are also external political factors (that is, 
those outside the Bank) of significance, right down to the local level. It is important to 
detail these, because many critiques of the Bank actually criticise the Bank what for 
what it supposedly does when it is often more prudent to analyse what it, or elements 
within it, actually attempt to do. Indeed, all sorts of political relationships exist that 
mean the organisation and elements within it often don’t get their way in part or in full. 
We should recall here that the SIN of the PWC is in no small way seen in this thesis as 
attempting to rectify problems of implementation. However, no institutional project is 
immune from politics and the KDP is certainly no exception. Here, it is critical to 
understand those factors that make it possible or impossible to implement, maintain and 
sustain the impact of a project like the KDP. 
  It is perhaps best to begin this section by looking at the internal political story of 
KDP. Interestingly, much of this tale mirrors what was covered in chapter two (which 
looked at SIN’s ascendancy). Critical here is the illustration of the role of the social 
development elements within the Bank and their relationship to other groups (the 
economists and Wolfensohn for example). The KDP, in no small way, is associated 
with the ascendancy of this group and their promotion of particular themes that resonate 
throughout SIN (such as participation and partnership). Indeed, KDP is very much tied A SINFUL APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION? 
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to the SDU in the Indonesia country office of the Bank, and in particular to 
Guggenheim himself.
775 
However, the trail that leads to KDP goes back to certain broader machinations 
within the Bank which have undoubtedly influenced it also. In earlier chapters of the 
thesis, the themes that have been pushed by the Bank’s social development staff have 
been highlighted as important in contributing to the formation of the SIN. In relation to 
much of the work on social capital (not to mention empowerment, and participation and 
so on), ideas which permeate KDP, the Bank’s Social Development Network (SDN) has 
been an important locus of ideas and debates within the Bank.
776 Crucially here, 
Wolfensohn was obviously drawn to the area of the SDN, promoting ideas associated 
with it, and in turn, ideas behind the KDP. As Guggenheim unambiguously notes: 
 
I think the single biggest factor that was behind KDP in the Bank was 
Wolfensohn and the fact that he was pushing very much all this language about 
participation and grass roots development – but no one really knew, very well, 
how you go about doing those things. He had made a number of openings 
which I think triggered a lot of what ended up becoming KDP. The first of 
these was [that] he was pretty interested in this notion of what can social 
development contribute to development overall and he commissioned this 
presidential taskforce on new entry points… . The most important part of that is 
it sends a signal to everyone else in the Bank that he wants to see more of this 
kind of thing.
777 
 
Guggenheim also highlights the work Wolfensohn did towards working with NGOs and 
the staff ‘grassroots emersion’ programs (where many staff without field experience 
were sent into the field) as important in sending signals that nobody within the Bank 
could ignore. These, in turn, are seen as important for helping to ‘set the stage’ for 
KDP:   
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It was the same with the work he did with NGOs, even though they eventually 
turned against him. In the beginning it was a signal that everybody had to deal 
with. A third example of that is the grassroots emersion programs, which is 
hysterical because you see what hypocrites these Bank economists were, saying 
what a life-changing experience it was after 11 hours [in the field] – 
nevertheless it was sending a signal and the signals were all in the same 
direction – the Bank’s gone too far towards abstract analysis, top-down 
planning. He wanted to see much more bottom-up. So he set the stage.
778 
 
Additionally, in Indonesia, Guggenheim notes other factors that assisted KDP coming 
into being. Important in this regard, was that there was already a ‘cluster of people who 
were either sort of socially progressive or interested in grassroots participation (or knew 
how to make a project really function)’.
779 For example, one particular person, who now 
works with the Ministry of Home Affairs on KDP and who was interviewed for this 
thesis, was part of this cluster and was involved in the Village Infrastructure Project 
(VIP), the technical aspects of which were to be part of KDP.
780 
Crucially, though, these ‘internal’ political factors assisting KDP’s rise collided 
with external factors (outside the Bank) and the global political economy – especially 
the onset of the Asian crisis and the impact that this had upon the Bank’s projects in 
Indonesia and the country’s post-New Order transition:  
 
What brought all this together was essentially two things. One was the Bank’s 
program here – because it was a big structural program – was very line agency 
based. So when the crisis hit every single project collapsed. Growth had been 
so sustained that the safety net system they had in the fifties had fallen apart 
and nobody knew how to put it back together again. So KDP initially had an 
opening because it had appeals to the Bank on the empowerment side and 
appeals to the government because they didn’t have too many choices. And 
ever since then I would say that the guiding framework for what happened in 
KDP is this notion of Indonesia’s transition.
781 
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KDP developed amidst crises (both in Indonesia and for neoliberalism more 
generally).
782 As Guggenheim has pointed out in a paper, the timing of KDP was vital, 
explaining how it was possible to get the Bank to both move beyond financing 
highways and irrigation while getting the New Order regime to borrow money ‘…to 
bypass its own bureaucracy, assign paralegals to rural villages, and pay independent 
journalists to publish newspaper stories on development corruption’.
783 The World 
Bank had worked closely with the Suharto government and had a record that was the 
target of NGO’s – especially in regard to the transmigration programmes and a dam that 
displaced over 35,000 villagers.
784 Further to this, the Bank’s analysis, monitoring and 
reporting on Indonesia was seen wanting when the crisis hit, revealing ‘the fragility and 
corruption of the financial system’.
785 
  A clarifying note should be made here on the KDP’s receptivity within the 
Bank, which hasn’t been all positive. As Victor Bottini (Community Development 
Specialist in the SDU) noted to me, some sectors within the Bank – in particular the 
rural development sector within Washington – are less receptive to the program than 
others.
786 For him this was partly a ‘turf war’ and partly a concern over 
‘backstop/technical issues’ over what the problems were and how they should be 
tackled.
787 Bottini also mentioned that the rural development people in Washington had 
some concerns over how KDP functioned.
788  
Furthermore, when quizzed about the KDP in relation to the rest of the projects 
in the Bank’s portfolio and how the differences between these get managed, 
Guggenheim effuses the opinion that there is still a lack of uptake upon institutional 
factors by Bank economists:  
 
No – it has to [be managed] – it’s a constant problem. The Bank’s power 
groups – which are essentially the macro-economists – they could get rid of the 
whole ‘real sector’ and just do budget reports. They would love that. …The 
problem is that the theory they manage essentially explains away institutional 
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variables and it also doesn’t explain how they happen – so it becomes very 
clearly illogical. …A lot of the institutional and policy reforms that the macro 
guys want – they come from experience in macro-finance [where] in finance 
five guys can control the money supply. That’s not true with how local 
governments function. So a basic policy strategy that depends on, legislation, 
new regulations and that’s it is in pretty much direct conflict with something 
that says it has to be much more direct engagement with why people behave the 
way they do. And so we have to deal with that constantly.
789 
 
Nevertheless, the current Country Director for the Bank in Indonesia, Andrew Steer, the 
previous country director, the vice-president and Wolfensohn were all very supportive 
of KDP, with the Vice-President and the Country Director almost being ‘too supportive’ 
– mentioning the project all the time.
790 Further to this, specific bilateral donors (such as 
DfID) have developed a significant amount of trust of the SDU which has allowed the 
Unit extra funding and autonomy.
791 
  The operation of KDP has not been immune from external political factors – 
which should be unsurprising given its structure and its institutionally ambitious 
objectives. Setting it up, Guggenheim points out that there was no real opposition at the 
national level within government.
792 The real opposition for KDP was at the middle 
level of government – where KDP was really going to shake things up:  
 
At the middle level there was a tremendous amount of opposition by kabupaten 
[regency or district level]governments who felt that it was bypassing them, and 
camats [head of the kecamatan] who thought the same thing. Kabupaten, 
because it bypassed them financially and camats because it bypassed them 
organisationally.
793  
 
Additional to the mid-level impediments to KDP, politically there were issues at the 
national level within the Department of Public Works, which wanted everything to go 
through them, although this wasn’t a huge issue because of links between BAPPENAS 
and the Department.
794 Bottini, adds to this that there was resistance from local 
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government too, which is not present anymore.
795 For him, presently the biggest 
problems faced by KDP are in Jakarta with mid-level bureaucrats who dislike the 
consultants and facilitators involved in the program. He sees the sentiment towards 
KDP at ministerial level as supportive, yet offers that the government suffers from both 
a lack of capacity (even though the middle-level bureaucrats would like power) and is 
‘gun shy’ after decentralisation.
796 
  Over time though, resistance to KDP has shifted, with resistance from the 
middle levels of government outside of Jakarta now turning into support – especially 
financial support. Interestingly, as it has scaled up quickly (taking many by surprise) it 
has drawn resistance from sections within BAPPENAS because of what Guggenheim 
calls a ‘nationalist backlash going on that’s tied to a reaction against a previous deputy 
director of BAPPENAS, Tatag Wiranto, who was heavily associated with the KDP’s 
development and earlier projects.
797 Wiranto himself is critical of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in relation to KDP suggesting that there are problems with its management – 
especially the fact that the people in important positions within the ministry change all 
the time.
798 In particular, while resistance from the Department of Public Works 
(mentioned above) has declined, new resistance from sections of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (the government agency responsible for KDP) has emerged towards KDP 
because of ministry’s desire for everything associated with KDP go through a single 
budgetary transfer system.
799  
One final note should be made about NGOs and KDP. What is interesting here 
is that generally the KDP receives little flak from NGOs that might normally be 
antagonistic to a World Bank project – especially a large one. For Guggenheim, NGOs 
essentially are split between those that are  
 
generally favourable and…the fire-breather NGOs who can never support any 
foreign project [yet], [who] think that it’s probably less bad than most of them 
but wildly overrated. But [these NGOs think that] if you’re going to oppose [a 
project] this is not one you’re going to oppose. We have such garbage coming 
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in on big dams and highways – picking on a community project [isn’t a high 
priority].
800  
 
Clearly, figures within the Indonesian development bureaucracy played 
important roles in both KDP and the projects that fed into it.
801 Bank staff also noted to 
me that Guggenheim has had good connections with people within the Indonesian 
development bureaucracy, implying KDP and the SDU had significantly benefited from 
this.
802 Interestingly enough, though, while one Indonesian bureaucrat, Gunawan 
Sumodiningrat (who emphasised his conceptual involvement in the projects that fed 
into KDP and KDP itself), was very positive about KDP – he singled out the Bank for 
being too interventionist – especially in regard to ‘technical assistance’. In relation to 
one Bank official in particular (interviewed and quoted in this chapter), Sumodiningrat 
noted that this individual led the Bank to intervene too much with local consultants 
(disempowering them). Sumodiningrat also offered that members of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs ‘followed’ along with this same person.
803 Wiranto also noted some 
intervention on the part of the Bank, in relation to consultants that complicated the 
project, although his emphasis was more upon the ‘bureaucratic’ complication that the 
Bank added.
804 
What is particularly evident in the analysis of KDP’s development and form is 
that a unique political environment within the Bank and outside it provided the 
opportunity for the project to get off the ground and for it to be implemented. This 
explains how a rather radical looking project was possible within the halls of orthodoxy 
(within the Bank) and within Indonesia. However, we must be certain as to what is so 
radical about KDP. Crucially, KDP is careful not to breach the walls of orthodoxy. 
Indeed, it can be seen as a method by which, at least in the short-term and when 
conditions are conducive, to achieve the very implementation goals that SIN is so 
attached to.  
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Conclusion 
 
As a key ‘poverty reduction’ project for the Bank, KDP fundamentally attempts to build 
and reform institutions, en masse, around government, in a way that exhibits strong 
market-focused tendencies – yet without dealing with broader structural issues relating 
to poverty. What is particularly radical about it is its approach to reform delivery. Here, 
the politics of KDP, internal and external, explain how crises within and without, along 
with the juncture of particular theoretical perspectives (especially that of social capital) 
and the influence of specific individuals (such as Wolfensohn, Guggenheim and others) 
collided to make the program possible.  
Importantly, while KDP’s impact upon poverty reduction is still open to 
question, it does seem to be having real impacts on modes of behaviour, at least in the 
short-term. Whether these can be sustained and turned into substantive reductions in 
poverty is, however, another matter. This raises issues that not only relate to the logic 
that associates improvements of governance with reductions in poverty but with the 
very longevity of such governance reforms. Interestingly, on the question of whether the 
efforts oriented towards governance associated with the KDP can be overturned, 
Guggenheim is more than clear:  
  
No I think all of these can be eroded. Again it comes back to your political 
economy. Can a strong elite erode even a strong KDP – yeah, well actually they 
can. They can erode it – this happens everywhere – communities that have been 
spending three hundred years together are suddenly at each other’s throats. So 
why wouldn’t something that you learnt from KDP be susceptible to that too.
805 
 
What is evident though is that KDP in essence attempts to facilitate, albeit in a very 
inclusive manner, market participation of the poor while implementing a SIN-
compatible governance agenda. To this end, KDP could be an effective element – given 
its short-term capacity to be implemented – in securing the Bank’s proletarianisation 
project rather than facilitating the poor ascend from poverty. One possible outcome of 
KDP might just be that it ends up creating low-level, production-focussed hamlets 
servicing the needs of domestic and foreign capital, with little prospect of reducing 
poverty substantively, if at all. This is not to say that this is what the KDP’s architects 
consciously intended – people like Guggenheim and others clearly have genuine social 
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justice concerns. However, the problem is that the KDP has to fit within the dominant 
paradigm of SIN – a paradigm that has yet to prove itself adept at poverty reduction. 
This brings us back to the SIN of the PWC more generally and what 
distinguishes it as a new form of neoliberalism. Crucially, what is different about SIN is 
its approach to delivering its reform set. That different types of delivery devices and 
incarnations of political technology within SIN are possible is conditioned by political 
factors at various levels, as the analysis above makes clear. However, the reform 
content delivered by these devices and technologies remains eerily homogenised in line 
with SIN constraints. While particular project architects, such as Guggenheim, may 
have broader conceptions than the Bank of what governance entails, this doesn’t shape a 
project anywhere nearly as strongly as the need to adhere to the broader SIN 
framework. Essential in this regard is the need of satisfying the Bank’s ‘power group’ 
(the economists) with the adoption of a particular language (that associated with social 
capital) and a project that satisfies important SIN fundamentals. Thus, the very limits of 
SIN are apparent. Indeed, this begs questions about the capacity for generating change 
from within such an arrangement. While change to delivery is evident, change to the 
reform set being delivered seems nigh on impossible while SIN is ascendant.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
On March 31, 2005, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors unanimously 
endorsed the former US Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, as President of the 
World Bank. The very mention that Wolfowitz, a key architect of the Iraq War, was to 
be nominated by George W. Bush for the Bank presidency raised the hackles of many, 
both within and outside the Bank.
806 The nomination and subsequent appointment of 
Wolfowitz resonated somewhat with the earlier appointment of former US Defense 
Secretary, Robert McNamara, a Bank president who also harboured a hawkish past. 
However, the Bank that Wolfowitz took over in mid-2005 had changed significantly 
since McNamara’s time. When McNamara left the Bank, neoliberalism had yet to truly 
spread its wings within development policy. By Wolfowitz’s arrival, two and half 
decades later, neoliberalism’s hegemony over the Bank was obvious.
807 Further to this, 
neoliberalism’s form – especially as it related to development policy – throughout the 
1980s and 1990s had remained far from static. Indeed, it had shifted substantively. 
  Crucial in generating this shift was pressure arising from neoliberalism’s social 
impacts on the one hand and the existing means for politically managing this to 
maintain the legitimacy of market-led solutions to development problems. As we saw in 
chapter two, the early application of neoliberalism in the 1980s faced significant 
problems – both in terms of implementation and outcome. In the 1990s, neoliberalism 
encountered several massive problems in practice and dilemmas of explanation, 
especially in relation to the Russian transformation, the Asian ‘miracle’ and its 
subsequent collapse. In total, these and other problems generated a crisis of legitimacy 
for market-led development to which responses from within the walls of neoliberalism 
were both produced and contested. Within the Bank itself, problems associated with 
structural adjustment, the impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects and issues 
relating to implementation were increasingly addressed with an expanding focus upon 
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the role of institutions and specific methods and processes to assist with embedding 
Bank prescriptions. Here, the incorporation of foci such as participation and partnership, 
stemming from within the social development section of the Bank, were notable 
beacons, signalling operational change. In particular, during James Wolfensohn’s 
tenure, significant organisational shifts occurred that, at least on the surface, seemed to 
signal a move away from the Washington consensus and structural adjustment. With the 
arrival of Stiglitz at the Bank, this push appeared even more dramatic, with battles 
within neoliberalism clearly apparent. 
  It is however essential that we understand the precise policy shifts that have 
occurred and their place within a broader political project. Crucially, that project 
includes new political technologies that are expressly used to alter notions of political 
participation and, indeed, citizenship in an attempt to embed a new form of neoliberal 
state. In essence, this project attempts to narrowly channel political participation in both 
the development process and, indeed, competition over the particular form that the state 
takes, towards the greater task of subjecting society to the disciplines of the market. In 
order to understand this attempt to transform the form and rationale of political rule an 
adequate framework is needed to scrutinise the methods and impact of the project, or 
more specifically, to comprehend the PWC in practice. 
While protagonists such as Stiglitz have advocated a particular conception of the 
PWC and critics have in turn tackled it, neither assist us sufficiently in understanding 
the PWC as a fundamentally political project that attempts to change the very politics 
associated with the state’s reconstitution. To this end, it is critical that our analysis shifts 
from a technocratic assessment of institutional policy prescriptions to comprehend the 
transformation of politics and, specifically, citizenship so deeply intertwined with the 
implementation of PWC’s prescriptions. Indeed, what has been particularly neglected in 
critical analyses of the PWC has been the application of new approaches to 
transforming both the state and society in a market-compatible image. In sharp contrast 
with the technocratic evaluations of policy success or failure from both custodians and 
critics of the PWC, the case has been made that the PWC constitutes the promotion of a 
new form of neoliberalism – SIN – which essentially applies new methods towards state 
transformation, in the interest of subjecting states, societies and individuals to the 
disciplining dictates (following Gill)
808 of the liberal market. To this end, SIN is not so 
much about critically revisiting the core assumptions of neoliberal development policy 
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as it is about new methods to embed market-based societies, based around new 
institutional prescriptions which seek to transform the state and that both embody and 
attempt to propagate liberal market ideology.  
Indeed, and this is a vital point, the ideological aspects of SIN may well outlive 
and outshine the World Bank’s immediate attempts at structural reform. For example, 
while the notions of participation and partnership embodied within the Bank’s work 
face certain impediments in embedding structural reforms, they nevertheless play an 
important role in enmeshing and normalising new modes of governance that seek to 
contain political conflict and build consensus around the market project. Here, 
participatory processes are subordinated to the hierarchically dominant task of 
implementing market discipline, involving a very specific conceptualisation of politics. 
Further to this, SIN’s ideological impact is evident in its increasing influence upon 
policy makers (both in the global north and south), which seems somewhat autonomous 
of its actual implementation travails. Notable in this regard is the seemingly ever-
ascending influence of the good governance discourse, the incidence of market 
extension projects (such as public-private partnerships), and the market contextualising 
of social relationships (through the language of social capital), health and education 
(human capital). Here, SIN has obviously played a significant role in shaping the very 
terrain over which political contestation is fought and the boundaries of that battle. Put 
another way, SIN has been influential in significantly narrowing the ideational 
spectrum, limiting possible policy options and the political processes associated with 
them. 
Structurally, SIN proponents allocate the state a central role. Crucially, SIN is 
explicitly concerned with establishing a liberal-market compatible state in the interest of 
facilitating economic efficiency. From this perspective the state constitutes a bundle of 
institutions that should serve the market by providing incentive structures to market 
participants which, following NIE, lower transaction costs and reduce information 
asymmetries. However, this reconceptualisation of the state and its attempted 
application is a highly political project. As was made evident in chapter three, the 
general characterisation of the relationship between institutions and market efficiency 
that is associated with NIE undervalues both the politics of markets and other 
institutions. This said, the Bank’s application of SIN, and in particular its political, 
technologies, demonstrates an acute appreciation of the political nature of institutions 
(both the structures that the Bank intends to embed and those which it confronts).  CONCLUSION 
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However, following social conflict theory, because institutions embody 
struggles between societal forces differentially affected by liberal market structures, the 
political exercise attempted through SIN is not without its problems. SIN’s political 
technologies are specifically designed to manage the tensions between societal and state 
forces – which include NGOs, domestic and transnational capitalists, government 
departments and local politicians – and neoliberalism. Yet, these diverse interests, 
which are regularly not in harmony with one another, are often not easily reconciled 
with SIN’s broader task. While the attempt by the Bank to engage ‘civil society’ is an 
indicator that the organisation is actually acutely aware of the political nature of reform, 
the often diverging interests noted above mean that this engagement has definite limits 
in aiding with the implementation of neoliberal reform and it remains to be seen just 
how successful the Bank’s new political technologies are at both containing and 
reconciling these over time. This suggests significant ongoing issues of legitimacy for 
neoliberalism – even in its most recent form. While SIN’s various delivery devices and 
political technologies attempt to deal with some of these implementation issues, their 
narrowly functional concern with implementation of SIN’s market-focused tenets, 
which generate their own tensions, clearly reveals their respective limitations.  
  In chapter six, the evident implementation issues bring into question the capacity 
for implementing NIE assumptions and the issue of public support for the process of 
market extension. The case of the privatisation of Manila’s water services, in which the 
Bank’s IFC played a leading technical assistance role, demonstrated the manner in 
which big interests and neoliberal ideology coalesced to make the undertaking of reform 
possible. Big domestic and international capital came together, assisted by government 
(foreign and domestic) to push for privatisation of the MWSS, in an environment where 
the Philippine Government was already committed to neoliberalism. While this meant 
that the process went forward, the manner in which it unfolded illustrated the way that 
particular interests make SIN reform extremely difficult to implement in its ideal form. 
Rather than generating big efficiency gains for the public, massive problems with water 
provision persisted and the state actually had to step in and pick up the pieces of one 
concession. Yet, despite these technical failures in the Bank’s project, the delivery 
device of ‘technical assistance’ constituted an effective element in realising institutional 
transformation and the concomitant shift in political power associated with the 
commodification of utilities.   CONCLUSION 
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In chapter seven we saw how participation and partnership, as political 
technologies, were incorporated by the Bank into the development of the CAS for the 
Philippines and its implementation. What was clear was that these political technologies 
were to be used for building consensus around SIN policies. This use of participation 
and partnership illustrates that the Bank understands that reform is a political exercise. 
That particular groups – especially those representing class-based interests, such as 
labour and the poor – often chose to exclude themselves from the Bank’s attempts at 
‘participatory’ work does, however, indicate the limits of such technologies. Indeed, 
reconciling the divergent interests of the Bank and its prescriptions with many of these 
groups seems simply impossible. Yet, this runs both ways, with the Bank demonstrating 
an ability to attract some support for its project, where interests were congenial or 
perceived as such, in the Philippine setting. The crucial point here is that, while as 
political technologies designed to embed the new basics of SIN participation and 
partnership might have limited success in addressing poverty (which the Bank is 
mandated to do), they are significant attempts at narrowing political contestation over 
neoliberalism. In short, participation and partnership attempt to orientate the process of 
state transformation, the key objective of SIN, away from contestation towards 
consensus, specifically around market foci.  
Finally, the delivery device of the KDP (covered in chapter eight) included an 
attempt to redefine citizenship in a liberal market-compatible way through notions of 
‘community empowerment’. Importantly, in some contrast to the reform impediments 
faced by other Bank projects, the KDP has fostered new patterns of political 
participation that eschew broader scrutiny of the power relations of the market and 
which are confined to seemingly technocratic refinements related to program 
effectiveness. This demonstrates the fundamental argument of this thesis that the 
primary purpose of the PWC’s programs is political: fostering market norms through 
new delivery devices and political technologies. Importantly, though, we should be 
clear that the political sustainability of the shift in norms that the program has 
engendered is open to significant challenge – a point even conceded by the program’s 
architect. Furthermore, and related, the program’s connection with poverty reduction 
needs to be looked at over time. Given the KDP’s debt-based structure that works 
within the confines of SIN, the program may well just be another element that further 
entrenching existing economic asymmetries. This has obvious potential legitimacy CONCLUSION 
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implications of the kind that played such a critical role in the rise of the KDP, and 
indeed SIN more generally.   
So where does this leave us with SIN and the World Bank? The thesis suggests 
that SIN’s capacity to realise state transformation is limited, though far from 
inconsequential. Furthermore, where it is implemented its capacity to substantively 
reduce poverty is highly questionable. Indeed, it harbours the distinct possibility of 
furthering the proletarianisation of the world’s poor through a market-led notion of 
empowerment. In this approach the individual is still supposed to take responsibility for 
his or her empowerment, aided by a state that is supposed to present the institutional 
incentives necessary to facilitate an ideal-as-possible liberal market. As we have seen in 
the foregoing analysis there is much ambiguity over SIN’s potential. This 
predominately relates to the ability of organisations like the Bank to transform the state 
in an ‘ideal’ SIN form, and, when some transformation does occur, to clearly yield the 
results to which SIN is linked (such as poverty reduction). Yet, despite these issues, it is 
perhaps SIN’s ideological impact that may well constitute the key legacy of the Bank’s 
work, rather than its attempt at direct institutional change in an ideal socio-institutional 
neoliberal image. Indeed, SIN’s persistent dominance within development circles seems 
indicative of this.  
Whether SIN evolves significantly further in relation to conflict, crisis and 
contradiction is yet to be seen. While Wolfowitz’s nomination was greeted with much 
scepticism, interestingly we haven’t seen a vast change in the adherence by the Bank to 
SIN. If anything, the negligible change at the Bank during Wolfowitz’s brief period as 
President is indicative of SIN’s hegemony. However, the very same pressures of 
legitimacy, crisis and conflict that propelled SIN into such a position within 
development policy could bring this into question, requiring the legitimising efforts of 
neoliberals to continue to alter and/or embellish SIN’s form.  
 
Further applications for the framework: The World Bank and beyond 
 
The thesis has demonstrated just how important a framework that looks deeply into the 
very politics of implementation is in understanding the PWC and what an organisation 
like the Bank does in practice. Crucially, this reveals much about the nature of what is 
different about the PWC compared to the Washington consensus and what has changed 
at the Bank. The framework – which draws in variously social conflict theory, new 
materialist and (to a lesser extent) neo-Gramscian approaches – also elucidates how CONCLUSION 
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power is central to understanding the organisational and institutional form of PWC 
programs and the factors shaping the PWC’s political sustainability. Significant 
potential exists to apply the framework developed here to analyse other instances of 
SIN promoted by the Bank, other organisations and governments. 
For instance, the World Bank’s Country Development Partnerships (CDPs) that 
it runs in Thailand could be explored as further evidence of the operation of SIN’s 
different delivery devices in particular political and economic contexts. Importantly, the 
CDPs, which are classed around specific SIN themes, are examples of a form of 
delivery device that may indeed become more prevalent in years to come.
809 In the 
CDPs we see an interesting instance of a country turning towards the Bank for advice 
on policy without the inherent leverage that the Bank has in the lender/borrower 
relationship.
810 The Bank’s monopoly on development knowledge allows it to attempt 
to maintain a presence in non-borrowing, so-called middle-income countries to extend 
its version of development. The CDPs can be understood as concrete examples of the 
Bank’s ability to adapt mechanisms to a particular country by sheer virtue of its 
capabilities and organisational position.
811 Critically, despite the minimal leverage 
involved with the CDPs, these partnerships are exercises in politics ushered in under the 
guise of depoliticisation.
 812  
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In terms of the application of the framework developed in the thesis to non-Bank 
work there are potentially many different areas where this could prove useful. The work 
of bilateral donor organisations and other multilateral organisations (such as the ADB) 
are obvious targets. However, there is no reason why the framework cannot also be 
applied to the attempted delivery of neoliberal policies in developed countries. Indeed, 
in this environment we see government embracing different sorts of devices for 
delivering neoliberal reform and drawing upon various technologies to attempt to 
embed it. In this way, the efforts and methods of some western governments to remodel 
elements of their own states could benefit from the application of the framework to 
illustrate the manner in which reform is attempted and why. The framework could also 
assist in an assessment of reform implementation and outcome in such situations. What 
is essential in this analysis is that the role of both interests and ideology – which have 
been at the centre of this thesis – are central. 
                                                                                                                                               
involved in the CDPs include the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), AusAID, USAID, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
and others. Each CDP has different compositions of Thai government agencies and external and 
internal partners associated with it.  
The Asia-Europe Meeting is described on both the EU website and the World Bank website as 
an informal arrangement for dialogue and cooperation on political, economic and cultural issues 
relating to Europe and Asia. Its members are EU member states, the European Commission and thirteen 
Asian countries. The ASEM Trust Fund was established after the 1997 Asian Crisis after being decided 
upon at the London Summit of ASEM in April 1998. The fund was intended to provide finance for 
technical assistance, advice regarding the restructuring of the financial sector and attention to poverty 
and provides funding for many projects. The World Bank administers the ASEM Trust Fund. 
Interestingly, the process that approves submitted proposals ensures that the Bank retains macro-control 
of the direction of the initiative in two ways – both of which are tied to the CAS (covered in chapter 
four). Firstly, each initiative is reviewed, endorsed and proritised to ensure that it is in line with the 
Bank’s CAS for that Country and the ASEM Country Strategy Note (CSN). Secondly, the CSN itself is 
designed to ‘…guide the ASEM TF’s [Trust Fund’s] assistance in the grant recipient countries within 
the over-all CAS framework’. See World Bank, ‘ASEM Trust Fund FAQs’, available online:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/ASEM/0,,c
ontentMDK:50004544~menuPK:64018259~pagePK:64018272~piPK:64018284~theSitePK:277456,00
.html, accessed May 13, 2005; 
European Union, ‘The ASEM Process,  Background’, available online:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/other_activities/eco_pillar.htm#4)%20ASEM%20Tr
ust%20Fund , accessed May 13, 2005; 
European Union, ‘ASEM Key Issues, Economic Pillar’ , available online: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/other_activities/eco_pillar.htm#4)%20ASEM%20Tr
ust%20Fund, accessed May 13, 2005; World Bank, ‘Country Development Partnerships’.  
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